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Russon, A. E., Handayani, D. P., Kuncoro, P., & Ferisa, A. (2007). Orangutan leaf-carrying for nest-building: toward unraveling cultural processes. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 189–202.
Abstract: We report an empirical study on leaf-carrying, a newly discovered nest-building technique that involves collecting nest materials before reaching the nest site. We assessed whether leaf-carrying by rehabilitant orangutans on Kaja Island, Central Kalimantan, owes to cultural influences. Findings derive from ca 600 h observational data on nesting skills and nesting associations in Kaja's 42 resident rehabilitants, which yielded 355 nests and 125 leaf-carrying cases by 34 rehabilitants. Regional contrasts with 14 other communities (7 rehabilitant, 7 wild) indicated cultural influences on leaf-carrying on Kaja. Association data showed exceptional social learning opportunities for leaf-carrying on Kaja, with residents taking differential advantage of these opportunities as a function of development, experience, and social position. Juvenile males with basic nesting skills were most influenced by social input. Most (27) leaf-carriers had probably learned leaf-carrying when caged and 7 probably learned it on Kaja. Social priming was probably the main impetus to leaf-carrying on Kaja, by simply prompting observers to copy when leaf-carrying associates collected nesting materials, what they collected, and where they used their collected materials. Implications concern acquisition processes and ontogenetic schedules that orchestrate sets of features-needs or interests, cognitive abilities, social preferences-which enable cultural transmission.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). online material (Vol. 317).
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). online material. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Hvorecny, L. M., Grudowski, J. L., Blakeslee, C. J., Simmons, T. L., Roy, P. R., Brooks, J. A., et al. (2007). Octopuses (Octopus bimaculoides) and cuttlefishes (Sepia pharaonis, S. officinalis) can conditionally discriminate. Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: In complex navigation using landmarks, an animal must discriminate between potential cues and show context (condition) sensitivity. Such conditional discrimination is considered a form of complex learning and has been associated primarily with vertebrates. We tested the hypothesis that octopuses and cuttlefish are capable of conditional discrimination. Subjects were trained in two maze configurations (the conditions) in which they were required to select one of two particular escape routes within each maze (the discrimination). Conditional discrimination could be demonstrated by selecting the correct escape route in each maze. Six of ten mud-flat octopuses (Octopus bimaculoides), 6 of 13 pharaoh cuttlefish (Sepia pharaonis), and one of four common cuttlefish (S. officinalis) demonstrated conditional discrimination by successfully solving both mazes. These experiments demonstrate that cephalopods are capable of conditional discrimination and extend the limits of invertebrate complex learning.
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Gifford, A. K., Cloutier, S., & Newberry, R. C. (2007). Objects as enrichment: Effects of object exposure time and delay interval on object recognition memory of the domestic pig. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 107(3-4), 206–217.
Abstract: A modified spontaneous object recognition test was used to examine object recognition memory in the domestic pig. This test uses preference for a novel object over a previously encountered sample object as indicating recognition of the sample object, and no preference as indicating no recognition. Two factors hypothesized to affect object recognition are duration of exposure to the sample stimulus and delay interval before re-exposure. Both of these factors could be manipulated in a rotational object enrichment program for pigs. Reducing exposure time and increasing the delay interval before re-exposure should decrease object recognition and prolong novelty-induced object exploration. We exposed 5-week-old pigs to different sample objects in their home pens for 10 min and 2 days, respectively. We tested for object recognition memory at various delay intervals after initial exposure by placing littermate pairs in a test pen for 10 min and recording snout contact with a sample object and a completely novel object. At a 1-h delay, half the pairs were tested with the 2-day sample object; the other half received the 10-min sample object. At a 3-h delay, pairs were tested with the opposite sample object. Pairs were also tested with the 2-day sample at a 5-day delay and the 10-min sample at a 6-day delay. We predicted that pigs would show a preference for the novel versus the 2-day sample object at all three delays, but would only prefer the novel object over the 10-min sample object at the 1-h and 3-h delays. Pigs did not show novelty preference in the presence of the 10-min sample object at any delay. Novelty preference in the presence of the 2-day sample object occurred at the 3-h (P < 0.05) and 5-day delays (P < 0.001), but not the 1-h delay. The lack of novelty preference when pigs were tested with the 10-min sample object may have been due to failure to habituate to the sample object. Testing in a different location from the initial sample object exposure and retroactive interference from exposure to the 10-min sample object may have contributed to a temporary lack of novelty preference when pigs were tested with the 2-day sample object at the 1-h delay. The finding that pigs retained a memory for the 2-day sample object for at least 5 days suggests that restricting object exposure to less than 2 days may help to preserve the exploratory value of objects rotated among pens.
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Hostetter, A. B., Russell, J. L., Freeman, H., & Hopkins, W. D. (2007). Now you see me, now you don't: evidence that chimpanzees understand the role of the eyes in attention. Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 55–62.
Abstract: Chimpanzees appear to understand something about the attentional states of others; in the present experiment, we investigated whether they understand that the attentional state of a human is based on eye gaze. In all, 116 adult chimpanzees were offered food by an experimenter who engaged in one of the four experimental manipulations: eyes closed, eyes open, hand over eyes, and hand over mouth. The communicative behavior of the chimpanzees was observed. More visible behaviors were produced when the experimenter's eyes were visible than when the experimenter's eyes were not visible. More vocalizations were produced when the experimenter's eyes were closed than when they were open, but there were no differences in other attention getting behaviors. There was no effect of age or rearing history. The results suggest that chimpanzees use the presence of the eyes as a cue that their visual gestures will be effective.
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Tebbich, S., Seed, A. M., Emery, N. J., & Clayton, N. S. (2007). Non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus, solve the trap-tube problem. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 225–231.
Abstract: The trap-tube problem is used to assess whether an individual is able to foresee the outcome of its actions. To solve the task, an animal must use a tool to push a piece of food out of a tube, which has a trap along its length. An animal may learn to avoid the trap through a rule based on associative processes, e.g. using the distance of trap or food as a cue, or by understanding relations between cause and effect. This task has been used to test physical cognition in a number of tool-using species, but never a non-tool-user. We developed an experimental design that enabled us to test non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus. Our modification of the task removed the cognitive requirements of active tool use but still allowed us to test whether rooks can solve the trap-tube problem, and if so how. Additionally, we developed two new control tasks to determine whether rooks were able to transfer knowledge to similar, but novel problems, thus revealing more about the mechanisms involved in solving the task. We found that three out of seven rooks solved the modified trap-tube problem task, showing that the ability to solve the trap-tube problem is not restricted to tool-using animals. We found no evidence that the birds solved the task using an understanding of its causal properties, given that none of the birds passed the novel transfer tasks.
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Gabris, G. T., & Ihrke, D. M. (2007). No End to Hierarchy: Does Rank Make a Difference in Perceptions of Leadership Credibility? Admin. Soc., 39(1), 107–123.
Abstract: This article investigates whether authority hierarchy still serves as an important factor influencing employee perceptions toward organizational roles and expected behavior. Results of a study in a federal agency suggest that hierarchy does serve as a significant force influencing employee attitudes toward leadership roles, contrary to the notion that hierarchy will diminish in importance over time. Hierarchy remains a crucial structural force in public organizations and is unlikely to wither away.
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Morell, V. (2007). Nicola Clayton profile. Nicky and the jays (Vol. 315).
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Anderson, W. D., & Summers, C. H. (2007). Neuroendocrine Mechanisms, Stress Coping Strategies, and Social Dominance: Comparative Lessons about Leadership Potential. Ann Am Acad Polit Soc Sci, 614(1), 102–130.
Abstract: The authors examine dominance and subordination in the social psychology, political science, and biology literatures. Using Summers and Winberg (2006) as a guide, the authors suggest that extreme dominance or subordination phenotypes--including social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism--are determined by an organism's genetic predispositions, motivations, stress responses, and long-term hormone release and uptake states. The authors offer hypotheses about the likely neurochemical profiles for each of these extreme dominance and subordination phenotypes and suggest two designs that begin to test these hypotheses.
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