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Macholc, E. J. A. (2006). Equine interspecies aggression (Vol. 159).
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Henry, S., Richard-Yris, M. - A., & Hausberger, M. (2006). Influence of various early human-foal interferences on subsequent human-foal relationship. Dev Psychobiol, 48(8), 712–718.
Abstract: Whereas the way animals perceive human contact has been particularly examined in pet animals, a small amount of investigations has been done in domestic ungulates. It was nevertheless assumed that, as pet animals, non-aggressive forms of tactile contact were as well rewarding or positive for these species, even though the features of intraspecific relationships in pet animals and domestic ungulates may be to some extent different.We test here the hypothesis that horses may not consider physical handling by humans as a positive event. When comparing different early human-foal interactions, we found that early exposure to a motionless human enhanced slightly foals reactions to humans whereas forced stroking or handling in early life did not improve later human-foal relation. Foals that were assisted during their first suckling (e.g., brought to the dam's teat) even tended to avoid human approach at 2 weeks, and physical contact at 1 month of age.We argue that interspecies differences may exist in how tactile stimulation is perceived. It may be important for the establishment of a bond that a young animal is active in the process and able, through its behavioral responses, to help define what is positive for it. This way of investigation may have important general implications in how we consider the development of social relations, both within and between species.
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Pritchard, J. C., Barr, A. R. S., & Whay, H. R. (2006). Validity of a behavioural measure of heat stress and a skin tent test for dehydration in working horses and donkeys (Vol. 38).
Abstract: REASONS FOR PERFORMING STUDY: Dehydration and heat stress are serious welfare issues for equids working in developing countries. There is a lack of any standardised method or validated interpretation of the skin tent test in horses and donkeys. Owners of dehydrated and heat-stressed animals often depend on veterinary examination for identification of these conditions, leading to delays in treatment and unnecessary reliance on external sources to effect welfare improvement. OBJECTIVES: To validate a standardised skin tent test for dehydration and a behavioural measure of heat stress in working equids; and to examine the effect of heat stress and dehydration on tripping and staggering behaviour. METHODS: The study was carried out on 130 working horses and donkeys in Pakistan. Associations between skin tent and blood parameters (packed cell volume [PCV], serum total protein [TP], serum osmolality), clinical parameters, resting and drinking behaviour were examined. Heat stress behaviour (increased respiratory rate and depth, head nodding, flared nostrils, apathy) was observed in conjunction with rectal temperature. Tripping and staggering were assessed using a simple obstacle course. RESULTS: In both species, heat stress behaviour was significantly associated with increased rectal temperature (P<0.001). A positive skin tent test was not significantly associated with PCV or TP, although in donkeys it was significantly associated with lower serum osmolality (P<0.001). More animals age >15 years had a positive skin tent than those in younger age groups (P = 0.037). Very thin horses were more likely to have a positive skin tent than those in thin or moderate condition (P = 0.028). There was no significant correlation between skin tent and tripping or staggering in either species. CONCLUSIONS AND POTENTIAL RELEVANCE: Heat stress behaviour is related to increased body temperature in working horses and donkeys. Owners may use this to make judgements regarding rest and cooling, precluding the need to seek veterinary attention. The skin tent test for dehydration used in this study did not show a significant relationship with PCV or TP. However, the use of blood parameters to validate the skin tent test may be confounded by anaemia, hypoproteinaemia or electrolyte depletion. Alternative methods are needed to confirm or refute the validity of the skin tent test in working equids.
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Thrower, W. R. (1970). Aggression in horses. Proc R Soc Med, 63(2), 163–167.
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Breen, M., Downs, P., Irvin, Z., & Bell, K. (1994). Intrageneric amplification of horse microsatellite markers with emphasis on the Przewalski's horse (E. przewalskii). Anim Genet, 25(6), 401–405.
Abstract: Primer sequences flanking 13 microsatellite loci isolated from the domestic horse (E. caballus) were successfully used to amplify homologous loci in the Przewalski's horse (E. przewalskii). The results demonstrate that the level of polymorphism at all 13 loci in the Przewalski's horse was comparable to that in the domestic horse and the overall exclusion probability in the Przewalski's horse was calculated to be 0.9994. The results suggest that it should be possible to use E. caballus-derived microsatellite markers to provide parentage verification and additional valuable information to the captive management of E. przewalskii. The ability to amplify corresponding loci in the remaining five species of the genus was also confirmed, illustrating the general application of markers isolated from the domestic horse to the evaluation of polymorphism in the other six species of the genus.
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Call, J. (2006). Inferences by exclusion in the great apes: the effect of age and species. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 393–403.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347-362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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Neiworth, J. J., Hassett, J. M., & Sylvester, C. J. (2007). Face processing in humans and new world monkeys: the influence of experiential and ecological factors. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 125–134.
Abstract: This study tests whether the face-processing system of humans and a nonhuman primate species share characteristics that would allow for early and quick processing of socially salient stimuli: a sensitivity toward conspecific faces, a sensitivity toward highly practiced face stimuli, and an ability to generalize changes in the face that do not suggest a new identity, such as a face differently oriented. The look rates by adult tamarins and humans toward conspecific and other primate faces were examined to determine if these characteristics are shared. A visual paired comparison (VPC) task presented subjects with either a human face, chimpanzee face, tamarin face, or an object as a sample, and then a pair containing the previous stimulus and a novel stimulus was presented. The stimuli were either presented all in an upright orientation, or all in an inverted orientation. The novel stimulus in the pair was either an orientation change of the same face/object or a new example of the same type of face/object, and the stimuli were shown either in an upright orientation or in an inverted orientation. Preference to novelty scores revealed that humans attended most to novel individual human faces, and this effect decreased significantly if the stimuli were inverted. Tamarins showed preferential looking toward novel orientations of previously seen tamarin faces in the upright orientation, but not in an inverted orientation. Similarly, their preference to look longer at novel tamarin and human faces within the pair was reduced significantly with inverted stimuli. The results confirmed prior findings in humans that novel human faces generate more attention in the upright than in the inverted orientation. The monkeys also attended more to faces of conspecifics, but showed an inversion effect to orientation change in tamarin faces and to identity changes in tamarin and human faces. The results indicate configural processing restricted to particular kinds of primate faces by a New World monkey species, with configural processing influenced by life experience (human faces and tamarin faces) and specialized to process orientation changes specific to conspecific faces.
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Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). How great apes perform on a modified trap-tube task. Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 193–199.
Abstract: To date, neither primates nor birds have shown clear evidence of causal knowledge when attempting to solve the trap tube task. One factor that may have contributed to mask the knowledge that subjects may have about the task is that subjects were only allowed to push the reward away from them, which is a particularly difficult action for primates in certain problem solving situations. We presented five orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two bonobos (Pan paniscus), and one gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) with a modified trap tube that allowed subjects to push or rake the reward with the tool. In two additional follow-up tests, we inverted the tube 180 degrees rendering the trap nonfunctional and also presented subjects with the original task in which they were required to push the reward out of the tube. Results showed that all but one of the subjects preferred to rake the reward. Two orangutans and one chimpanzee (all of whom preferred to rake the reward), consistently avoided the trap only when it was functional but failed the original task. These findings suggest that some great apes may have some causal knowledge about the trap-tube task. Their success, however, depended on whether they were allowed to choose certain tool-using actions.
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Santos, L. R., Pearson, H. M., Spaepen, G. M., Tsao, F., & Hauser, M. D. (2006). Probing the limits of tool competence: experiments with two non-tool-using species (Cercopithecus aethiops and Saguinus oedipus). Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 94–109.
Abstract: Non-human animals vary in their ability to make and use tools. The goal of the present study was to further explore what, if anything, differs between tool-users and non-tool-users, and whether these differences lie in the conceptual or motor domain. We tested two species that typically do not use tools-cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)-on problems that mirrored those designed for prolific tool users such as chimpanzees. We trained subjects on a task in which they could choose one of two canes to obtain an out-of-reach food reward. After training, subjects received several variations on the original task, each designed to examine a specific conceptual aspect of the pulling problem previously studied in other tool-using species. Both species recognized that effective pulling tools must be made of rigid materials. Subsequent conditions revealed significant species differences, with vervets outperforming tamarins across many conditions. Vervets, but not tamarins, had some recognition of the relationship between a tool's orientation and the position of the food reward, the relationship between a tool's trajectory and the substance that it moves on, and that tools must be connected in order to work properly. These results provide further evidence that tool-use may derive from domain-general, rather than domain-specific cognitive capacities that evolved for tool use per se.
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