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Hauser, M. D., Kralik, J., Botto-Mahan, C., Garrett, M., & Oser, J. (1995). Self-recognition in primates: phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 92(23), 10811–10814.
Abstract: Self-recognition has been explored in nonlinguistic organisms by recording whether individuals touch a dye-marked area on visually inaccessible parts of their face while looking in a mirror or inspect parts of their body while using the mirror's reflection. Only chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and humans over the age of approximately 2 years consistently evidence self-directed mirror-guided behavior without experimenter training. To evaluate the inferred phylogenetic gap between hominoids and other animals, a modified dye-mark test was conducted with cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus), a New World monkey species. The white hair on the tamarins' head was color-dyed, thereby significantly altering a visually distinctive species-typical feature. Only individuals with dyed hair and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the mirror. They looked longer in the mirror than controls, and some individuals used the mirror to observe visually inaccessible body parts. Prior failures to pass the mirror test may have been due to methodological problems, rather than to phylogenetic differences in the capacity for self-recognition. Specifically, an individual's sensitivity to experimentally modified parts of its body may depend crucially on the relative saliency of the modified part (e.g., face versus hair). Moreover, and in contrast to previous claims, we suggest that the mirror test may not be sufficient for assessing the concept of self or mental state attribution in nonlinguistic organisms.
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Roper, K. L., & Zentall, T. R. (1993). Directed forgetting in animals. Psychol Bull, 113(3), 513–532.
Abstract: Directed-forgetting research with animals suggests that animals show disrupted test performance only under certain conditions. Important variables are (a) whether during training, the cue to forget (F cue) signals nonreward (i.e., that the trial is over) versus reward (i.e., that reinforcement can be obtained) and (b) given that reinforcement can be obtained on F-cue trials, whether the post-F-cue response pattern is compatible with the baseline memory task. It is proposed that some findings of directed forgetting can be attributed to trained response biases, whereas others may be attributable perhaps to frustration-produced interference. It is suggested that directed forgetting in animals should be studied using procedures similar to those used to study directed forgetting in humans. This can be accomplished by presenting, within a trial, both to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten material.
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Nguyen, N. H., Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Imitation of a two-action sequence by pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 12(3), 514–518.
Abstract: Developmental psychologists have described imitation as a process that suggests perspective-taking abilities. However, imitative behavior has been found in animals, which are generally not considered capable of taking the perspective of another. Previous studies with birds have demonstrated the imitation of a single response (sometimes referred to as action-level imitation). In the present experiment, we examined the extent to which pigeons would imitate an unfamiliar sequence of two behaviors (sometimes referred to as program-level imitation). Our results indicate that, although there are individual differences, pigeons show a significant tendency to match a demonstrated sequence of behavior involving, first, a response to a treadle (pecking at it or stepping on it) and, second, pushing aside a screen that blocks access to food (a left-vs.-right push).
Keywords: Animals; Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; Columbidae; *Imitative Behavior; *Learning
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Klein, E. D., Bhatt, R. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Contrast and the justification of effort. Psychon Bull Rev, 12(2), 335–339.
Abstract: When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.
Keywords: Awareness; *Cognition; *Discrimination (Psychology); Female; Humans; Male; Questionnaires; *Visual Perception
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Dunbar, R. (2003). Evolution of the social brain. Science, 302(5648), 1160–1161.
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Blaisdell, A. P., Sawa, K., Leising, K. J., & Waldmann, M. R. (2006). Causal reasoning in rats. Science, 311(5763), 1020–1022.
Abstract: Empirical research with nonhuman primates appears to support the view that causal reasoning is a key cognitive faculty that divides humans from animals. The claim is that animals approximate causal learning using associative processes. The present results cast doubt on that conclusion. Rats made causal inferences in a basic task that taps into core features of causal reasoning without requiring complex physical knowledge. They derived predictions of the outcomes of interventions after passive observational learning of different kinds of causal models. These competencies cannot be explained by current associative theories but are consistent with causal Bayes net theories.
Keywords: Animals; *Association Learning; Bayes Theorem; *Cognition; Comprehension; Forecasting; Male; Rats; Rats, Long-Evans
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Cheney, D., Seyfarth, R., & Smuts, B. (1986). Social relationships and social cognition in nonhuman primates. Science, 234(4782), 1361–1366.
Abstract: Complex social relationships among nonhuman primates appear to contribute to individual reproductive success. Experiments with and behavioral observations of natural populations suggest that sophisticated cognitive mechanisms may underlie primate social relationships. Similar capacities are usually less apparent in the nonsocial realm, supporting the view that at least some aspects of primate intelligence evolved to solve the challenges of interacting with conspecifics.
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Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). Apes save tools for future use. Science, 312(5776), 1038–1040.
Abstract: Planning for future needs, not just current ones, is one of the most formidable human cognitive achievements. Whether this skill is a uniquely human adaptation is a controversial issue. In a study we conducted, bonobos and orangutans selected, transported, and saved appropriate tools above baseline levels to use them 1 hour later (experiment 1). Experiment 2 extended these results to a 14-hour delay between collecting and using the tools. Experiment 3 showed that seeing the apparatus during tool selection was not necessary to succeed. These findings suggest that the precursor skills for planning for the future evolved in great apes before 14 million years ago, when all extant great ape species shared a common ancestor.
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Hare, B., Brown, M., Williamson, C., & Tomasello, M. (2002). The domestication of social cognition in dogs. Science, 298(5598), 1634–1636.
Abstract: Dogs are more skillful than great apes at a number of tasks in which they must read human communicative signals indicating the location of hidden food. In this study, we found that wolves who were raised by humans do not show these same skills, whereas domestic dog puppies only a few weeks old, even those that have had little human contact, do show these skills. These findings suggest that during the process of domestication, dogs have been selected for a set of social-cognitive abilities that enable them to communicate with humans in unique ways.
Keywords: Animals; *Animals, Domestic; *Behavior, Animal; *Cognition; *Cues; *Dogs; Food; Humans; Memory; Pan troglodytes; *Social Behavior; Species Specificity; Vision; Wolves
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Bergman, T. J., Beehner, J. C., Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2003). Hierarchical classification by rank and kinship in baboons. Science, 302(5648), 1234–1236.
Abstract: Humans routinely classify others according to both their individual attributes, such as social status or wealth, and membership in higher order groups, such as families or castes. They also recognize that people's individual attributes may be influenced and regulated by their group affiliations. It is not known whether such rule-governed, hierarchical classifications are specific to humans or might also occur in nonlinguistic species. Here we show that baboons recognize that a dominance hierarchy can be subdivided into family groups. In playback experiments, baboons respond more strongly to call sequences mimicking dominance rank reversals between families than within families, indicating that they classify others simultaneously according to both individual rank and kinship. The selective pressures imposed by complex societies may therefore have favored cognitive skills that constitute an evolutionary precursor to some components of human cognition.
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