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Drummond, H., & Canales, C. (1998). Dominance between booby nestlings involves winner and loser effects. Anim. Behav., 55(6), 1669–1676.
Abstract: Two-chick broods of the blue-footed booby,Sula nebouxii, ordinarily exhibit stable dominance-subordinance, with the senior (first-hatched) chick habitually aggressive and the junior one habitually submissive (Nelson 1978,The Sulidae: Gannets and Boobies. London: Oxford University Press). But are both the subordinate and the dominant chick affected in their agonistic tendencies by early social experience? To answer this, we permanently paired subordinate and dominant chicks, 2-3 weeks old, with singletons (chicks lacking experience with a nestmate) by cross-fostering. During the first 4 h after pairing, subordinate chicks were seven times less aggressive than singletons and twice as likely to be submissive; dominant chicks were six times as aggressive as singletons. Although most subordinates consistently lost agonistic encounters during the first 10 days after pairing, the proportion of dominants that won decreased progressively until, by day 6, only about half of dominant chicks were winning. Early social experience has a strong but reversable training effect on both subordinates and dominants. Training as a subordinate showed more persistent effects than training as a dominant, possibly in part because our testing situation perpetuated subordinate training and counteracted dominant training.
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Duboscq, J., Agil, M., Engelhardt, A., & Thierry, B. (2014). The function of postconflict interactions: new prospects from the study of a tolerant species of primate. Anim. Behav., 87, 107–120.
Abstract: Aggression can generate anxiety, create uncertainty about its aftermath and jeopardise social relationships. Postconflict interactions serve as conflict management strategies to mitigate these consequences. Whereas postconflict interactions are well characterized in many animals, their functions are still insufficiently investigated. Four functional hypotheses have been proposed: stress reduction, relationship repair, self-protection and benign intent. We aimed to test these hypotheses in females of a tolerant macaque species, the crested macaque, Macaca nigra, under natural conditions, for three postconflict interactions: reconciliation, affiliation and aggression with third parties. Our results provide meaningful contrasts compared with findings in other species. We found no evidence that aggression had consequences for individuals' behavioural indicators of anxiety, although it increased the likelihood of secondary aggression with third parties. There was little evidence for the stress reduction hypothesis as the occurrence of any of the three postconflict interactions investigated had little effect on the measured behavioural indicators of anxiety. Conflict and dyad characteristics also had limited influence on anxiety. The relationship repair function was only partly validated: dyads with stronger bonds or that exchanged more support did not reconcile more often, but dyads with attributes related to the symmetry, stability and predictability (i.e. security) within relationships did. Patterns of initiation and directionality of postconflict interactions in this study population suggest that reconciliation may constitute the signalling of appeasement and benign intent. Furthermore, we found that aggression towards third parties may serve as a source of self-protection and reassertion of the females' social status. The distinctive pattern of postconflict management strategies revealed in wild female crested macaques appears to be related to their typically tolerant social style. These results demonstrate the usefulness of concomitantly studying aggression, postconflict interactions and their functions, to understand conflict management strategies comprehensively, while taking into account the level of social tolerance characterizing the studied society.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (2001). Bystander effects and the structure of dominance hierarchies. Behav. Ecol., 12(3), 348–352.
Abstract: Prior modeling work has found that pure winner and loser effects (i.e., changing the estimation of your own fighting ability as a function of direct prior experience) can have important consequences for hierarchy formation. Here these models are extended to incorporate “bystander effects.” When bystander effects are in operation, observers (i.e., bystanders) of aggressive interactions change their assessment of the protagonists' fighting abilities (depending on who wins and who loses). Computer simulations demonstrate that when bystander winner effects alone are at play, groups have a clear omega (bottom-ranking individual), while the relative position of other group members remains difficult to determine. When only bystander loser effects are in operation, wins and losses are randomly distributed throughout a group (i.e., no discernible hierarchy). When pure and bystander winner effects are jointly in place, a linear hierarchy, in which all positions (i.e., {alpha} to {delta} when N = 4) are clearly defined, emerges. Joint pure and bystander loser effects produce the same result. In principle one could test the predictions from the models developed here in a straightforward comparative study. Hopefully, the results of this model will spur on such studies in the future.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1998). A comment on Lafleur et al.'s re-evaluation of mate-choice copying in guppies. Anim. Behav., 56(2), 513–514.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1997). Winner and loser effects and the structure of dominance hierarchies. Behav. Ecol., 8(6), 583–587.
Abstract: In the literature on dominance hierarchies, “winner” and “loser” effects usually are denned as an increased probability of winning at time T, bated on victories at time T-l, T-2, etc, and an increased probability of losing at time T, based on losing at T-1, T-2, etc., respectively. Despite some early theoretical work on winner and loser effects, these factors and how they affect the structure of dominance hierarchies have not been examined in detail. I developed a computer simulation to examine winner and loser effects when such effects are independent of one another (as well as when they interact) and when combatants assess each other's resource-holding power. When winner effects alone were important, a hierarchy in which all individuals held an unambiguous rank was found. When only loser effects were important, a dear alpha individual always emerged, but the rank of others in the group was often unclear because of the scarcity of aggressive interactions. Increasing winner effects for a given value of the loser effect increase the number of individuals with unambiguous positions in a hierarchy and the converse is true for increasing the value of the loser effect for a given winner effect Although winner and loser effects have been documented in a number of species, no study has documented both winner and loser effects (using some controlled, pairwise testing system) and the detailed nature of behavioral interactions when individuals are in groups. I hope the results of this model will spur such studies in the future.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1996). Tit for Tat, by-product mutualism and predator inspection: a reply to Connor. Anim. Behav., 51(2), 455–457.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1992). Tendency to inspect predators predicts mortality risk in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata). Behav. Ecol., 3(2), 124–127.
Abstract: Although predator inspection behavior in fishes has become a model system for examining game theoretical strategies such as Tit for Tat, the direct costs of inspection behavior have not been quantified. To begin quantifying such costs, I conducted an experiment that examined mortality due to predation as a function of predator inspection in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata). Before being subjected to a “survivorship” experiment, guppies were assayed for their tendency to inspect a predator. Groups were then composed of six guppies that differed in their tendency to inspect. These groups were placed into a pool containing a predator, and survivorship of guppies with different inspection tendencies was noted 36 and 60 h later. Results indicate that individuals that display high degrees of inspection behavior suffer greater mortality than their noninspecting shoalmates.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1991). Dynamics of the TIT FOR TAT strategy during predator inspection in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata). Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 29(2), 127–132.
Abstract: One well-known solution to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is the TIT FOR TAT strategy. This strategy has three “characteristics” associated with it. TIT FOR TAT is nice (cooperates on the first move of a game), retaliatory (plays defect against an individual that defected on the prior move), and forgiving (cooperates with an individual which has defected in the past but cooperates in the present). Predator inspection behavior in guppies (Poecilia reticulata) was examined in order to determine whether guppies displayed these three characteristics. Results indicate that while it can be quite difficult to translate the abstract concepts of niceness, retaliation, and forgiveness into measurable behaviors, the data support the hypothesis that guppies display the three characteristics associated with the TIT FOR TAT strategy.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Alfieri, M. (1991). Guppies and the TIT FOR TAT strategy: preference based on past interaction. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 28(4), 243–246.
Abstract: The evolution of cooperation requires either (a) nonrandom interactions, such that cooperators preferentially interact with other cooperators, or (b) conditional behaviors, such that individuals act cooperatively primarily towards other cooperators. Although these conditions can be met without assuming sophisticated animal cognition, they are more likely to be met if animals can remember individuals with whom they have interacted, associate past interactions with these individuals, and base future behavior on this information. Here we show that guppies (Poecilia reticulata), in the context of predator inspection behavior, can identify and remember (for at least 4 h) the “more cooperative” among two conspecifics and subsequently choose to be near these individuals in future encounters.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Bekoff, M. (2003). Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model. Behav. Process., 60(3), 209–214.
Abstract: Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.
Keywords: Play; Fairness; Game theory
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