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Hanson, R. P., & Trainer, D. O. (1969). Significance of changing ecology on the epidemiology of arboviruses in the United States. Proc Annu Meet U S Anim Health Assoc, 73, 291–294.
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Boray, J. C. (1969). Experimental fascioliasis in Australia. Adv Parasitol, 7, 95–210.
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Washino, R. K., & Tempelis, C. H. (1967). Host-feeding patterns of Anopheles freeborni in the Sacramento Valley, California. J Med Entomol, 4(3), 311–314.
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Nowlan, S. S., & Deibel, R. H. (1967). Group Q streptococci. I. Ecology, serology, physiology, and relationship to established enterococci. J Bacteriol, 94(2), 291–296.
Abstract: The group Q streptococci possess unique serological and physiological characteristics which differentiate them from established enterococci. The group Q antigen was not demonstrable in all strains; however, all possessed the group D antigen. All group Q strains were physiologically similar regardless of whether or not they possessed the group Q antigen. These strains differed from the established enterococcal species, as they neither hydrolyzed arginine nor initiated growth in 1.0% methylene blue-milk. They also differed radically in the fermentation of various carbohydrates, especially the polyhydric sugar alcohols. The results indicate that the group Q streptococci constitute a unique taxonomic entity; the species designation Streptococcus avium sp. n. is suggested, owing to their characteristic occurrence in chicken fecal specimens.
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Menges, R. W., Furcolow, M. L., Selby, L. A., Habermann, R. T., & Smith, C. D. (1967). Ecologic studies of histoplasmosis. Am J Epidemiol, 85(1), 108–119.
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Arluke, A. (2004). The use of dogs in medical and veterinary training: understanding and approaching student uneasiness. J Appl Anim Welf Sci, 7(3), 197–204.
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Bennett, A. T. (1996). Do animals have cognitive maps? J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 219–224.
Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.
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Gallistel, C. R., & Cramer, A. E. (1996). Computations on metric maps in mammals: getting oriented and choosing a multi-destination route. J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 211–217.
Abstract: The capacity to construct a cognitive map is hypothesized to rest on two foundations: (1) dead reckoning (path integration); (2) the perception of the direction and distance of terrain features relative to the animal. A map may be constructed by combining these two sources of positional information, with the result that the positions of all terrain features are represented in the coordinate framework used for dead reckoning. When animals need to become reoriented in a mapped space, results from rats and human toddlers indicate that they focus exclusively on the shape of the perceived environment, ignoring non-geometric features such as surface colors. As a result, in a rectangular space, they are misoriented half the time even when the two ends of the space differ strikingly in their appearance. In searching for a hidden object after becoming reoriented, both kinds of subjects search on the basis of the object's mapped position in the space rather than on the basis of its relationship to a goal sign (e.g. a distinctive container or nearby marker), even though they have demonstrably noted the relationship between the goal and the goal sign. When choosing a multidestination foraging route, vervet monkeys look at least three destinations ahead, even though they are only capable of keeping a maximum of six destinations in mind at once.
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Etienne, A. S., Maurer, R., & Seguinot, V. (1996). Path integration in mammals and its interaction with visual landmarks. J Exp Biol, 199(Pt 1), 201–209.
Abstract: During locomotion, mammals update their position with respect to a fixed point of reference, such as their point of departure, by processing inertial cues, proprioceptive feedback and stored motor commands generated during locomotion. This so-called path integration system (dead reckoning) allows the animal to return to its home, or to a familiar feeding place, even when external cues are absent or novel. However, without the use of external cues, the path integration process leads to rapid accumulation of errors involving both the direction and distance of the goal. Therefore, even nocturnal species such as hamsters and mice rely more on previously learned visual references than on the path integration system when the two types of information are in conflict. Recent studies investigate the extent to which path integration and familiar visual cues cooperate to optimize the navigational performance.
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Aust, U., & Huber, L. (2006). Picture-object recognition in pigeons: evidence of representational insight in a visual categorization task using a complementary information procedure. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 32(2), 190–195.
Abstract: Success in tasks requiring categorization of pictorial stimuli does not prove that a subject understands what the pictures stand for. The ability to achieve representational insight is by no means a trivial one because it exceeds mere detection of 2-D features present in both the pictorial images and their referents. So far, evidence for such an ability in nonhuman species is weak and inconclusive. Here, the authors report evidence of representational insight in pigeons. After being trained on pictures of incomplete human figures, the birds responded significantly more to pictures of the previously missing parts than to nonrepresentative stimuli, which demonstrates that they actually recognized the pictures' representational content.
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