|
|
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2006). Mirrors of the mind. Sci Am, 295(5), 54–61.
|
|
|
|
Van Schaik, C. (2006). Why are some animals so smart? Sci Am, 294(4), 64–71.
|
|
|
|
Cowell, P. E., Fitch, R. H., & Denenberg, V. H. (1999). Laterality in animals: relevance to schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull, 25(1), 41–62.
Abstract: Anomalies in the laterality of numerous neurocognitive dimensions associated with schizophrenia have been documented, but their role in the etiology and early development of the disorder remain unclear. In the study of normative neurobehavioral organization, animal models have shed much light on the mechanisms underlying and the factors affecting adult patterns of both functional and structural asymmetry. Nonhuman species have more recently been used to investigate the environmental, genetic, and neuroendocrine factors associated with developmental language disorders in humans. We propose that the animal models used to study the basis of lateralization in normative development and language disorders such as dyslexia could be modified to investigate lateralized phenomena in schizophrenia.
|
|
|
|
Nguyen, N. H., Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Imitation of a two-action sequence by pigeons. Psychon Bull Rev, 12(3), 514–518.
Abstract: Developmental psychologists have described imitation as a process that suggests perspective-taking abilities. However, imitative behavior has been found in animals, which are generally not considered capable of taking the perspective of another. Previous studies with birds have demonstrated the imitation of a single response (sometimes referred to as action-level imitation). In the present experiment, we examined the extent to which pigeons would imitate an unfamiliar sequence of two behaviors (sometimes referred to as program-level imitation). Our results indicate that, although there are individual differences, pigeons show a significant tendency to match a demonstrated sequence of behavior involving, first, a response to a treadle (pecking at it or stepping on it) and, second, pushing aside a screen that blocks access to food (a left-vs.-right push).
|
|
|
|
Klein, E. D., Bhatt, R. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Contrast and the justification of effort. Psychon Bull Rev, 12(2), 335–339.
Abstract: When humans are asked to evaluate rewards or outcomes that follow unpleasant (e.g., high-effort) events, they often assign higher value to that reward. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive dissonance or justification of effort. There is now evidence that a similar phenomenon can be found in nonhuman animals. When demonstrated in animals, however, it has been attributed to contrast between the unpleasant high effort and the conditioned stimulus for food. In the present experiment, we asked whether an analogous effect could be found in humans under conditions similar to those found in animals. Adult humans were trained to discriminate between shapes that followed a high-effort versus a low-effort response. In test, participants were found to prefer shapes that followed the high-effort response in training. These results suggest the possibility that contrast effects of the sort extensively studied in animals may play a role in cognitive dissonance and other related phenomena in humans.
|
|
|
|
Clement, T. S., Feltus, J. R., Kaiser, D. H., & Zentall, T. R. (2000). “Work ethic” in pigeons: reward value is directly related to the effort or time required to obtain the reward. Psychon Bull Rev, 7(1), 100–106.
Abstract: Stimuli associated with less effort or with shorter delays to reinforcement are generally preferred over those associated with greater effort or longer delays to reinforcement. However, the opposite appears to be true of stimuli that follow greater effort or longer delays. In training, a simple simultaneous discrimination followed a single peck to an initial stimulus (S+FR1 S-FR1) and a different simple simultaneous discrimination followed 20 pecks to the initial stimulus (S+FR20 S-FR20). On test trials, pigeons preferred S+FR20 over S+FR1 and S-FR20 over S-FR1. These data support the view that the state of the animal immediately prior to presentation of the discrimination affects the value of the reinforcement that follows it. This contrast effect is analogous to effects that when they occur in humans have been attributed to more complex cognitive and social factors.
|
|
|
|
Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2000). Development of a single-code/default coding strategy in pigeons. Psychol Sci, 11(3), 261–264.
Abstract: We tested the hypothesis that pigeons could use a cognitively efficient coding strategy by training them on a conditional discrimination (delayed symbolic matching) in which one alternative was correct following the presentation of one sample (one-to-one), whereas the other alternative was correct following the presentation of any one of four other samples (many-to-one). When retention intervals of different durations were inserted between the offset of the sample and the onset of the choice stimuli, divergent retention functions were found. With increasing retention interval, matching accuracy on trials involving any of the many-to-one samples was increasingly better than matching accuracy on trials involving the one-to-one sample. Furthermore, following this test, pigeons treated a novel sample as if it had been one of the many-to-one samples. The data suggest that rather than learning each of the five sample-comparison associations independently, the pigeons developed a cognitively efficient single-code/default coding strategy.
|
|
|
|
Roper, K. L., & Zentall, T. R. (1993). Directed forgetting in animals. Psychol Bull, 113(3), 513–532.
Abstract: Directed-forgetting research with animals suggests that animals show disrupted test performance only under certain conditions. Important variables are (a) whether during training, the cue to forget (F cue) signals nonreward (i.e., that the trial is over) versus reward (i.e., that reinforcement can be obtained) and (b) given that reinforcement can be obtained on F-cue trials, whether the post-F-cue response pattern is compatible with the baseline memory task. It is proposed that some findings of directed forgetting can be attributed to trained response biases, whereas others may be attributable perhaps to frustration-produced interference. It is suggested that directed forgetting in animals should be studied using procedures similar to those used to study directed forgetting in humans. This can be accomplished by presenting, within a trial, both to-be-remembered and to-be-forgotten material.
|
|
|
|
Tibbetts, E. A. (2002). Visual signals of individual identity in the wasp Polistes fuscatus. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 269(1423), 1423–1428.
Abstract: Individual recognition is an essential component of interactions in many social systems, but insects are often thought incapable of the sophistication necessary to recognize individuals. If this were true, it would impose limits on the societies that insects could form. For example, queens and workers of the paper wasp Polistes fuscatus form a linear dominance hierarchy that determines how food, work and reproduction are divided within the colony. Such a stable hierarchy would be facilitated if individuals of different ranks have some degree of recognition. P. fuscatus wasps have, to our knowledge, previously undocumented variability in their yellow facial and abdominal markings that are intriguing candidates for signals of individual identity. Here, I describe these highly variable markings and experimentally test whether P. fuscatus queens and workers use these markings to identify individual nest-mates visually. I demonstrate that individuals whose yellow markings are experimentally altered with paint receive more aggression than control wasps who are painted in a way that does not alter their markings. Further, aggression declines towards wasps with experimentally altered markings as these novel markings become familiar to their nestmates. This evidence for individual recognition in P. fuscatus indicates that interactions between insects may be even more complex than previously anticipated.
Full
|
|
|
|
de Waal, F. B. M., Dindo, M., Freeman, C. A., & Hall, M. J. (2005). The monkey in the mirror: hardly a stranger. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 102(32), 11140–11147.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that monkeys see a stranger in the mirror, whereas apes and humans recognize themselves. In this study, we question the former assumption by using a detailed comparison of how monkeys respond to mirrors versus live individuals. Eight adult female and six adult male brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were exposed twice to three conditions: (i) a familiar same-sex partner, (ii) an unfamiliar same-sex partner, and (iii) a mirror. Females showed more eye contact and friendly behavior and fewer signs of anxiety in front of a mirror than they did when exposed to an unfamiliar partner. Males showed greater ambiguity, but they too reacted differently to mirrors and strangers. Discrimination between conditions was immediate, and blind coders were able to tell the difference between monkeys under the three conditions. Capuchins thus seem to recognize their reflection in the mirror as special, and they may not confuse it with an actual conspecific. Possibly, they reach a level of self-other distinction intermediate between seeing their mirror image as other and recognizing it as self.
|
|
