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Stahlbaum, C. C., & Houpt, K. A. (1989). The role of the Flehmen response in the behavioral repertoire of the stallion. Physiol. Behav., 45(6), 1207–1214.
Abstract: The role of the Flehmen response in equine behavior was investigated under field and laboratory conditions. In Experiment 1, a field study made of five stallions on pasture with between three and eighteen mares each during the season indicated the following: 1) The Flehmen response was most frequently preceded by nasal, rather than oral, investigation of substances; 2) The stallions' rate of Flehmen varied with the estrous cycles of the mares; 3) The rate of Flehmen response did not show a variation with time of day; and 4) The Flehmen response was most frequently followed by marking behaviors rather than courtship behaviors. The results suggest that the Flehmen response is not an immediate component of sexual behavior, e.g., courtship of the stallion but may be involved in the overall monitoring of the mare's estrous cycle. Therefore the Flehmen response may contribute to the chemosensory priming of the stallion for reproduction. In Experiment 2 stallions were presented with urine or feces of mares in various stages of the reproductive cycle as well as with their own or other males' urine or feces. The occurrence of sniffing and Flehmen was used to determine the discriminatory ability of the stallions. Stallions can differentiate the sex of a horse on the basis of its feces alone, but cannot differentiate on the basis of urine. This ability may explain the function of fecal marking behavior of stallions.
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de Waal, F. B. M., Dindo, M., Freeman, C. A., & Hall, M. J. (2005). The monkey in the mirror: hardly a stranger. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 102(32), 11140–11147.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that monkeys see a stranger in the mirror, whereas apes and humans recognize themselves. In this study, we question the former assumption by using a detailed comparison of how monkeys respond to mirrors versus live individuals. Eight adult female and six adult male brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were exposed twice to three conditions: (i) a familiar same-sex partner, (ii) an unfamiliar same-sex partner, and (iii) a mirror. Females showed more eye contact and friendly behavior and fewer signs of anxiety in front of a mirror than they did when exposed to an unfamiliar partner. Males showed greater ambiguity, but they too reacted differently to mirrors and strangers. Discrimination between conditions was immediate, and blind coders were able to tell the difference between monkeys under the three conditions. Capuchins thus seem to recognize their reflection in the mirror as special, and they may not confuse it with an actual conspecific. Possibly, they reach a level of self-other distinction intermediate between seeing their mirror image as other and recognizing it as self.
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Parr, L. A., Winslow, J. T., Hopkins, W. D., & de Waal, F. B. (2000). Recognizing facial cues: individual discrimination by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). J Comp Psychol, 114(1), 47–60.
Abstract: Faces are one of the most salient classes of stimuli involved in social communication. Three experiments compared face-recognition abilities in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In the face-matching task, the chimpanzees matched identical photographs of conspecifics' faces on Trial 1, and the rhesus monkeys did the same after 4 generalization trials. In the individual-recognition task, the chimpanzees matched 2 different photographs of the same individual after 2 trials, and the rhesus monkeys generalized in fewer than 6 trials. The feature-masking task showed that the eyes were the most important cue for individual recognition. Thus, chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys are able to use facial cues to discriminate unfamiliar conspecifics. Although the rhesus monkeys required many trials to learn the tasks, this is not evidence that faces are not as important social stimuli for them as for the chimpanzees.
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Parr, L. A., Hopkins, W. D., & de Waal, F. B. (1997). Haptic discrimination in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): evidence of manual specialization. Neuropsychologia, 35(2), 143–152.
Abstract: Two experiments investigated the effects of haptic and visual discrimination on hand preference in 22 brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). The percentage of left-handed subjects in Experiment 1 were 63.6%, 45.5%, and 18.2% for haptic, bipedal, and quadrupedal reaching, respectively. In Experiment 2, the haptic demands of the task were manipulated by using additional food types and another tactile medium. Left-hand preferences were further strengthened when reaching into water compared to pineshavings in Experiment 1. Reaching with no tactile interference resulted in equal numbers of lateralized and nonlateralized subjects. These results show that when reaching demands the use of haptic cues, as opposed to visual ones, monkeys shift towards greater left hand use. This is consistent with what is known about right hemisphere superiority for haptic discrimination in humans.
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Singer, R. A., Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2006). Use of a single-code/default strategy by pigeons to acquire duration sample discriminations. Learn Behav, 34(4), 340–347.
Abstract: Past evidence that pigeons may adopt a single-code/default strategy to solve duration sample discriminations may be attributable to the similarity between the intertrial interval (ITI) and the retention interval. The present experiments tested whether pigeons would adopt a single-code/default strategy when possible ITI-retention-interval ambiguity was eliminated and sample salience was increased. Previous studies of duration sample discriminations that have purported to show evidence for the use of a single-code/default coding strategy have used durations of 0, 2, and 10 sec (Zentall, Klein, and Singer, 2004). However, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that the use of a 0-sec sample may produce an artifact resulting in inadvertent present/absent sample matching. In Experiment 2, when pigeons were trained with three nonzero duration samples (2, 8, and 32 sec), clear evidence for the use of a single-code/default strategy was found.
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Zentall, T. R., & Kaiser, D. H. (2005). Interval timing with gaps: gap ambiguity as an alternative to temporal decay. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(4), 484–486.
Abstract: C. V. Buhusi, D. Perera, and W. H. Meck (2005) proposed a hypothesis of timing in rats to account for the results of experiments that have used the peak procedure with gaps. According to this hypothesis, the introduction of a gap causes the animal's memory for the pregap interval to passively decay (subjectively shorten) in direct proportion to the duration and salience of the gap. Thus, animals should pause with short, nonsalient gaps but should reset their clock with longer, salient gaps. The present authors suggest that the ambiguity of the gap (i.e., the similarity between the gap and the intertrial interval in both appearance and relative duration) causes the animal to actively reset the clock and prevents adequate assessments of the fate of timed intervals prior to the gap. Furthermore, when the intertrial interval is discriminable from the gap, the evidence suggests that timed intervals prior to the gap are not lost but are retained in memory.
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Zentall, T. R. (2005). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: the role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 70(3), 209–222.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
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Klein, E. D., Bhatt, R. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Contrast and the justification of effort. Psychon Bull Rev, 12(2), 335–339.
Abstract: When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.
Keywords: Awareness; *Cognition; *Discrimination (Psychology); Female; Humans; Male; Questionnaires; *Visual Perception
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Zentall, T. R. (2005). Selective and divided attention in animals. Behav. Process., 69(1), 1–15.
Abstract: This article reviews some of the research on attentional processes in animals. In the traditional approach to selective attention, it is proposed that in addition to specific response attachments, animals also learn something about the dimension along which the stimuli fall (e.g., hue, brightness, or line orientation). More recently, there has been an attempt to find animal analogs to methodologies originally applied to research with humans. One line of research has been directed to the question of whether animals can locate a target among distracters faster if they are prepared for the presentation of the target (search image and priming). In the study of search image, the target is typically a food item and the cue consists of previous trials on which the same target is presented. In research on priming effects, the cue is typically different from the target but is a good predictor of its occurrence. The study of preattentive processes shows that perceptually, certain stimuli stand out from distracters better than others, depending not only on characteristics of the target relative to the distracters, but also on relations among the distracters. Research on divided attention is examined with the goal of determining whether an animal can process two elements of a compound sample with the same efficiency as one. Taken together, the reviewed research indicates that animals are capable of centrally (not just peripherally) attending to selective aspects of a stimulus display.
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Martin, T. I., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Post-choice information processing by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 273–278.
Abstract: In a conditional discrimination (matching-to-sample), a sample is followed by two comparison stimuli, one of which is correct, depending on the sample. Evidence from previous research suggests that if the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect response (the so-called penalty-time procedure), acquisition by pigeons is facilitated. The present research tested the hypothesis that the penalty-time procedure allows the pigeons to review and learn from the maintained stimulus display following an incorrect choice. It did so by including a penalty-time group for which, following an incorrect choice, the sample changed to match the incorrect comparison, thus providing the pigeons with post-choice 'misinformation.' This misinformation group acquired the matching task significantly slower than the standard penalty-time group (that had no change in the sample following an error). Furthermore, acquisition of matching by a control group that received no penalty time fell midway between the other two groups, suggesting that the pigeons did not merely take more care in making choices because of the aversiveness of penalty-time. Thus, it appears that in the acquisition of matching-to-sample, when the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect choice, the pigeons can review or acquire information from the display. This is the first time that such an effect has been reported for a nonhuman species.
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