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Parr, L. A. (2004). Perceptual biases for multimodal cues in chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) affect recognition. Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 171–178.
Abstract: The ability of organisms to discriminate social signals, such as affective displays, using different sensory modalities is important for social communication. However, a major problem for understanding the evolution and integration of multimodal signals is determining how humans and animals attend to different sensory modalities, and these different modalities contribute to the perception and categorization of social signals. Using a matching-to-sample procedure, chimpanzees discriminated videos of conspecifics' facial expressions that contained only auditory or only visual cues by selecting one of two facial expression photographs that matched the expression category represented by the sample. Other videos were edited to contain incongruent sensory cues, i.e., visual features of one expression but auditory features of another. In these cases, subjects were free to select the expression that matched either the auditory or visual modality, whichever was more salient for that expression type. Results showed that chimpanzees were able to discriminate facial expressions using only auditory or visual cues, and when these modalities were mixed. However, in these latter trials, depending on the expression category, clear preferences for either the visual or auditory modality emerged. Pant-hoots and play faces were discriminated preferentially using the auditory modality, while screams were discriminated preferentially using the visual modality. Therefore, depending on the type of expressive display, the auditory and visual modalities were differentially salient in ways that appear consistent with the ethological importance of that display's social function.
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Parr, L. A. (2001). Cognitive and physiological markers of emotional awareness in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 223–229.
Abstract: The ability to understand emotion in others is one of the most important factors involved in regulating social interactions in primates. Such emotional awareness functions to coordinate activity among group members, enable the formation of long-lasting individual relationships, and facilitate the pursuit of shared interests. Despite these important evolutionary implications, comparative studies of emotional processing in humans and great apes are practically nonexistent, constituting a major gap in our understanding of the extent to which emotional awareness has played an important role in shaping human behavior and societies. This paper presents the results of two experiments that examine chimpanzees' responses to emotional stimuli. First, changes in peripheral skin temperature were measured while subjects viewed three categories of emotionally negative video scenes; conspecifics being injected with needles (INJ), darts and needles alone (DART), and conspecific directing agonism towards the veterinarians (CHASE). Second, chimpanzees were required to use facial expressions to categorize emotional video scenes, i.e., favorite food and objects and veterinarian procedures, according to their positive and negative valence. With no prior training, subjects spontaneously matched the emotional videos to conspecific facial expressions according to their shared emotional meaning, indicating that chimpanzee facial expressions are processed emotionally, as are human expressions. Decreases in peripheral skin temperature, indicative of negative sympathetic arousal, were significantly lower when subjects viewed the INJ and DART videos, compared to the CHASE videos, indicating greater negative arousal when viewing conspecifics being injected with needles, and needles themselves, than when viewing conspecifics engaged in general agonism.
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Parr, L. A., Winslow, J. T., & Hopkins, W. D. (1999). Is the inversion effect in rhesus monkeys face-specific? Anim. Cogn., 2(3), 123–129.
Abstract: This study investigated the face inversion effect in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Face stimuli consisted of ten black-and-white examples of unfamiliar rhesus monkey faces, brown capuchin faces, and human faces. Two non-face categories included ten examples of automobiles and abstract shapes. All stimuli were presented in a sequential matching-to-sample format using an automated joystick-testing paradigm. Subjects performed significantly better on upright than on inverted presentations of automobiles, rhesus monkey and capuchin faces, but not human faces or abstract shapes. These results are inconsistent with data from humans and chimpanzees that show the inversion effect only for categories of stimuli for which subjects have developed expertise. The inversion effect in rhesus monkeys does not appear to be face-specific, and should therefore not be used as a marker of specialized face processing in this species.
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Paukner, A., Anderson, J. R., & Fujita, K. (2006). Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition? Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 110–117.
Abstract: This study investigated capuchin monkeys' understanding of their own visual search behavior as a means to gather information. Five monkeys were presented with three tubes that could be visually searched to determine the location of a bait. The bait's visibility was experimentally manipulated, and the monkeys' spontaneous visual searches before tube selection were analyzed. In Experiment 1, three monkeys selected the baited tube significantly above chance; however, the monkeys also searched transparent tubes. In Experiment 2, a bent tube in which food was never visible was introduced. When the bent tube was baited, the monkeys failed to deduce the bait location and responded randomly. They also continued to look into the bent tube despite not gaining any pertinent information from it. The capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques. This difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2006). Grey parrot numerical competence: a review. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 377–391.
Abstract: The extent to which humans and nonhumans share numerical competency is a matter of debate. Some researchers argue that nonhumans, lacking human language, possess only a simple understanding of small quantities, generally less than four. Animals that have, however, received some training in human communication systems might demonstrate abilities intermediate between those of untrained nonhumans and humans. Here I review data for a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus) that has been shown to quantify sets of up to and including six items (including heterogeneous subsets) using vocal English labels, to comprehend these labels fully, and to have a zero-like concept. Recent research demonstrates that he can also sum small quantities. His success shows that he understands number symbols as abstract representations of real-world collections, and that his sense of number compares favorably to that of chimpanzees and young human children.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2004). “Insightful” string-pulling in Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) is affected by vocal competence. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 263–266.
Abstract: Four Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) were tested on their ability to obtain an item suspended from a string such that mutiple, repeated, coordinated beak-foot actions were required for success (e.g., Heinrich 1995). Those birds with little training in referential English requests (e.g. “I want X”) succeeded, whereas birds who could request the suspended item failed to obtain the object but engaged in repeated requesting.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). The value of the Piagetian framework for comparative cognitive studies. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 177–182.
Abstract: Although the Piagetian framework has been used by numerous researchers to compare cognitive abilities of diverse species, the system is often criticized as implemented. I examine the various criticisms, suggest ways in which the system can be improved, and argue for the need for descriptive systems such as the Piagetian framework to complement programs that look for cellular and molecular bases or mathematical models to explain behavior.
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Petruso, E. J., Fuchs, T., & Bingman, V. P. (2007). Time-space learning in homing pigeons (Columba livia): orientation to an artificial light source. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 181–188.
Abstract: Time-space learning reflects an ability to represent in memory event-stimulus properties together with the place and time of the event; a capacity well developed in birds. Homing pigeons were trained in an indoor octagonal arena to locate one food goal in the morning and a different food goal in the late afternoon. The goals differed with respect to their angular/directional relationship to an artificial light source located outside the arena. Further, the angular difference in reward position approximated the displacement of the sun's azimuth that would occur during the same time period. The experimental birds quickly learned the task, demonstrating the apparent ease with which birds can adopt an artificial light source to discriminate among alternative spatial responses at different times of the day. However, a novel midday probe session following successful learning revealed that the light source was interpreted as a stable landmark and not as a surrogate sun that would support compass orientation. Probe sessions following a phase shift of the light-dark cycle revealed that the mechanism employed to make the temporal discrimination was prevailingly based on an endogenous circadian rhythm and not an interval timing mechanism.
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Pongrácz, P., Vida, V., Bánhegyi, P., & Miklósi, Á. (2008). How does dominance rank status affect individual and social learning performance in the dog (Canis familiaris)? Anim. Cogn., 11, 75–82.
Abstract: Dogs can learn effectively to detour around a V-shaped fence after observing a demonstration from either an unfamiliar human or dog demonstrator. We found earlier that there is substantial individual variation between the dogs' performance, even when using the same experimental conditions. Here, we investigate if the subjects' relative dominance rank with other dogs had an effect on their social learning performance. On the basis of the owners' answers to a questionnaire, subjects from multi-dog homes were sorted into groups of dominant and subordinate dogs. In Experiment 1, dominant and subordinate dogs were tested without demonstration and we did not find any difference between the groups-they had similarly low detour performances on their own. In Experiment 2 and 3, dogs from single dog and multi-dog households were tested in the detour task with demonstration by an unfamiliar dog, or human, respectively. The results showed that social learning performance of the single dogs fell between the dominant and subordinate multi-dogs with both dog and human demonstration. Subordinate dogs displayed significantly better performance after having observed a dog demonstrator in comparison to dominant dogs. In contrast, the performance of dominant and subordinate dogs was almost similar, when they observed a human demonstrator. These results suggest that perceived dominance rank in its own group has a strong effect on social learning in dogs, but this effect seems to depend also on the demonstrator species. This finding reveals an intricate organization of the social structure in multi-dog households, which can contribute to individual differences existing among dogs.
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Potì, P. (2000). Aspects of spatial cognition in capuchins (Cebus apella): frames of reference and scale of space. Anim. Cogn., 3(2), 69–77.
Abstract: Frames of reference (i.e. sets of loci defining spatial locations) determine animals' performances in object search tasks. Reference frames are used at different scales. Although much behavioural research has been conducted on search strategies in many animal species, relatively little has been done on nonhuman primates. The two experiments reported here focused on the relative strength and the level of functioning of different reference frames at the small-scale level in four capuchins (Cebus apella). Two identical boxes and a landmark were placed on a round platform that could be rotated. A reward was hidden in subject's view under one box, and then a sash-screen was lowered to hide the rotation of the platform; the sash-screen was then lifted and the subject allowed to search for the reward. In experiment 1 the rewarded box was always the closer to the landmark, in experiment 2 it could be either the box closer to or the box farther from the landmark. Capuchins were successful after invisible rotations in experiment 1, but they failed after invisible rotations in experiment 2. Two possible explanations are proposed: (1) capuchins relied heavily on the left-right body-axis as a frame, and they could only substitute it with a simple association between the rewarded position and the landmark; or (2) capuchins failed because they chose external cues in the room, therefore on a inappropriate scale. The latter explanation allows two further inferences: (a) the capuchins' choice was indirectly related to their body-axes; and (b) the capuchins revealed a cognitive asymmetry between small-scale and large-scale spaces, thus differing from humans.
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