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Author Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title Bystander effects and the structure of dominance hierarchies Type Journal Article
  Year 2001 Publication Behavioral Ecology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol.  
  Volume 12 Issue 3 Pages 348-352  
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  Abstract Prior modeling work has found that pure winner and loser effects (i.e., changing the estimation of your own fighting ability as a function of direct prior experience) can have important consequences for hierarchy formation. Here these models are extended to incorporate “bystander effects.” When bystander effects are in operation, observers (i.e., bystanders) of aggressive interactions change their assessment of the protagonists' fighting abilities (depending on who wins and who loses). Computer simulations demonstrate that when bystander winner effects alone are at play, groups have a clear omega (bottom-ranking individual), while the relative position of other group members remains difficult to determine. When only bystander loser effects are in operation, wins and losses are randomly distributed throughout a group (i.e., no discernible hierarchy). When pure and bystander winner effects are jointly in place, a linear hierarchy, in which all positions (i.e., {alpha} to {delta} when N = 4) are clearly defined, emerges. Joint pure and bystander loser effects produce the same result. In principle one could test the predictions from the models developed here in a straightforward comparative study. Hopefully, the results of this model will spur on such studies in the future.  
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  Notes 10.1093/beheco/12.3.348 Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 441  
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Author Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title Toward a theory of dominance hierarchies: effects of assessment, group size, and variation in fighting ability Type Journal Article
  Year 1995 Publication Behavioral Ecology Abbreviated Journal Behav. Ecol.  
  Volume 6 Issue 4 Pages 416-423  
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  Abstract We introduce assessment to the analysis of dominance hierarchies by exploring the effect of an evolutionarily stable fighting rule when there is variation in resource holding potential (RHP) and RHP is not a perfectly reliable predictor of the outcome of a fight. With assessment, the probability of a linear hierarchy decreases with group size but can remain appreciable for groups of up to seven or eight individuals, whereas it decreases virtually to zero if there is no assessment. The probability of a hierarchy that correlates perfectly with RHP is low unless group size is small.  
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  Notes 10.1093/beheco/6.4.416 Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 447  
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Author Wilson, D.S.; Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title A reply to Lombardi & Hurlbert Type Journal Article
  Year 1996 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 52 Issue 2 Pages 423-425  
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  Abstract No abstract  
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  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 475  
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Wilson, D.S. url  doi
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  Title Choice experiments and cognition: a reply to Lamprecht & Hofer Type Journal Article
  Year 1994 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 47 Issue 6 Pages 1459-1461  
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  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 479  
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Author Mesterton-Gibbons, M.; Dugatkin, L.A. url  openurl
  Title Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma: towards testable models of mutualism versus reciprocity Type Journal Article
  Year 1997 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 54 Issue 3 Pages 551-557  
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  Abstract For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of `pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication.  
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  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 480  
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Mesterton-Gibbons, M. url  doi
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  Title Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes Type Journal Article
  Year 1996 Publication Biosystems Abbreviated Journal Biosystems  
  Volume 37 Issue 1-2 Pages 19-30  
  Keywords By-product mutualism; Cooperative behavior; Fish; Reciprocal altruism; Trait-group selection  
  Abstract Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish.  
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  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 481  
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Hoglund, J. url  doi
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  Title Delayed breeding and the evolution of mate copying in lekking species Type Journal Article
  Year 1995 Publication Journal of Theoretical Biology Abbreviated Journal J. Theor. Biol.  
  Volume 174 Issue 3 Pages 261-267  
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  Abstract Recent experimental evidence indicates that females may copy the mate choice of others. Here, we present a model for the evolution of mate copying strategies in lekking species. In the model, all females (copiers and non-copiers) assess male quality, but a copier's assessment of a male's quality increases after males have mated with other females. The model demonstrates that mate copying is favored when breeding late in the season has a relatively high cost. We hope that our results will spur empirical work quantifying the time constraints associated with breeding, thus allowing more direct tests of the model's predictions.  
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  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 482  
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Author Crowley, P.H.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Alfieri, M. url  doi
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  Title Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition Type Journal Article
  Year 1996 Publication Biosystems Abbreviated Journal Biosystems  
  Volume 37 Issue 1-2 Pages 49-66  
  Keywords Game theory; Genetic algorithms; Individual recognition; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Reciprocal altruism  
  Abstract To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated.  
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  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 483  
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Author Dugatkin, L.A. url  doi
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  Title Tit for Tat, by-product mutualism and predator inspection: a reply to Connor Type Journal Article
  Year 1996 Publication Animal Behaviour. Abbreviated Journal Anim. Behav.  
  Volume 51 Issue 2 Pages 455-457  
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  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 487  
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Author Dugatkin, L.A.; Bekoff, M. url  doi
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  Title Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model Type Journal Article
  Year 2003 Publication Behavioural Processes Abbreviated Journal Behav. Process.  
  Volume 60 Issue 3 Pages 209-214  
  Keywords Play; Fairness; Game theory  
  Abstract Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.  
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  Notes Approved no  
  Call Number refbase @ user @ Serial (up) 488  
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