|
|
Baragli, P., Demuru, E., & Palagi, E. (2015). Mirror on the wall, who is the horsest of our all? Self-recognition in Equus caballus. In Proceedings of the 3. International Equine Science Meeting.
Abstract: Mirror Self-Recognition (MSR) is an extremely rare capacity in the animal kingdom that reveals the emergence of complex cognitive capacities (de Waal 2008). So far, MSR has been reported only in humans, chimpanzees (Gallup, 1970), bottlenose dolphins (Reiss and Marino, 2001) and Asian elephants (Plotnik et al, 2006), all species characterized by a highly developed cognition. There is growing evidence that domestic horses posses high cognitive abilities, such as cross-modal individual recognition (Proops et al, 2009), triadic post-conflict reunion to maintain social homeostasis (Cozzi et al, 2010), complex communicative systems (Whatan and McComb, 2014), flexibility in problem-solving (Lovrovich et al, 2015), and long-term memory (Hanggi and Ingersoll, 2009). All these capacities make horses a good candidate to test the ability of MSR in a domestic species. Through a classical MSR experimental paradigm (de Waal 2008) we tested eight horses living in social groups under semi-natural conditions (from the Italian Horse Protection rescue centre). Animals showing MSR typically go through four stages (Plotnik et al, 2006): (i) social response, (ii) physical mirror inspection (e.g., looking behind the mirror), (iii) repetitive mirror-testing behaviour (i.e., the beginning of mirror understanding), and (iv) self-directed behaviour (i.e., recognition of the mirror image as self). The final stage, known as the “mark-test”, is verified when a subject spontaneously uses the mirror to check for a coloured artificial mark on its own body which it cannot perceive otherwise. The horses underwent a three-phase “mark-test”: 1) with sham mark (transparent ultrasound water gel) positioned on both side at jaw level, 2) mark (yellow eye shadow mixed with ultrasound water gel) positioned on left side of jaw (with sham mark on the right), 3) mark (yellow eye shadow mixed with ultrasound water gel) positioned on right side of jaw (with sham mark on the left)
The mirror was one 0.5-cm-thick piece of 140x220-cm plexiglass glue on wood. Each test lasted one hour, horses were tested once a day, in consecutive days and at the same time. Our preliminary result on 1 horse shows some changes in self-directed behaviours which can be attributed to presence of the coloured mark. Firstly, the presence of the coloured mark significantly increased the frequency of scratching on both sides of the muzzle (p < 0.0001). The most intriguing result (p < 0.0001) comes from the comparison of the scratching rates directed towards the coloured mark side (N = 41) and the sham mark side (N = 23). Under the control condition (i.e. sham mark on both sides) no statistical difference was found for the scratching rates directed to the muzzle sides (dx N = 8; sx N = 5). Although further analyses are needed to confirm these preliminary results, our finding opens new scenarios about the evolution of Mirror Self-Recognition. The capacity of horses to recognize themselves in a mirror may be the outcome of an evolutionary convergence process driven by the cognitive pressures imposed by a complex social system and maintained despite thousands years of domestication.
Keywords:
Domestic horse · Mark test · Socio-cognitive skills · Self-awareness
References
De Waal FBM (2008) The thief in the mirror. PloS Biol 6(8):e201
Gallup GG Jr (1970) Chimpanzees: Self-recognition. Science 167: 86-87.
Reiss D, Marino L (2001). Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: A case of cognitive convergence. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 98:5937-5942.
Plotnik J, de Waal FBM, Reiss D (2006) Self-recognition in an Asian elephant. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103: 17053-17057.
Proops L, McComb K, Reby D. (2009) Cross-modal individual recognition in domestic horses (Equus caballus). Proc Nat Acad Sci USA;106:947-951.
Cozzi A, Sighieri C, Gazzano A, Nicol CJ, Baragli P. Post-conflict friendly reunion in a permanent group of horses (Equus caballus). Behav Process 2010;85:185-190.
Wathan J, McComb K. The eyes and ears are visual indicators of attention in domestic horses. Curr Biol 2014;24(15): R677-R679.
Lovrovich P, Sighieri C, Baragli P (2015) Following human-given cues or not? Horses (Equus caballus) get smarter and change strategy in a delayed three choice task. Appl Anim Behav Sci, in press.
Hanggi EB, Ingersoll JF. (2009) Long-term memory for categories and concepts in horses (Equus caballus). Anim Cogn; 12:451-462.
|
|
|
|
Broom, D. M. (2010). Cognitive ability and awareness in domestic animals and decisions about obligations to animals. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 126(1-2), 1–11.
Abstract: Observation of behaviour, especially social behaviour, and experimental studies of learning and brain function give us information about the complexity of concepts that animals have. In order to learn to obtain a resource or carry out an action, domestic animals may: relate stimuli such as human words to the reward, perform sequences of actions including navigation or detours, discriminate amongst other individuals, copy the actions of other individuals, distinguish between individuals who do or do not have information, or communicate so as to cause humans or other animals to carry out actions. Some parrots, that are accustomed to humans but not domesticated, can use words to have specific meanings. In some cases, stimuli, individuals or actions are remembered for days, weeks or years. Events likely to occur in the future may be predicted and changes over time taken into account. Scientific evidence for the needs of animals depends, in part, on studies assessing motivational strength whose methodology depends on the cognitive ability of the animals. Recognition and learning may be associated with changes in physiology, behaviour and positive or negative feelings. Learning and other complex behaviour can result in affect and affect can alter cognition. The demonstration of cognitive bias gives indications about affect and welfare but should be interpreted in the light of other information. All of the information mentioned so far helps to provide evidence about sentience and the level of awareness. The term sentience implies a range of abilities, not just the capacity to have some feelings. The reluctance of scientists to attribute complex abilities and feelings to non-humans has slowed the development of this area of science. Most people consider that they have obligations to some animals. However, they might protect animals because they consider that an animal has an intrinsic value, or because of their concern for its welfare. In social species, there has been selection promoting moral systems that might result in behaviours such as attempts to avoid harm to others, collaboration and other altruistic behaviour. An evaluation of such behaviour may provide one of the criteria for decisions about whether or not to protect animals of a particular species. Other criteria may be: whether or not the animal is known as an individual, similarity to humans, level of awareness, extent of feelings, being large, being rare, being useful or having aesthetic quality for humans. Cognitive ability should also be considered when designing methods of enriching the environments of captive animals.
|
|
|
|
Broom, D. M., Sena, H., & Moynihan, K. L. (2009). Pigs learn what a mirror image represents and use it to obtain information. Anim. Behav., 78(5), 1037–1041.
Abstract: Mirror usage has been taken to indicate some degree of awareness in animals. Can pigs, Sus scrofa, obtain information from a mirror? When put in a pen with a mirror in it, young pigs made movements while apparently looking at their image. After 5 h spent with a mirror, the pigs were shown a familiar food bowl, visible in the mirror but hidden behind a solid barrier. Seven out of eight pigs found the food bowl in a mean of 23 s by going away from the mirror and around the barrier. Naïve pigs shown the same looked behind the mirror. The pigs were not locating the food bowl by odour, did not have a preference for the area where the food bowl was and did not go to that area when the food bowl was visible elsewhere. To use information from a mirror and find a food bowl, each pig must have observed features of its surroundings, remembered these and its own actions, deduced relationships among observed and remembered features and acted accordingly. This ability indicates assessment awareness in pigs. The results may have some effects on the design of housing conditions for pigs and may lead to better pig welfare.
|
|
|
|
Schwab, C., & Huber, L. (2006). Obey or not obey? Dogs (Canis familiaris) behave differently in response to attentional states of their owners. J Comp Psychol, 120(3), 169–175.
Abstract: Sixteen domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) were tested in a familiar context in a series of 1-min trials on how well they obeyed after being told by their owner to lie down. Food was used in 1/3 of all trials, and during the trial the owner engaged in 1 of 5 activities. The dogs behaved differently depending on the owner's attention to them. When being watched by the owner, the dogs stayed lying down most often and/or for the longest time compared with when the owner read a book, watched TV, turned his or her back on them, or left the room. These results indicate that the dogs sensed the attentional state of their owners by judging observable behavioral cues such as eye contact and eye, head, and body orientation.
|
|
|
|
Lomas, C. A., Piggins, D., & Phillips, C. J. C. (1998). Visual awareness. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 57(3-4), 247–257.
Abstract: Awareness varies between different species and humans can never truly appreciate what it is like to be another individual, either of the same species or another. Visual perceptual faculties provide some evidence of the extent to which domesticated animals derive information from objects in their environment, whilst changes in behaviour resulting from different visual stimuli can also provide valuable information on the state of visual awareness. Extensive processing of potentially visual information must occur in all domesticated species, but is much less well understood than purely sensory based information. For example, sensory aspects of colour vision are reasonably well understood, but the role of wavelength variables in an animal's cognition and its colour experience is not clear. Considerable use is made of diurnal changes in photoperiod to synchronise endogenous rhythms to particular times of the day and the year. Variation in light intensity in natural images is also important for social reasons for animals to be able to discriminate between, e.g., different faces, but little is known about intensity preferences or the effects of intensity on behaviour. It appears likely that in many cases visual stimuli represent some of the most important influences on an animal's awareness, either alone or in combination with, e.g., olfactory cues. However, a much greater understanding of their processing is required before we can make useful deductions about visual awareness in domesticated animals.
|
|
|
|
Piggins, D., & Phillips, C. J. C. (1998). Awareness in domesticated animals--concepts and definitions. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 57(3-4), 181–200.
Abstract: Humans will probably never experience the awareness of another species, but adopting a broad concept of awareness leads to the conclusion that other species have some awareness. The existence of a more complex mind in humans, compared with other species, leads some to suggest that awareness only exists in humans. We postulate that humans possess a significantly increased level of awareness, facilitated in particular by the acquisition of language, but that generally animals possess a level of awareness that is appropriate to their needs. Categories of awareness can be devised by identifying levels, such as are used in the identification of the conscious state in humans, or by ranking states of awareness in order of complexity. A scheme is proposed that combines these two approaches, which is considered suitable for use with domesticated animals. The advantages of identifying awareness as being sensation-, perception- or cognition-based are discussed, as well as the possibility of a scheme based on the degree and site of CNS processing. Finally, the acquisition of awareness by learning and inheritance is considered, and it is argued that in variable environments, animals will evolve increased awareness, whereas in very stable environments the energetic cost of awareness will encourage the evolution of less aware animals.
|
|
|
|
Gould, J. L. (2004). Animal cognition. Curr Biol, 14(10), R372–5.
|
|
|
|
Anderson, J. R. (1995). Self-recognition in dolphins: credible cetaceans; compromised criteria, controls, and conclusions. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 239–243.
|
|
|
|
Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
|
|
|
|
Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
|
|
