Abstract: Locating and capturing food are suggested as significant selection pressures for the evolution of various cognitive abilities in mammals and birds. The hypothesis is proposed that aspects of food procuring behaviour should be strongly indicative of particular cognitive abilities. Experimental data concerning higher mental abilities in mammals and birds are reviewed. These data deal with self-recognition studies, rule-learning experiments, number concept, deceptive abilities, tool-use and observational learning. A Darwinian approach reveals: (1) the adaptiveness of particular abilities for particular niches, (2) that in complex foraging environments, increases in foraging efficiencies in animals should result from the evolution of particular cognitive abilities, (3) that phenomena such as convergent mental evolution should be expected to have taken place across taxonomic groups for species exploiting similar niches, (4) that divergence in mental ability should also have taken place where related species have exploited dissimilar niches. Experimental data of higher mental abilities in animals concur with a Darwinian explanation for the distribution of these cognitive abilities and no anomalies have been found. There are, as a consequence, significant implications for the welfare of animals subject to training when training methodology gives little or no consideration to the various mental abilities of species.

Abstract: A preference test was used to demonstrate that gilts have the ability to associate two sets of neutral cues with two different periods of confinement and water deprivation and to anticipate the long-term consequences of their choice in the test. Twelve gilts housed in two large, straw-bedded pens were trained to go to two sets of 12 crates, positioned on each side of a choice point, for feeding twice a day. Following initial training, the two sets of crates were marked with contrasting visual patterns and the patterns were associated with either 30 min (`short' confinement) or 240 min (`long' confinement) of confinement in the crates after entry. During 16 days of preference testing, the gilts were sent alternately to one side or the other in the mornings and allowed to choose in the afternoons. Eight gilts chose the short confinement side more often, two, the long confinement side more often and two, each side an equal number of times, indicating that most gilts learned the association and preferred to be released shortly after feeding. However, gilts still chose the long confinement side on occasion, suggesting that they did not find 240 min of confinement very aversive. When the gilts were sent to the crates in the morning, their behaviour indicated that they expected to be released or confined depending on which crate they were in. The cognitive abilities of animals with respect to perception of time and anticipation of future events have important implications for their welfare. This study demonstrates that methods can be developed to ask animals about such things.

Abstract: Abstract. This paper examines the significance of imitation in non-human animals with respect to the phylogenetic origins of culture and cognitive complexity. It is argued that both imitation (learning about behaviour through nonspecific observation) and social learning (learning about the environment through conspecific observation) can mediate social transmission of information, and that neither is likely to play an important role in supporting behavioural traditions or culture. Current evidence suggests that imitation is unlikely to do this because it does not insulate information from modification through individual learning in the retention period between acquisition and re-transmission. Although insignificant in relation to culture, imitation apparently involves complex and little-understood cognitive operations. It is unique in requiring animals spontaneously to equate extrinsic visual input with proprioceptive and/or kinaesthetic feedback from their own actions, but not in requiring or implicating self-consciousness, representation, metarepresentation or a capacity for goal-directed action.