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Abstract |
Abstract. This paper examines the significance of imitation in non-human animals with respect to the phylogenetic origins of culture and cognitive complexity. It is argued that both imitation (learning about behaviour through nonspecific observation) and social learning (learning about the environment through conspecific observation) can mediate social transmission of information, and that neither is likely to play an important role in supporting behavioural traditions or culture. Current evidence suggests that imitation is unlikely to do this because it does not insulate information from modification through individual learning in the retention period between acquisition and re-transmission. Although insignificant in relation to culture, imitation apparently involves complex and little-understood cognitive operations. It is unique in requiring animals spontaneously to equate extrinsic visual input with proprioceptive and/or kinaesthetic feedback from their own actions, but not in requiring or implicating self-consciousness, representation, metarepresentation or a capacity for goal-directed action. |
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