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Author |
Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Title |
A comment on Lafleur et al.'s re-evaluation of mate-choice copying in guppies |
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Journal Article |
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1998 |
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Animal Behaviour. |
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Anim. Behav. |
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56 |
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2 |
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513-514 |
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1812 |
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Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M. |
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Title |
Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
1996 |
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Biosystems |
Abbreviated Journal |
Biosystems |
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37 |
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1-2 |
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49-66 |
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Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism |
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To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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483 |
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Dugatkin, L.A.; Mesterton-Gibbons, M. |
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Title |
Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
1996 |
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Biosystems |
Abbreviated Journal |
Biosystems |
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37 |
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1-2 |
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19-30 |
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By-product mutualism; Cooperative behavior; Fish; Reciprocal altruism; Trait-group selection |
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Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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481 |
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Author |
Dugatkin, L.A.; Bekoff, M. |
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Title |
Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model |
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Journal Article |
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2003 |
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Behavioural Processes |
Abbreviated Journal |
Behav. Process. |
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60 |
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3 |
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209-214 |
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Play; Fairness; Game theory |
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Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness. |
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refbase @ user @ |
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488 |
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Johnstone, R.A.; Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Title |
Coalition formation in animals and the nature of winner and loser effects |
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Journal Article |
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2000 |
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Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences |
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Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. |
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267 |
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1438 |
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17-21 |
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Coalition formation has been documented in a diverse array of taxa, yet there has been little formal analysis of polyadic interactions such as coalitions. Here, we develop an optimality model which examines the role of winner and loser effects in shaping coalition formation. We demonstrate that the predicted patterns of alliances are strongly dependent on the way in which winner and loser effects change with contestant strength. When winner and loser effects decrease with the resource-holding power (RHP) of the combatants, coalitions will be favoured between the strongest members of a group, but not between the weakest. If, in contrast, winner and loser effects increase with RHP, exactly the opposite predictions emerge. All other things being equal, intervention is more likely to prove worthwhile when the beneficiary of the aid is weaker (and its opponent is stronger), because the beneficiary is then less likely to win without help. Consequently, intervention is more probable when the impact of victory on the subsequent performance of a combatant increases with that individual's strength because this selects for intervention in favour of weaker combatants. The published literature on hierarchy formation does not reveal how winner and loser effects actually change with contestant strength and we therefore hope that our model will spur others to collect such data; in this light we suggest an experiment which will help to elucidate the nature of winner and loser effects and their impact on coalition formation in animals. |
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* aggression * dominance * hierarchy * intervention * reciprocity |
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10.1098/rspb.2000.0960 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5290 |
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Author |
Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Title |
Breaking up fights between others: a model of intervention behaviour |
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Journal Article |
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Year |
1998 |
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Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences |
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Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B |
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265 |
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1394 |
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433-437 |
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To examine when and why animals break up fights between others in their group, I modelled whether ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ effects might be one element driving the evolution of intervention behaviour. I considered one particular type of intervention: when the intervener simply breaks up fights between two others, but does not favour either party in so doing. When victories at time T + 1 are more likely given a victory at time T (i.e. winner effects), intervention is often favoured. Intervention is favoured in these circumstances because the intervening party in essence stops others from ‘getting on a roll’ and climbing up any hierarchy that exists. However, when loser effects alone are at work (defeats at time T + 1 are more likely given a defeat at time T), breaking up fights between others is never selected. If both winner and loser effects are operating simultaneously, then the likelihood of intervention behaviour evolving is a function of the relative strength of these two effects. The greater the winner effect relative to the loser effect, the more likely intervention behaviour is to evolve. |
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10.1098/rspb.1998.0313 |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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5240 |
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Dugatkin, L.A.; Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Houston, A.I. |
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Title |
Beyond the prisoner's dilemma: Toward models to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation in nature |
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1992 |
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Trends Evol. Ecol. |
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7 |
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202-205 |
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The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach. |
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10.1016/0169-5347(92)90074-L |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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4843 |
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Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Title |
Winner and loser effects and the structure of dominance hierarchies |
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1997 |
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Behavioral Ecology |
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Behav. Ecol. |
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8 |
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6 |
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583-587 |
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In the literature on dominance hierarchies, “winner” and “loser” effects usually are denned as an increased probability of winning at time T, bated on victories at time T-l, T-2, etc, and an increased probability of losing at time T, based on losing at T-1, T-2, etc., respectively. Despite some early theoretical work on winner and loser effects, these factors and how they affect the structure of dominance hierarchies have not been examined in detail. I developed a computer simulation to examine winner and loser effects when such effects are independent of one another (as well as when they interact) and when combatants assess each other's resource-holding power. When winner effects alone were important, a hierarchy in which all individuals held an unambiguous rank was found. When only loser effects were important, a dear alpha individual always emerged, but the rank of others in the group was often unclear because of the scarcity of aggressive interactions. Increasing winner effects for a given value of the loser effect increase the number of individuals with unambiguous positions in a hierarchy and the converse is true for increasing the value of the loser effect for a given winner effect Although winner and loser effects have been documented in a number of species, no study has documented both winner and loser effects (using some controlled, pairwise testing system) and the detailed nature of behavioral interactions when individuals are in groups. I hope the results of this model will spur such studies in the future. |
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10.1093/beheco/8.6.583 |
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refbase @ user @ |
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759 |
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Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Dugatkin, L.A. |
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Toward a theory of dominance hierarchies: effects of assessment, group size, and variation in fighting ability |
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1995 |
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Behavioral Ecology |
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Behav. Ecol. |
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6 |
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4 |
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416-423 |
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We introduce assessment to the analysis of dominance hierarchies by exploring the effect of an evolutionarily stable fighting rule when there is variation in resource holding potential (RHP) and RHP is not a perfectly reliable predictor of the outcome of a fight. With assessment, the probability of a linear hierarchy decreases with group size but can remain appreciable for groups of up to seven or eight individuals, whereas it decreases virtually to zero if there is no assessment. The probability of a hierarchy that correlates perfectly with RHP is low unless group size is small. |
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10.1093/beheco/6.4.416 |
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refbase @ user @ |
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447 |
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Dugatkin, L.A.; Godin, J.-G.J. |
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Title |
Female mate copying in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata): age-dependent effects |
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1993 |
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Behavioral Ecology |
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Behav. Ecol. |
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4 |
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4 |
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289-292 |
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mate choice, copying, guppy, Poecilia reticulata |
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Virtually all studies of mate choice to date have assumed that females choose mates independent of one another. Social cues, however, such as the mate choice of conspecifics, may also play an important role in such decisions. Previous work has shown that female guppies of similar age copy each other's choice of mates. Here we examine the effect of relative age on mate choice copying in the guppy, Poecilia reticulata, and examine whether younger individuals are more likely to copy the mate choice of older conspecifics than vice versa. Results indicate that younger females copy the mate choice of older females, but older individuals do not appear to be influenced by the mate choice of younger individuals. |
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Equine Behaviour @ team @ |
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