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Ruggieri, V. (1999). The running horse stops: the hypothetical role of the eyes in imagery of movement. Percept Mot Skills, 89(3 Pt 2), 1088–1092.
Abstract: To examine the hypothetical role of the eyes in visual mental imagery of movement 72 undergraduate women students in psychology were asked to imagine a running horse and then to produce the same mental image without moving the eyes and the head. In 59% of the subjects interesting modifications of the imagined movement appeared: 37% observed an inhibition of the movement and 19% an evident slowing up of the moving figure. The interpretation of this result was made by hypothesizing that the eyes are concretely involved in visual imagery processes.
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Vokey, J. R., Rendall, D., Tangen, J. M., Parr, L. A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). Visual kin recognition and family resemblance in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 118(2), 194–199.
Abstract: The male-offspring biased visual kin recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) reported by L. A. Parr and F. B. M. de Waal (1999) was replicated with human (Homo sapiens) participants and a principal components analysis (PCA) of pixel maps of the chimpanzee face photos. With the same original materials and methods, both humans and the PCA produced the same asymmetry in kin recognition as found with the chimpanzees. The PCA suggested that the asymmetry was a function of differences in the distribution of global characteristics associated with the framing of the faces in the son and daughter test sets. Eliminating potential framing biases, either by cropping the photos tightly to the faces or by rebalancing the recognition foils, eliminated the asymmetry but not human participants' ability to recognize chimpanzee kin.
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Flack, J. C., Jeannotte, L. A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). Play signaling and the perception of social rules by juvenile chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). J Comp Psychol, 118(2), 149–159.
Abstract: Prescriptive social rules are enforced statistical regularities. The authors investigated whether juvenile chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) recognize and use enforced statistical regularities to guide dyadic play behavior. They hypothesized (a) that proximity of adults, especially mothers of younger play partners, to play bouts will increase the play signaling of older partners and (b) that when juvenile-juvenile play bouts occur in proximity to adults, older partners will play at a lower intensity than when no adults are present. They found that older and younger partners increase their play signaling in the presence of the mothers of younger partners, particularly as the intensity of play bouts increases. In contrast to their hypothesis, older partners played more roughly when the mothers of younger partners were in proximity. These results suggest that juvenile chimpanzees increase play signaling to prevent termination of the play bouts by mothers of younger partners.
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Plotnik, J., Nelson, P. A., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Visual field information in the face perception of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1000, 94–98.
Abstract: Evidence for a visual field advantage (VFA) in the face perception of chimpanzees was investigated using a modification of a free-vision task. Four of six chimpanzee subjects previously trained on a computer joystick match-to-sample paradigm were able to distinguish between images of neutral face chimeras consisting of two left sides (LL) or right sides (RR) of the face. While an individual's ability to make this distinction would be unlikely to determine their suitability for the VFA tests, it was important to establish that distinctive information was available in test images. Data were then recorded on their choice of the LL vs. RR chimera as a match to the true, neutral image; a bias for one of these options would indicate an hemispatial visual field advantage. Results suggest that chimpanzees, unlike humans, do not exhibit a left visual field advantage. These results have important implications for studies on laterality and asymmetry in facial signals and their perception in primates.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Darwin's legacy and the study of primate visual communication. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1000, 7–31.
Abstract: After Charles Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, published in 1872, we had to wait 60 years before the theme of animal expressions was picked up by another astute observer. In 1935, Nadezhda Ladygina-Kohts published a detailed comparison of the expressive behavior of a juvenile chimpanzee and of her own child. After Kohts, we had to wait until the 1960s for modern ethological analyses of primate facial and gestural communication. Again, the focus was on the chimpanzee, but ethograms on other primates appeared as well. Our understanding of the range of expressions in other primates is at present far more advanced than that in Darwin's time. A strong social component has been added: instead of focusing on the expressions per se, they are now often classified according to the social situations in which they typically occur. Initially, quantitative analyses were sequential (i.e., concerned with temporal associations between behavior patterns), and they avoided the language of emotions. I will discuss some of this early work, including my own on the communicative repertoire of the bonobo, a close relative of the chimpanzee (and ourselves). I will provide concrete examples to make the point that there is a much richer matrix of contexts possible than the common behavioral categories of aggression, sex, fear, play, and so on. Primate signaling is a form of negotiation, and previous classifications have ignored the specifics of what animals try to achieve with their exchanges. There is also increasing evidence for signal conventionalization in primates, especially the apes, in both captivity and the field. This process results in group-specific or “cultural” communication patterns.
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Parr, L. A., Winslow, J. T., Hopkins, W. D., & de Waal, F. B. (2000). Recognizing facial cues: individual discrimination by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). J Comp Psychol, 114(1), 47–60.
Abstract: Faces are one of the most salient classes of stimuli involved in social communication. Three experiments compared face-recognition abilities in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). In the face-matching task, the chimpanzees matched identical photographs of conspecifics' faces on Trial 1, and the rhesus monkeys did the same after 4 generalization trials. In the individual-recognition task, the chimpanzees matched 2 different photographs of the same individual after 2 trials, and the rhesus monkeys generalized in fewer than 6 trials. The feature-masking task showed that the eyes were the most important cue for individual recognition. Thus, chimpanzees and rhesus monkeys are able to use facial cues to discriminate unfamiliar conspecifics. Although the rhesus monkeys required many trials to learn the tasks, this is not evidence that faces are not as important social stimuli for them as for the chimpanzees.
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Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
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Zentall, T. R., & Kaiser, D. H. (2005). Interval timing with gaps: gap ambiguity as an alternative to temporal decay. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 31(4), 484–486.
Abstract: C. V. Buhusi, D. Perera, and W. H. Meck (2005) proposed a hypothesis of timing in rats to account for the results of experiments that have used the peak procedure with gaps. According to this hypothesis, the introduction of a gap causes the animal's memory for the pregap interval to passively decay (subjectively shorten) in direct proportion to the duration and salience of the gap. Thus, animals should pause with short, nonsalient gaps but should reset their clock with longer, salient gaps. The present authors suggest that the ambiguity of the gap (i.e., the similarity between the gap and the intertrial interval in both appearance and relative duration) causes the animal to actively reset the clock and prevents adequate assessments of the fate of timed intervals prior to the gap. Furthermore, when the intertrial interval is discriminable from the gap, the evidence suggests that timed intervals prior to the gap are not lost but are retained in memory.
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Zentall, T. R. (2005). Timing, memory for intervals, and memory for untimed stimuli: the role of instructional ambiguity. Behav. Process., 70(3), 209–222.
Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.
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Klein, E. D., Bhatt, R. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Contrast and the justification of effort. Psychon Bull Rev, 12(2), 335–339.
Abstract: When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.
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