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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1997). Signalling among relatives. I. Is costly signalling too costly? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 352(1353), 609–617.
Abstract: ahavi's handicap principle,originally proposed as an explanation for sexual selection ofelaborate male traits, suggests that a sufficient cost to dishonest signals can outweigh the rewards of deception and allow individuals to communicate honestly. Maynard Smith (1991) and Johnstone and Grafen (1992) introduce the Sir Philip Sidney game in order to extend the handicap principle to interactions among related individuals, and to demonstrate that stable costly signalling systems can exist among relatives.
In this paper we demonstrate that despite the benefits associated with honest information transfer, the costs incurred in a stable costly signalling system may leave all participants worse off than they would be in a system with no signalling at all. In both the discrete and continuous forms of the Sir Philip Sidney game, there exist conditions under which costly signalling among relatives, while stable, is so costly that it is disadvantageous compared with no signalling at all. We determine the factors which dictate signal cost and signal benefit in a generalized version of this game, and explain how signal cost can exceed signal value. Such results raise concerns about theevolutionary pathways which could have led to the existence of signalling equilibria in nature. The paper stresses the importance of comparing signalling equilibria with other possible strategies, beforedrawing conclusions regarding the optimality of signalling.
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Bonnie, K. E., & Earley, R. L. (2007). Expanding the scope for social information use. Anim. Behav., 74(2), 171–18.
Abstract: Our understanding of how, why, and the circumstances under which animals use social information has been facilitated by three principal areas of research, social learning, public information use and social eavesdropping. With few exceptions, these related concepts have remained remarkably distinct within the literature, with little discussion or integration among them. Are these distinctions warranted? We tackle the issue by exploring similarities and differences between the concepts with respect to how animals gather and use social information, the type of information gathered, how information is packaged, and the relative payoffs to individuals involved. We contend that none of the currently dominant paradigms, social learning, public information use, or social eavesdropping, provide a unifying theme for studying social information use. Instead, we favour the central characteristic of the three concepts, social information use, as the overarching umbrella, and advocate a broader conceptual framework for understanding more comprehensively how animals behave with their social environments. Our intention is not to revolutionize the fields of social learning, public information use or social eavesdropping, but rather to stimulate discussion among researchers investigating the abilities of animals to extract information from the social environment.
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Reeve, H. K. (1997). Evolutionarily stable communication between kin: a general model. Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 264((1384)). Retrieved December 22, 2024, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1997.0143
Abstract: At present, the most general evolutionary theory of honest communication is Grafen's model of Zahavi's 'handicap' signalling system, in which honesty of signals about the signaller's quality (e.g. mate suitability or fighting ability) is maintained by the differentially high cost of signals to signallers having lower quality. The latter model is here further generalized to include any communication between signallers and receivers that are genetically related (e.g. parents and begging offspring, cooperative or competing siblings). Signalling systems involving relatives are shown to be evolutionarily stable, despite a potential pay-off for false signalling, if the Zahavian assumption of differential signal costs holds and there are diminishing reproductive returns to the signaller as the receiver's assessed value of its attribute increases, or if, regardless of whether the Zahavian assumption holds, signallers with high values of the attribute benefit more from a given receiver assessment than signallers with low values (e.g. begging chicks that are hungrier benefit more from being fed). In stable systems of signalling among kin, it is also shown to be generally true that (i) levels of signalling and thus observed signal costs will decline as relatedness increases or as the receiver's reproductive penalty for erroneous assessment increases, and (ii) receivers will consistently, altruistically overestimate the true value of the signalled attribute.
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Scordato, E. S., & Drea, C. M. (2007). Scents and sensibility: information content of olfactory signals in the ringtailed lemur, Lemur catta. Anim. Behav., 73(2), 301–314.
Abstract: The function of olfactory signalling in social species is less well understood than in asocial species. Consequently, we examined olfactory communication in the ringtailed lemur, a socially complex primate that retains a functional vomeronasal organ, has well-developed scent glands and shows a suite of scent-marking behaviour. To assess the information content of different types of scent gland secretions, we decoupled olfactory cues from the visual and behavioural modalities with which scent marking is normally associated. We presented male and female subjects (signal receivers) with a series of choice tests between odours derived from conspecific donors (signal senders) varying by sex, age, social status and reproductive condition. We additionally examined the influence of the receivers' reproductive state and familiarity with the signaller. The reproductive condition, social status and familiarity of senders and receivers affected signal transmission; specifically, male receivers attended most to the odours of conspecifics in breeding condition and to the odours of familiar, dominant animals. By contrast, females varied their responses according to both their own reproductive state and that of the sender. Based on male and female patterns of countermarking, we suggest that scent marking serves a function in intergroup spacing and intrasexual competition for both sexes, as might be expected in a female-dominant species. By contrast, minimal female interest in male odours counters a female mate choice function for scent marking in this species. Nevertheless, scent marks are critical to male-male competition and, therefore, may be subject to sexual selection.
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