toggle visibility Search & Display Options

Select All    Deselect All
 |   | 
Details
   print
  Records Links
Author Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title A comment on Lafleur et al.'s re-evaluation of mate-choice copying in guppies Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1998 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 56 Issue 2 Pages 513-514  
  Keywords  
  Abstract  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number Serial 1812  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Dugatkin, L.A. url  doi
openurl 
  Title Breaking up fights between others: a model of intervention behaviour Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1998 Publication Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences Abbreviated Journal Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B  
  Volume 265 Issue 1394 Pages 433-437  
  Keywords  
  Abstract To examine when and why animals break up fights between others in their group, I modelled whether ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ effects might be one element driving the evolution of intervention behaviour. I considered one particular type of intervention: when the intervener simply breaks up fights between two others, but does not favour either party in so doing. When victories at time T + 1 are more likely given a victory at time T (i.e. winner effects), intervention is often favoured. Intervention is favoured in these circumstances because the intervening party in essence stops others from ‘getting on a roll’ and climbing up any hierarchy that exists. However, when loser effects alone are at work (defeats at time T + 1 are more likely given a defeat at time T), breaking up fights between others is never selected. If both winner and loser effects are operating simultaneously, then the likelihood of intervention behaviour evolving is a function of the relative strength of these two effects. The greater the winner effect relative to the loser effect, the more likely intervention behaviour is to evolve.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes 10.1098/rspb.1998.0313 Approved no  
  Call Number Equine Behaviour @ team @ Serial 5240  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma: towards testable models of mutualism versus reciprocity Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1997 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 54 Issue 3 Pages 551-557  
  Keywords  
  Abstract For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of `pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 480  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title Winner and loser effects and the structure of dominance hierarchies Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1997 Publication Behavioral Ecology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol.  
  Volume 8 Issue 6 Pages 583-587  
  Keywords  
  Abstract In the literature on dominance hierarchies, “winner” and “loser” effects usually are denned as an increased probability of winning at time T, bated on victories at time T-l, T-2, etc, and an increased probability of losing at time T, based on losing at T-1, T-2, etc., respectively. Despite some early theoretical work on winner and loser effects, these factors and how they affect the structure of dominance hierarchies have not been examined in detail. I developed a computer simulation to examine winner and loser effects when such effects are independent of one another (as well as when they interact) and when combatants assess each other's resource-holding power. When winner effects alone were important, a hierarchy in which all individuals held an unambiguous rank was found. When only loser effects were important, a dear alpha individual always emerged, but the rank of others in the group was often unclear because of the scarcity of aggressive interactions. Increasing winner effects for a given value of the loser effect increase the number of individuals with unambiguous positions in a hierarchy and the converse is true for increasing the value of the loser effect for a given winner effect Although winner and loser effects have been documented in a number of species, no study has documented both winner and loser effects (using some controlled, pairwise testing system) and the detailed nature of behavioral interactions when individuals are in groups. I hope the results of this model will spur such studies in the future.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes 10.1093/beheco/8.6.583 Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 759  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Wilson, D.S.; Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title A reply to Lombardi & Hurlbert Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1996 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 52 Issue 2 Pages 423-425  
  Keywords  
  Abstract No abstract  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 475  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Mesterton-Gibbons, M. url  doi
openurl 
  Title Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1996 Publication Biosystems Abbreviated Journal Biosystems  
  Volume 37 Issue 1-2 Pages 19-30  
  Keywords By-product mutualism; Cooperative behavior; Fish; Reciprocal altruism; Trait-group selection  
  Abstract Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 481  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M. url  doi
openurl 
  Title Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1996 Publication Biosystems Abbreviated Journal Biosystems  
  Volume 37 Issue 1-2 Pages 49-66  
  Keywords Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism  
  Abstract To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 483  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Dugatkin, L.A. url  doi
openurl 
  Title Tit for Tat, by-product mutualism and predator inspection: a reply to Connor Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1996 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 51 Issue 2 Pages 455-457  
  Keywords  
  Abstract  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 487  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title Toward a theory of dominance hierarchies: effects of assessment, group size, and variation in fighting ability Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1995 Publication Behavioral Ecology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol.  
  Volume 6 Issue 4 Pages 416-423  
  Keywords  
  Abstract We introduce assessment to the analysis of dominance hierarchies by exploring the effect of an evolutionarily stable fighting rule when there is variation in resource holding potential (RHP) and RHP is not a perfectly reliable predictor of the outcome of a fight. With assessment, the probability of a linear hierarchy decreases with group size but can remain appreciable for groups of up to seven or eight individuals, whereas it decreases virtually to zero if there is no assessment. The probability of a hierarchy that correlates perfectly with RHP is low unless group size is small.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes 10.1093/beheco/6.4.416 Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 447  
Permanent link to this record
 

 
Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Hoglund, J. url  doi
openurl 
  Title Delayed breeding and the evolution of mate copying in lekking species Type Journal Article
  Year (down) 1995 Publication Journal of Theoretical Biology Abbreviated Journal J. Theor. Biol.  
  Volume 174 Issue 3 Pages 261-267  
  Keywords  
  Abstract Recent experimental evidence indicates that females may copy the mate choice of others. Here, we present a model for the evolution of mate copying strategies in lekking species. In the model, all females (copiers and non-copiers) assess male quality, but a copier's assessment of a male's quality increases after males have mated with other females. The model demonstrates that mate copying is favored when breeding late in the season has a relatively high cost. We hope that our results will spur empirical work quantifying the time constraints associated with breeding, thus allowing more direct tests of the model's predictions.  
  Address  
  Corporate Author Thesis  
  Publisher Place of Publication Editor  
  Language Summary Language Original Title  
  Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title  
  Series Volume Series Issue Edition  
  ISSN ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial 482  
Permanent link to this record
Select All    Deselect All
 |   | 
Details
   print