Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.

Abstract: Predictions of the model of van Schaik (1989) of female-bonding in primates are tested by systematically comparing the ecology, level of within-group contest competition for food (WGC), and patterns of social behaviour found in two contrasting baboon populations. Significant differences were found in food distribution (percentage of the diet from clumped sources), feeding supplant rates and grooming patterns. In accord with the model, the tendencies of females to affiliate and form coalitions with one another, and to be philopatric, were strongest where ecological conditions promoted WGC. Group fission in the population with strong WGC was “horizontal” with respect to female dominance rank, and associated with female-female aggression during a period of elevated feeding competition. In contrast, where WGC was low, females' grooming was focused on adult males rather than other females. Recent evidence suggests that group fission here is initiated by males, tends to result in the formation of one-male groups, and is not related to feeding competition but to male-male competition for mates. An ecological model of baboon social structure is presented which incorporates the effects of female-female competition, male-male competition, and predation pressure. The model potentially accounts for wide variability in group size, group structure and social relationships within the genus Papio. Socio-ecological convergence between common baboons and hamadryas baboons, however, may be limited in some respects by phylogenetic inertia.

Abstract: In the literature on dominance hierarchies, “winner” and “loser” effects usually are denned as an increased probability of winning at time T, bated on victories at time T-l, T-2, etc, and an increased probability of losing at time T, based on losing at T-1, T-2, etc., respectively. Despite some early theoretical work on winner and loser effects, these factors and how they affect the structure of dominance hierarchies have not been examined in detail. I developed a computer simulation to examine winner and loser effects when such effects are independent of one another (as well as when they interact) and when combatants assess each other's resource-holding power. When winner effects alone were important, a hierarchy in which all individuals held an unambiguous rank was found. When only loser effects were important, a dear alpha individual always emerged, but the rank of others in the group was often unclear because of the scarcity of aggressive interactions. Increasing winner effects for a given value of the loser effect increase the number of individuals with unambiguous positions in a hierarchy and the converse is true for increasing the value of the loser effect for a given winner effect Although winner and loser effects have been documented in a number of species, no study has documented both winner and loser effects (using some controlled, pairwise testing system) and the detailed nature of behavioral interactions when individuals are in groups. I hope the results of this model will spur such studies in the future.

Abstract: Considerable interspeci®c variation in female social relationships occurs in gregarious primates, particularly with regard to agonism and cooperation between females and to the quality of female relationships with males. This variation exists alongside variation in female philopatry and dispersal. Socioecological theories have tried to explain variation in female-female social relationships from an evolutionary perspective focused on ecological factors, notably predation and food distribution. According to the current ``ecological model'', predation risk forces females of most diurnal primate species to live in groups; the strength of the contest component of competition for resources within and between groups then largely determines social relationships between females. Social elationships among gregarious females are here characterized as DispersalEgalitarian, Resident-Nepotistic, Resident-Nepotistic-Tolerant, or Resident-Egalitarian. This ecological model has successfully explained i€erences in the occurrence of formal submission signals, decided dominance relation ships, coalitions and female philopatry. Group size and female rank generally a€ect female reproduction success as the model predicts, and studies of closely related species in di€erent ecological circumstances underscore the importance of the model. Some cases, however, can only be explained when we extend the model to incorporate the e€ects of infanticide risk and habitat saturation. We review evidence in support of the ecological model and test the power of alternative models that invoke between-group competition, forced female philopatry, demographic female recruitment, male interventions into female aggression, and male harassment.
Not one of these models can replace the ecological model, which already encompasses the between-group competition. Currently the best model, which explains
several phenomena that the ecological model does not, is a ``socioecological model'' based on the combined importance of ecological factors, habitat saturation and infanticide avoidance. We note some points of similarity and divergence with other mammalian taxa; these remain to be explored in detail.

Abstract: Abstract   We present here an attempt to understand behaviors of dominant individuals and of subordinate individuals as behavior strategies in an asymmetric “hawk-dove” game. We assume that contestants have perfect information about relative fighting ability and the value of the resource. Any type of asymmetry, both relevant to and irrelevant to the fighting ability, can be considered. It is concluded that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) depend on the resource value (V), the cost of injury (D), and the probability that the individual in one role will win (x). Different ESSs can exist even when values of V, D, and x are the same. The characteristics of dominance relations detected by observers may result from the ESSs that the individuals are adopting. The model explains some characteristics of dominance relations, for example, the consistent outcome of contests, the rare occurrence of escalated fights, and the discrepancy between resource holding potential (RHP) and dominance relations, from the viewpoint of individual selection.