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Broad, K. D., Curley, J. P., & Keverne, E. B. (2006). Mother-infant bonding and the evolution of mammalian social relationships. Phil. Trans. Biol. Sci., 361(1476), 2199–2214.
Abstract: A wide variety of maternal, social and sexual bonding strategies have been described across mammalian species, including humans. Many of the neural and hormonal mechanisms that underpin the formation and maintenance of these bonds demonstrate a considerable degree of evolutionary conservation across a representative range of these species. However, there is also a considerable degree of diversity in both the way these mechanisms are activated and in the behavioural responses that result. In the majority of small-brained mammals (including rodents), the formation of a maternal or partner preference bond requires individual recognition by olfactory cues, activation of neural mechanisms concerned with social reward by these cues and gender-specific hormonal priming for behavioural output. With the evolutionary increase of neocortex seen in monkeys and apes, there has been a corresponding increase in the complexity of social relationships and bonding strategies together with a significant redundancy in hormonal priming for motivated behaviour. Olfactory recognition and olfactory inputs to areas of the brain concerned with social reward are downregulated and recognition is based on integration of multimodal sensory cues requiring an expanded neocortex, particularly the association cortex. This emancipation from olfactory and hormonal determinants of bonding has been succeeded by the increased importance of social learning that is necessitated by living in a complex social world and, especially in humans, a world that is dominated by cultural inheritance. © 2006 The Royal Society.
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Baragli, P., Cozzi, A., Rugani, R., Sighieria, C., & Regolin, L. (2008). Delayed search for non-social goals by Equids (Equus caballus and Equus asinus). In IESM 2008.
Abstract: Delayed-responses have been traditionally employed to investigate the temporal characteristics of animals“ ability to represent and recall objects that have disappeared. In the typical condition, the animal, usually a mammal, observes the experimenter hiding an interesting goal (e.g. some food) in a certain location. A delayed-response task (DRT) was administered to 4 female Esperia pony (2 years old) coming from a free-range breed (Frosinone, Italy) and to 7 female Amiata donkeys (4.2±2 years old) coming from a conservation stock (University of Pisa, Italy). The DRT's apparatus was located in a square fence. A single ”U-shaped“ screen (330x160x140 cm) made by wood shavings blocks was positioned in the centre of the fence. A gap (40x50 cm) on the ground was in the middle of the central side of the U-shaped-screen and served to make the food-attractor disappear. The food-attractor consisted in cereal flakes and fresh grass for ponies and cereal flakes for donkeys. A bucket full of food was placed on a dolly tied on a rope which could be pulled by an experimenter. In a preliminary training each animal was allowed to eat food from the bucket and, while the animal was eating, the dolly was gently pulled away from the animal, and beyond the screen through the gap. The subjects needed to move around of the screen in order to retrieve the food. As a reinforcement, they were allowed to eat some food from the bucket once behind the screen. From trial to trial, the bucket was presented farther and farther (starting with a distance of 1 m in front of the screen to reach 7 m). Therefore subjects were tested in the DRT requiring them to rejoin the bucket with the goal-food disappearing behind the screen as in the preliminary training but following a 10 s delay. For the DRT, the bucket was placed 7 m in front of the screen, 3 m away from the animal's starting area. Then the dolly was pulled away from the animal. Ten seconds after the disappearance of the dolly behind the screen the animal was released from the starting area. The DRT ended when the subject had reached the attractor behind the screen on 3 consecutive trials. Results showed that all animals were able to rejoin the food behind the screen after 10 s delay. The mean time of the delayed-response (mean±sd, in s) in the ponies (1st: 19.8±8; 2nd: 10.8±2.2; 3rd: 12.8±2.8) and in the donkeys (1st: 28.4±10; 2nd: 26.9±13; 3rd: 24.3±16.6) showed a trend to decrease from first trial to third. These preliminary results suggest that like other mammals our ponies and donkeys can maintain a working memory trace of the location where biologically attractive objects have been seen to disappear. In conclusion, this study paves the way to set up a viable model system for the investigation of the more sophisticated aspects of Equids” cognitive abilities such as working memory.
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Schwartz, B. L., & Evans, S. (2001). Episodic memory in primates. Am. J. Primatol., 55(2), 71–85.
Abstract: Episodic memory refers to a system of memory with the capacity to recollect specific events from an individual's life. Some psychologists have suggested that episodic memory is a uniquely human phenomenon. We challenge that idea and present evidence that great apes and other primates may possess episodic-like memory. We review criteria developed to assess episodic-like memory in nonhumans, and how they apply to primates. In particular, we discuss the criteria of Clayton et al. [2001], who stated that episodic-like memory is based on the retrieval of multiple and integrated components of an event. We then review eight studies examining memory in great apes and apply the Clayton et al. criteria to each of them. We summarize the evidence that is compatible with the existence of episodic-like memory, although none of the data completely satisfy the Clayton et al. criteria. Morover, feelings of pastness and feelings of confidence, which mark episodic memory in humans, have not been empirically addressed in nonhuman primates. Future studies should be directed at these aspects of memory in primates. We speculate on the functional significance of episodic memory in nonhuman primates.
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Neuringer, A. (2004). Reinforced variability in animals and people: implications for adaptive action. Am Psychol, 59(9), 891–906.
Abstract: Although reinforcement often leads to repetitive, even stereotyped responding, that is not a necessary outcome. When it depends on variations, reinforcement results in responding that is diverse, novel, indeed unpredictable, with distributions sometimes approaching those of a random process. This article reviews evidence for the powerful and precise control by reinforcement over behavioral variability, evidence obtained from human and animal-model studies, and implications of such control. For example, reinforcement of variability facilitates learning of complex new responses, aids problem solving, and may contribute to creativity. Depression and autism are characterized by abnormally repetitive behaviors, but individuals afflicted with such psychopathologies can learn to vary their behaviors when reinforced for so doing. And reinforced variability may help to solve a basic puzzle concerning the nature of voluntary action.
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Straub, A. (2007). An intelligent crow beats a lab. Science, 316(5825), 688.
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Ikeda, M., Patterson, K., Graham, K. S., Ralph, M. A. L., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). A horse of a different colour: do patients with semantic dementia recognise different versions of the same object as the same? Neuropsychologia, 44(4), 566–575.
Abstract: Ten patients with semantic dementia resulting from bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy, and 10 matched controls, were tested on an object recognition task in which they were invited to choose (from a four-item array) the picture representing “the same thing” as an object picture that they had just inspected and attempted to name. The target in the response array was never physically identical to the studied picture but differed from it – in the various conditions – in size, angle of view, colour or exemplar (e.g. a different breed of dog). In one test block for each patient, the response array was presented immediately after the studied picture was removed; in another block, a 2 min filled delay was inserted between study and test. The patients performed relatively well when the studied object and target response differed only in the size of the picture on the page, but were significantly impaired as a group in the other three type-of-change conditions, even with no delay between study and test. The five patients whose structural brain imaging revealed major right-temporal atrophy were more impaired overall, and also more affected by the 2 min delay, than the five patients with an asymmetric pattern characterised by predominant left-sided atrophy. These results are interpreted in terms of a hypothesis that successful classification of an object token as an object type is not a pre-semantic ability but rather results from interaction of perceptual and conceptual processing.
Keywords: Adult; Aged; Anomia/diagnosis/psychology; Atrophy; *Attention; Color Perception; Dementia/*diagnosis/psychology; *Discrimination Learning; Dominance, Cerebral; Female; Humans; Male; *Memory, Short-Term; Middle Aged; Neuropsychological Tests; Orientation; *Pattern Recognition, Visual; Reference Values; Retention (Psychology); Semantics; Size Perception; Temporal Lobe/pathology
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Murray, J. K., Singer, E. R., Morgan, K. L., Proudman, C. J., & French, N. P. (2004). Memory decay and performance-related information bias in the reporting of scores by event riders. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 63(3-4), 173–182.
Abstract: We used data from a case-control study investigating risk factors for horse falls in the cross-country phase of eventing in Great Britain (GB) to examine evidence for memory decay and information bias. Responses to two questions obtained by telephone for 173 cases and 521 controls were examined for evidence of differential reporting according to the respondent's case-control status and performance in the dressage and cross-country phases of competitions. Information bias was found in the accuracy of reporting dressage penalty scores when analysed as a function of performance level (good/poor). Poor dressage performers were less likely to report accurate dressage scores than good performers. The accuracy of reporting dressage scores decreased as the time between the event and questionnaire completion increased, with no case-control interaction. Competitors who incurred cross-country jumping penalties at the event preceding the selected event reported their cross-country scores with less accuracy when compared with competitors who incurred no penalties. No information bias was found when the reporting of dressage and cross-country scores were analysed as a function of respondent category (case/control).
Keywords: Reporting bias; Memory decay; Risk factors; Horse; Cross-country
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Marinier, S. L., & Alexander, A. J. (1994). The use of a maze in testing learning and memory in horses. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 39(2), 177–182.
Abstract: Two mazes were used to test the learning ability and memory of horses, and changes in these abilities. Testing was done on four occasions. On Occasion 1, the horses were run through Maze A until they had reached the criterion of three consecutive correct runs. A week later (Occasion 2), they were retested in Maze A to the same criterion as a measure of memory. On Occasion 3,2 months later, the horses were run through Mazes A and B until they reached the criterion. Occasion 4 took place 1 week later when they were run through Mazes A and B. An estimation of changes in ability to learn came from a comparison of results from Occasions 1 and 3. Similarly, changes in ability to remember came from a comparison of results from Occasions 2 and 4. Nine horses with a variable amount of riding training were the subjects. All horses were able to learn the maze, but the ability varied among horses. There was no obvious correlation between quality of handling of the horses and learning ability. Once the horses had learned the maze, they remembered it perfectly on subsequent occasions. There were changes in the memory and learning ability of the horses, but no clear explanation for this could be found.
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Matsushima, T., Izawa, E. - I., Aoki, N., & Yanagihara, S. (2003). The mind through chick eyes: memory, cognition and anticipation. Zoolog Sci, 20(4), 395–408.
Abstract: To understand the animal mind, we have to reconstruct how animals recognize the external world through their own eyes. For the reconstruction to be realistic, explanations must be made both in their proximate causes (brain mechanisms) as well as ultimate causes (evolutionary backgrounds). Here, we review recent advances in the behavioral, psychological, and system-neuroscience studies accomplished using the domestic chick as subjects. Diverse behavioral paradigms are compared (such as filial imprinting, sexual imprinting, one-trial passive avoidance learning, and reinforcement operant conditioning) in their behavioral characterizations (development, sensory and motor aspects of functions, fitness gains) and relevant brain mechanisms. We will stress that common brain regions are shared by these distinct paradigms, particularly those in the ventral telencephalic structures such as AIv (in the archistriatum) and LPO (in the medial striatum). Neuronal ensembles in these regions could code the chick's anticipation for forthcoming events, particularly the quality/quantity and the temporal proximity of rewards. Without the internal representation of the anticipated proximity in LPO, behavioral tolerance will be lost, and the chick makes impulsive choice for a less optimized option. Functional roles of these regions proved compatible with their anatomical counterparts in the mammalian brain, thus suggesting that the neural systems linking between the memorized past and the anticipated future have remained highly conservative through the evolution of the amniotic vertebrates during the last 300 million years. With the conservative nature in mind, research efforts should be oriented toward a unifying theory, which could explain behavioral deviations from optimized foraging, such as “naive curiosity,” “contra-freeloading,” “Concorde fallacy,” and “altruism.”
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Williams, N. (1997). Evolutionary psychologists look for roots of cognition (Vol. 275).
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