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Anderson, J. R., Kuroshima, H., Kuwahata, H., & Fujita, K. (2004). Do squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) predict that looking leads to touching? Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 185–192.
Abstract: Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were tested using an expectancy violation procedure to assess whether they use an actor's gaze direction, signaled by congruent head and eye orientation, to predict subsequent behavior. The monkeys visually habituated to a repeated sequence in which the actor (a familiar human or a puppet) looked at an object and then picked it up, but they did not react strongly when the actor looked at an object but then picked up another object. Capuchin monkeys' responses in the puppet condition were slightly more suggestive of expectancy. There was no differential responding to congruent versus incongruent look-touch sequences when familiarization trials were omitted. The weak findings contrast with a strongly positive result previously reported for tamarin monkeys. Additional evidence is required before concluding that behavior prediction based on gaze cues typifies primates; other approaches for studying how they process attention cues are indicated.
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Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297–299.
Abstract: During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.
Keywords: Aging; Animals; Cebus/*psychology; Choice Behavior; *Cooperative Behavior; Female; Male; *Reward; Social Justice
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Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). A concept of value during experimental exchange in brown capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella. Folia Primatol (Basel), 75(5), 317–330.
Abstract: We evaluated the response of brown capuchin monkeys to two differentially valued tokens in an experimental exchange situation akin to a simple barter. Monkeys were given a series of three tests to evaluate their ability to associate tokens with food, then their responses were examined in a barter situation in which tokens were either limited or unlimited. Capuchins did not perform barter in the typical sense, returning the tokens which were associated with the reward. However, females, but not males, showed a different response, preferring the higher-value token. This may indicate that they learned to prefer one token over the other rather than to associate the tokens with their specific rewards. This sex difference parallels previous findings of greater reciprocity in female brown capuchins than in males.
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Brosnan, S. F., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2004). Socially learned preferences for differentially rewarded tokens in the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). J Comp Psychol, 118(2), 133–139.
Abstract: Social learning is assumed to underlie traditions, yet evidence indicating social learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), which exhibit traditions, is sparse. The authors tested capuchins for their ability to learn the value of novel tokens using a previously familiar token-exchange economy. Capuchins change their preferences in favor of a token worth a high-value food reward after watching a conspecific model exchange 2 differentially rewarded tokens, yet they fail to develop a similar preference after watching tokens paired with foods in the absence of a conspecific model. They also fail to learn that the value of familiar tokens has changed. Information about token value is available in all situations, but capuchins seem to pay more attention in a social situation involving novel tokens.
Keywords: Animals; Behavior, Animal; Cebus; *Choice Behavior; Female; *Learning; Male; *Reward; *Social Behavior
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Brosnan, S. F., Freeman, C., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2006). Partner's behavior, not reward distribution, determines success in an unequal cooperative task in capuchin monkeys. Am. J. Primatol., 68(7), 713–724.
Abstract: It was recently demonstrated that capuchin monkeys notice and respond to distributional inequity, a trait that has been proposed to support the evolution of cooperation in the human species. However, it is unknown how capuchins react to inequitable rewards in an unrestricted cooperative paradigm in which they may freely choose both whether to participate and, within the bounds of their partner's behavior, which reward they will receive for their participation. We tested capuchin monkeys with such a design, using a cooperative barpull, which has been used with great success in the past. Contrary to our expectations, the equity of the reward distribution did not affect success or pulling behavior. However, the behavior of the partner in an unequal situation did affect overall success rates: pairs that had a tendency to alternate which individual received the higher-value food in unequal reward situations were more than twice as successful in obtaining rewards than pairs in which one individual dominated the higher-value food. This ability to equitably distribute rewards in inherently biased cooperative situations has profound implications for activities such as group hunts, in which multiple individuals work together for a single, monopolizable reward.
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Cleveland, A., Rocca, A. M., Wendt, E. L., & Westergaard, G. C. (2004). Transport of tools to food sites in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 193–198.
Abstract: Tool use and transport represent cognitively important aspects of early hominid evolution, and nonhuman primates are often used as models to examine the cognitive, ecological, morphological and social correlates of these behaviors in order to gain insights into the behavior of our early human ancestors. In 2001, Jalles-Filho et al. found that free-ranging capuchin monkeys failed to transport tools (stones) to food sites (nuts), but transported the foods to the tool sites. This result cast doubt on the usefulness of Cebus to model early human tool-using behavior. In this study, we examined the performance of six captive tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in a tool transport task. Subjects were provided with the opportunity to transport two different tools to fixed food reward sites when the food reward was visible from the tool site and when the food reward was not visible from the tool site. We found that the subjects quickly and readily transported probing tools to an apparatus baited with syrup, but rarely transported stones to a nut-cracking apparatus. We suggest that the performance of the capuchins here reflects an efficient foraging strategy, in terms of energy return, among wild Cebus monkeys.
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de Waal, F. B. (1997). Food transfers through mesh in brown capuchins. J Comp Psychol, 111(4), 370–378.
Abstract: Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) share food even if their partner is behind a mesh restraint. Pairs of adult capuchins were moved into a test chamber in which 1 monkey received cucumber pieces for 20 min and the other received apple slices during the following 20 min. Tolerant transfers of food occurred reciprocally among females: The rate of transfer from Female B to A in the second test phase varied with the rate from Female A to B in the first test phase. Several social mechanisms may explain this reciprocity. Whereas this study does not contradict cognitively complex explanations (e.g., mental record keeping of given and received food), the results are consistent with a rather simple explanation: that food sharing reflects a combination of affiliative tendency and high tolerance. The study suggests that sharing mechanisms may be different for adult male capuchins, with males sharing food more readily and less discriminatingly than females.
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de Waal, F. B., & Berger, M. L. (2000). Payment for labour in monkeys. Nature, 404(6778), 563.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). How animals do business. Sci Am, 292(4), 54–61.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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