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Holekamp, K. E., Sakai, S. T., & Lundrigan, B. L. (2007). Social intelligence in the spotted hyena (Crocuta crocuta). Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 362(1480), 523–538.
Abstract: If the large brains and great intelligence characteristic of primates were favoured by selection pressures associated with life in complex societies, then cognitive abilities and nervous systems with primate-like attributes should have evolved convergently in non-primate mammals living in large, elaborate societies in which social dexterity enhances individual fitness. The societies of spotted hyenas are remarkably like those of cercopithecine primates with respect to size, structure and patterns of competition and cooperation. These similarities set an ideal stage for comparative analysis of social intelligence and nervous system organization. As in cercopithecine primates, spotted hyenas use multiple sensory modalities to recognize their kin and other conspecifics as individuals, they recognize third-party kin and rank relationships among their clan mates, and they use this knowledge adaptively during social decision making. However, hyenas appear to rely more intensively than primates on social facilitation and simple rules of thumb in social decision making. No evidence to date suggests that hyenas are capable of true imitation. Finally, it appears that the gross anatomy of the brain in spotted hyenas might resemble that in primates with respect to expansion of frontal cortex, presumed to be involved in the mediation of social behaviour.
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Sterling, E. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (1999). Tool use, aye-ayes, and sensorimotor intelligence. Folia Primatol (Basel), 70(1), 8–16.
Abstract: Humans, chimpanzees, capuchins and aye-ayes all display an unusually high degree of encephalization and diverse omnivorous extractive foraging. It has been suggested that the high degree of encephalization in aye-ayes may be the result of their diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging behaviors. In combination with certain forms of tool use, omnivorous extractive foraging has been hypothesized to be linked to higher levels of sensorimotor intelligence (stages 5 or 6). Although free-ranging aye-ayes have not been observed to use tools directly in the context of their extractive foraging activities, they have recently been reported to use lianas as tools in a manner that independently suggests that they may possess stage 5 or 6 sensorimotor intelligence. Although other primate species which display diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging have been tested for sensorimotor intelligence, aye-ayes have not. We report a test of captive aye-ayes' comprehension of tool use in a situation designed to simulate natural conditions. The results support the view that aye-ayes do not achieve stage 6 comprehension of tool use, but rather may use trial-and-error learning to develop tool-use behaviors. Other theories for aye-aye encephalization are considered.
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Previc, F. H. (2002). Thyroid hormone production in chimpanzees and humans: implications for the origins of human intelligence. Am J Phys Anthropol, 118(4), 402–3; discussion 404–5.
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Heinrich, B., & Bugnyar, T. (2007). Just how smart are ravens? Sci Am, 296(4), 64–71.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Social animals prove their smarts (Vol. 312).
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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Van Schaik, C. (2006). Why are some animals so smart? Sci Am, 294(4), 64–71.
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). The value of the Piagetian framework for comparative cognitive studies. Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 177–182.
Abstract: Although the Piagetian framework has been used by numerous researchers to compare cognitive abilities of diverse species, the system is often criticized as implemented. I examine the various criticisms, suggest ways in which the system can be improved, and argue for the need for descriptive systems such as the Piagetian framework to complement programs that look for cellular and molecular bases or mathematical models to explain behavior.
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Borsari, A., & Ottoni, E. B. (2005). Preliminary observations of tool use in captive hyacinth macaws (Anodorhynchus hyacinthinus). Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 48–52.
Abstract: Many animals use tools (detached objects applied to another object to produce an alteration in shape, position, or structure) in foraging, for instance, to access encapsulated food. Descriptions of tool use by hyacinth macaws (Anodorhynchus hyacinthinus) are scarce and brief. In order to describe one case of such behavior, six captive birds were observed while feeding. Differences in nut manipulation and opening proficiency between adults and juveniles were recorded. The tools may be serving as a wedge, preventing the nut from slipping and/or rotating, reducing the impact of opening, or providing mechanical aid in its positioning and/or use of force. Data suggest that birds of this species have an innate tendency to use objects (tools) as aids during nut manipulation and opening.
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Ducoing, A. M., & Thierry, B. (2005). Tool-use learning in Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana). Anim. Cogn., 8(2), 103–113.
Abstract: The transmission of tool use is a rare event in monkeys. Such an event arose in a group of semi-free-ranging Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) in which leaning a pole against the park's fence (branch leaning) appeared and spread to several males. This prompted us to test individual and social learning of this behavior in seven young males. In the first experiment, three males learned individually to obtain a food reward using a wooden pole as a climbing tool. They began using the pole to retrieve the reward only when they could alternatively experience acting on the object and reaching the target. In a second experiment, we first tested whether four other subjects could learn branch leaning after having observed a group-mate performing the task. Despite repeated opportunities to observe the demonstrator, they did not learn to use the pole as a tool. Hence we exposed the latter subjects to individual learning trials and they succeeded in the task. Tool use was not transmitted in the experimental situation, which contrasts with observations in the park. We can conclude that the subjects were not able to recognize the target as such. It is possible that they recognized it and learned the task individually when we alternated the opportunity to act upon the object and to reach the reward. This suggests that these macaques could then have associated the action they exercised upon the pole and the use of the pole as a means to reach the reward.
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