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Bernauer, K., Kollross, H., Schuetz, A., Farmer, K., & Krueger, K. (2020). How do horses (Equus caballus) learn from observing human action? Anim. Cogn., 23, 1–9.
Abstract: A previous study demonstrated that horses can learn socially from observing humans, but could not draw any conclusions about the social learning mechanisms. Here we develop this by showing horses four different human action sequences as demonstrations of how to press a button to open a feed box. We tested 68 horses aged between 3 and 12 years. 63 horses passed the habituation phase and were assigned either to the group Hand Demo (N = 13) for which a kneeling person used a hand to press the button, Head Demo (N = 13) for which a kneeling person used the head, Mixed Demo (N = 12) for which a squatting person used both head and hand, Foot Demo (N = 12) in which a standing person used a foot, or No Demo (N = 13) in which horses did not receive a demonstration. 44 horses reached the learning criterion of opening the feeder twenty times consecutively, 40 of these were 75% of the Demo group horses and four horses were 31% of the No Demo group horses. Horses not reaching the learning criterion approached the human experimenters more often than those who did. Significantly more horses used their head to press the button no matter which demonstration they received. However, in the Foot Demo group four horses consistently preferred to use a hoof and two switched between hoof and head use. After the Mixed Demo the horses' actions were more diverse. The results indicate that only a few horses copy behaviours when learning socially from humans. A few may learn through observational conditioning, as some appeared to adapt to demonstrated actions in the course of reaching the learning criterion. Most horses learn socially through enhancement, using humans to learn where, and which aspect of a mechanism has to be manipulated, and by applying individual trial and error learning to reach their goal.
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Miyata, H., Gajdon, G. K., Huber, L., & Fujita, K. (2011). How do keas (Nestor notabilis) solve artificial-fruit problems with multiple locks? Anim. Cogn., 14(1), 45–58.
Abstract: Keas, a species of parrots from New Zealand, are an interesting species for comparative studies of problem solving and cognition because they are known not only for efficient capacities for object manipulation but also for explorative and playful behaviors. To what extent are they efficient or explorative, and what cognitive abilities do they use? We examined how keas would solve several versions of artificial-fruit box problems having multiple locks. After training keas to remove a metal rod from over a Plexiglas lid that had to be opened, we exposed the birds to a variety of tasks having two or more locks. We also introduced a preview phase during which the keas had extended opportunity to look at the tasks before the experimenter allowed the birds to solve them, to examine whether the preview phase would facilitate the birds' performance on the tasks. In a large number of tests, the keas showed a strong trend to solve the tasks with no positive effect of previewing the tasks. When the tasks became complex, however, the keas corrected inappropriate responses more quickly when they had had chance to preview the problems than when they had not. The results suggest that the keas primarily used explorative strategies in solving the lock problems but might have obtained some information about the tasks before starting to solve them. This may reflect a good compromise of keas' trial-and-error tendency and their good cognitive ability that result from a selection pressure they have faced in their natural habitat.
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Gothard, K. M., Erickson, C. A., & Amaral, D. G. (2004). How do rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) scan faces in a visual paired comparison task? Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 25–36.
Abstract: When novel and familiar faces are viewed simultaneously, humans and monkeys show a preference for looking at the novel face. The facial features attended to in familiar and novel faces, were determined by analyzing the visual exploration patterns, or scanpaths, of four monkeys performing a visual paired comparison task. In this task, the viewer was first familiarized with an image and then it was presented simultaneously with a novel and the familiar image. A looking preference for the novel image indicated that the viewer recognized the familiar image and hence differentiates between the familiar and the novel images. Scanpaths and relative looking preference were compared for four types of images: (1) familiar and novel objects, (2) familiar and novel monkey faces with neutral expressions, (3) familiar and novel inverted monkey faces, and (4) faces from the same monkey with different facial expressions. Looking time was significantly longer for the novel face, whether it was neutral, expressing an emotion, or inverted. Monkeys did not show a preference, or an aversion, for looking at aggressive or affiliative facial expressions. The analysis of scanpaths indicated that the eyes were the most explored facial feature in all faces. When faces expressed emotions such as a fear grimace, then monkeys scanned features of the face, which contributed to the uniqueness of the expression. Inverted facial images were scanned similarly to upright images. Precise measurement of eye movements during the visual paired comparison task, allowed a novel and more quantitative assessment of the perceptual processes involved the spontaneous visual exploration of faces and facial expressions. These studies indicate that non-human primates carry out the visual analysis of complex images such as faces in a characteristic and quantifiable manner.
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MacLean, E., Matthews, L., Hare, B., Nunn, C., Anderson, R., Aureli, F., et al. (2012). How does cognition evolve? Phylogenetic comparative psychology. Anim. Cogn., 15(2), 223–238.
Abstract: Now more than ever animal studies have the potential to test hypotheses regarding how cognition evolves. Comparative psychologists have developed new techniques to probe the cognitive mechanisms underlying animal behavior, and they have become increasingly skillful at adapting methodologies to test multiple species. Meanwhile, evolutionary biologists have generated quantitative approaches to investigate the phylogenetic distribution and function of phenotypic traits, including cognition. In particular, phylogenetic methods can quantitatively (1) test whether specific cognitive abilities are correlated with life history (e.g., lifespan), morphology (e.g., brain size), or socio-ecological variables (e.g., social system), (2) measure how strongly phylogenetic relatedness predicts the distribution of cognitive skills across species, and (3) estimate the ancestral state of a given cognitive trait using measures of cognitive performance from extant species. Phylogenetic methods can also be used to guide the selection of species comparisons that offer the strongest tests of a priori predictions of cognitive evolutionary hypotheses (i.e., phylogenetic targeting). Here, we explain how an integration of comparative psychology and evolutionary biology will answer a host of questions regarding the phylogenetic distribution and history of cognitive traits, as well as the evolutionary processes that drove their evolution.
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Pongrácz, P., Vida, V., Bánhegyi, P., & Miklósi, Á. (2008). How does dominance rank status affect individual and social learning performance in the dog (Canis familiaris)? Anim. Cogn., 11, 75–82.
Abstract: Dogs can learn effectively to detour around a V-shaped fence after observing a demonstration from either an unfamiliar human or dog demonstrator. We found earlier that there is substantial individual variation between the dogs' performance, even when using the same experimental conditions. Here, we investigate if the subjects' relative dominance rank with other dogs had an effect on their social learning performance. On the basis of the owners' answers to a questionnaire, subjects from multi-dog homes were sorted into groups of dominant and subordinate dogs. In Experiment 1, dominant and subordinate dogs were tested without demonstration and we did not find any difference between the groups-they had similarly low detour performances on their own. In Experiment 2 and 3, dogs from single dog and multi-dog households were tested in the detour task with demonstration by an unfamiliar dog, or human, respectively. The results showed that social learning performance of the single dogs fell between the dominant and subordinate multi-dogs with both dog and human demonstration. Subordinate dogs displayed significantly better performance after having observed a dog demonstrator in comparison to dominant dogs. In contrast, the performance of dominant and subordinate dogs was almost similar, when they observed a human demonstrator. These results suggest that perceived dominance rank in its own group has a strong effect on social learning in dogs, but this effect seems to depend also on the demonstrator species. This finding reveals an intricate organization of the social structure in multi-dog households, which can contribute to individual differences existing among dogs.
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Sovrano, V. A., Bisazza, A., & Vallortigara, G. (2007). How fish do geometry in large and in small spaces. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 47–54.
Abstract: It has been shown that children and non-human animals seem to integrate geometric and featural information to different extents in order to reorient themselves in environments of different spatial scales. We trained fish (redtail splitfins, Xenotoca eiseni) to reorient to find a corner in a rectangular tank with a distinctive featural cue (a blue wall). Then we tested fish after displacement of the feature on another adjacent wall. In the large enclosure, fish chose the two corners with the feature, and also tended to choose among them the one that maintained the correct arrangement of the featural cue with respect to geometric sense (i.e. left-right position). In contrast, in the small enclosure, fish chose both the two corners with the features and the corner, without any feature, that maintained the correct metric arrangement of the walls with respect to geometric sense. Possible reasons for species differences in the use of geometric and non-geometric information are discussed.
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Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 193–199.
Abstract: To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.
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Fureix, C., Jego, P., Sankey, C., & Hausberger, M. (2009). How horses (Equus caballus) see the world: humans as significant “objects”. Anim. Cogn., 12(4), 643–654.
Abstract: Abstract  This study aimed to determine whether horses have a kind of memory of humans (based on previous interactions), leading to a general significance of humans revealed by their reactions to humans in subsequent interactions. Subjects were 59 adult horses used to interact daily with humans. Three types of behavioural tests involving an unknown experimenter evaluated three possibly different memorized types of human–animal interactions (not work-related, using work-related objects, unfamiliar working task). We also performed standardized observations of routine interactions between each horse and its familiar handler (caretaker). To get a broad overview of the horses’ reactions to humans, we recorded both investigative and aggressive behaviours during the tests, representing respectively a “positive” and a “negative” memory of the relationship. Whereas correlations between tests revealed a general perception of humans as either positive or negative, unusual tests, i.e. that are not usually performed, elicited more positive reactions. Moreover, some horses reacted positively to a motionless person in their box, but negatively when this same person approached them, for example for halter fitting. Overall, aggressive reactions were more reliable indicators of the relationship than positive reactions, both between tests and between familiar and unfamiliar humans. Our results also show generalization of the perception of humans. These results support our hypothesis that perception of humans by horses may be based on experience, i.e. repeated interactions. Altogether, our results support the hypothesis that horses can form a memory of humans that impacts their reactions in subsequent interactions.
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Santos, L. R., & Hauser, M. D. (1999). How monkeys see the eyes: cotton-top tamarins' reaction to changes in visual attention and action. Anim. Cogn., 2(3), 131–139.
Abstract: Among social species, the capacity to detect where another individual is looking is adaptive because gaze direction often predicts what an individual is attending to, and thus what its future actions are likely to be. We used an expectancy violation procedure to determine whether cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus oedipus) use the direction of another individual's gaze to predict future actions. Subjects were familiarized with a sequence in which a human actor turned her attention toward one of two objects sitting on a table and then reached for that object. Following familiarization, subjects saw two test events. In one test event, the actor gazed at the new object and then reached for that object. From a human perspective, this event is considered consistent with the causal relationship between visual attention and subsequent action, that is, grabbing the object attended to. In the second test event, the actor gazed at the old object, but reached for the new object. This event is considered a violation of expectation. When the actor oriented with both her head-and-eyes, subjects looked significantly longer at the second test event in which the actor reached for the object to which she had not previously oriented. However, there was no difference in looking time between test events when the actor used only her eyes to orient. These findings suggest that tamarins are able to use some combination of head orientation and gaze direction, but not gaze direction alone, to predict the actions of a human agent.
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van der Willigen, R. F., Frost, B. J., & Wagner, H. (2003). How owls structure visual information. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 39–55.
Abstract: Recent studies on perceptual organization in humans claim that the ability to represent a visual scene as a set of coherent surfaces is of central importance for visual cognition. We examined whether this surface representation hypothesis generalizes to a non-mammalian species, the barn owl ( Tyto alba). Discrimination transfer combined with random-dot stimuli provided the appropriate means for a series of two behavioural experiments with the specific aims of (1) obtaining psychophysical measurements of figure-ground segmentation in the owl, and (2) determining the nature of the information involved. In experiment 1, two owls were trained to indicate the presence or absence of a central planar surface (figure) among a larger region of random dots (ground) based on differences in texture. Without additional training, the owls could make the same discrimination when figure and ground had reversed luminance, or were camouflaged by the use of uniformly textured random-dot stereograms. In the latter case, the figure stands out in depth from the ground when positional differences of the figure in two retinal images are combined (binocular disparity). In experiment 2, two new owls were trained to distinguish three-dimensional objects from holes using random-dot kinematograms. These birds could make the same discrimination when information on surface segmentation was unexpectedly switched from relative motion to half-occlusion. In the latter case, stereograms were used that provide the impression of stratified surfaces to humans by giving unpairable image features to the eyes. The ability to use image features such as texture, binocular disparity, relative motion, and half-occlusion interchangeably to determine figure-ground relationships suggests that in owls, as in humans, the structuring of the visual scene critically depends on how indirect image information (depth order, occlusion contours) is allocated between different surfaces.
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