Abstract: Social dominance is usually viewed from the perspective of intragroup competition over access to limited resources. The present paper, while not denying the importance of such competition, discusses the dominance concept among monkeys and apes in the context of affiliative bonding, social tolerance, and the reconciliation of aggressive conflicts. Two basic proximate mechanisms are supposed to provide a link between dominance and interindividual affiliation, namely, formalization of the dominance relationship (i.e., unequivocal communication of status), and conditional reassurance (i.e., the linkage of friendly coexistence to formalization of the relationship). Ritualized submission is imposed upon losers of dominance struggles by winners; losers are offered a “choice” between continued hostility or a tolerant relationship with a clearly signalled difference in status. If these two social mechanisms are lacking, aggression is bound to have dispersive effects. In their presence, aggression becomes a well-integrated, even constructive component of social life. In some higher primates this process of integration has reached the stage where status differences are strongly attenuated. In these species, sharing and trading can take the place of overt competition. The views underlying this “reconciled hierarchy” model are only partly new, as is evident from a review of the ethological literature. Many points are illustrated with data on a large semi-captive colony of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), particularly data related to striving for status, reconciliation behavior, and general association patterns. These observations demonstrate that relationships among adult male chimpanzees cannot be described in terms of a dichotomy between affiliative and antagonistic tendencies. Male bonding in this species has not been achieved by an elimination of aggression, but by a set of powerful buffering mechanisms that mitigate its effects. Although female chimpanzees do exhibit a potential for bonding under noncompetitive conditions, they appear to lack the buffering mechanisms of the males.

Abstract: When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.

Abstract: The work of behavioural pharmacologists has concentrated on small animals, such as rodents and pigeons. The validity of extrapolation of their findings to humans depends upon the existence of parallels in both physiology and psychology between these animals and humans. This paper considers the question whether there are in fact substantial cognitive parallels between, first, different non-human groups of vertebrates and, second, non-humans and humans. Behavioural data from 'simple' tasks, such as habituation and conditioning, do not point to species differences among vertebrates. Using examples that concentrate on the performance of rodents and birds, it is argued that, similarly, data from more complex tasks (learning-set formation, transitive inference, and spatial memory serve as examples) reveal few if any cognitive differences amongst non-human vertebrates. This conclusion supports the notion that association formation may be the critical problem-solving process available to non-human animals; associative mechanisms are assumed to have evolved to detect causal links between events, and would therefore be relevant in all ecological niches. In agreement with this view, recent advances in comparative neurology show striking parallels in functional organisation of mammalian and avian telencephalon. Finally, it is argued that although the peculiarly human capacity for language marks a large cognitive contrast between humans and non-humans, there is good evidence-in particular, from work on implicit learning--that the learning mechanisms available to non--humans are present and do play an important role in human cognition.

Abstract: Directed-forgetting research with animals suggests that animals show disrupted test performance only under certain conditions. Important variables are (a) whether during training, the cue to forget (F cue) signals nonreward (i.e., that the trial is over) versus reward (i.e., that reinforcement can be obtained) and (b) given that reinforcement can be obtained on F-cue trials, whether the post-F-cue response pattern is compatible with the baseline memory task. It is proposed that some findings of directed forgetting can be attributed to trained response biases, whereas others may be attributable perhaps to frustration-produced interference. It is suggested that directed forgetting in animals should be studied using procedures similar to those used to study directed forgetting in humans. This can be accomplished by presenting, within a trial, both to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten material.