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Barrett, L., & Henzi, P. (2005). The social nature of primate cognition. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1575), 1865–1875.
Abstract: The hypothesis that the enlarged brain size of the primates was selected for by social, rather than purely ecological, factors has been strongly influential in studies of primate cognition and behaviour over the past two decades. However, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, also known as the social brain hypothesis, tends to emphasize certain traits and behaviours, like exploitation and deception, at the expense of others, such as tolerance and behavioural coordination, and therefore presents only one view of how social life may shape cognition. This review outlines work from other relevant disciplines, including evolutionary economics, cognitive science and neurophysiology, to illustrate how these can be used to build a more general theoretical framework, incorporating notions of embodied and distributed cognition, in which to situate questions concerning the evolution of primate social cognition.
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Barton, R. A. (1996). Neocortex size and behavioural ecology in primates. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B, 263(1367), 173–177.
Abstract: The neocortex is widely held to have been the focus of mammalian brain evolution, but what selection pressures explain the observed diversity in its size and structure? Among primates, comparative studies suggest that neocortical evolution is related to the cognitive demands of sociality, and here I confirm that neocortex size and social group size are positively correlated once phylogenetic associations and overall brain size are taken into account. This association holds within haplorhine but not strepsirhine primates. In addition, the neocortex is larger in diurnal than in nocturnal primates, and among diurnal haplorhines its size is positively correlated with the degree of frugivory. These ecological correlates reflect the diverse sensory-cognitive functions of the neocortex.
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Bermudez, J. L. (1996). The moral significance of birth. Ethics, 106(2), 378–403.
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Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1996). Why Culture is Common, but Cultural Evolution is Rare. Proc Br Acad, 88, 73–93.
Abstract: If culture is defined as variation acquired and maintained by social learning, then culture is common in nature. However, cumulative cultural evolution resulting in behaviors that no individual could invent on their own is limited to humans, song birds, and perhaps chimpanzees. Circumstantial evidence suggests that cumulative cultural evolution requires the capacity for observational learning. Here, we analyze two models the evolution of psychological capacities that allow cumulative cultural evolution. Both models suggest that the conditions which allow the evolution of such capacities when rare are much more stringent than the conditions which allow the maintenance of the capacities when common. This result follows from the fact that the assumed benefit of the capacities, cumulative cultural adaptation, cannot occur when the capacities are rare. These results suggest why such capacities may be rare in nature.
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Bshary, R., Wickler, W., & Fricke, H. (2002). Fish cognition: a primate's eye view. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 1–13.
Abstract: We provide selected examples from the fish literature of phenomena found in fish that are currently being examined in discussions of cognitive abilities and evolution of neocortex size in primates. In the context of social intelligence, we looked at living in individualized groups and corresponding social strategies, social learning and tradition, and co-operative hunting. Regarding environmental intelligence, we searched for examples concerning special foraging skills, tool use, cognitive maps, memory, anti-predator behaviour, and the manipulation of the environment. Most phenomena of interest for primatologists are found in fish as well. We therefore conclude that more detailed studies on decision rules and mechanisms are necessary to test for differences between the cognitive abilities of primates and other taxa. Cognitive research can benefit from future fish studies in three ways: first, as fish are highly variable in their ecology, they can be used to determine the specific ecological factors that select for the evolution of specific cognitive abilities. Second, for the same reason they can be used to investigate the link between cognitive abilities and the enlargement of specific brain areas. Third, decision rules used by fish could be used as 'null-hypotheses' for primatologists looking at how monkeys might make their decisions. Finally, we propose a variety of fish species that we think are most promising as study objects.
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Cantlon, J. F., & Brannon, E. M. (2007). How Much Does Number Matter to a Monkey (Macaca mulatta)? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33(1), 32–41.
Abstract: Although many animal species can represent numerical values, little is known about how salient number is relative to other object properties for nonhuman animals. In one hypothesis, researchers propose that animals represent number only as a last resort, when no other properties differentiate stimuli. An alternative hypothesis is that animals automatically, spontaneously, and routinely represent the numerical attributes of their environments. The authors compared the influence of number versus that of shape, color, and surface area on rhesus monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) decisions by testing them on a matching task with more than one correct answer: a numerical match and a nonnumerical (color, surface area, or shape) match. The authors also tested whether previous laboratory experience with numerical discrimination influenced a monkey's propensity to represent number. Contrary to the last-resort hypothesis, all monkeys based their decisions on numerical value when the numerical ratio was favorable.
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Chalmeau, R., & Gallo, A. (1995). Cooperation in primates: Critical analysis of behavioural criteria. Behav. Process., 35(1-3), 101–111.
Abstract: Concerning hunting in chimpanzees, cooperation has generally been attributed to the behaviour of two or more individuals acting together to achieve a common goal (Boesch and Boesch, 1989). The common goal is often considered as the concrete result of a common action by two or several individuals. Although this result could be used as a criterion for cooperation, it could also be an outcome due to chance. We suggest that the goal, viewed as a concrete benefit shared by the partners, is not a requisite of cooperation but rather a possible consequence of a common action largely submitted to social constraints. Individuals engaged in a cooperative task in order to solve a problem have to exchange information to adjust to each other's behaviour. However, evidence of communication between partners during simultaneous cooperation is rare. An experiment in which two chimpanzees each had to simultaneously pull a handle to get a fruit was performed. We analysed not only the concrete result of the partners' activity but also what the individuals took into account before pulling a handle. We tried to specify what the chimpanzees learned by means of a series of logical propositions which we were able to confront the experimental results.
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Cheney, D., Seyfarth, R., & Smuts, B. (1986). Social relationships and social cognition in nonhuman primates. Science, 234(4782), 1361–1366.
Abstract: Complex social relationships among nonhuman primates appear to contribute to individual reproductive success. Experiments with and behavioral observations of natural populations suggest that sophisticated cognitive mechanisms may underlie primate social relationships. Similar capacities are usually less apparent in the nonsocial realm, supporting the view that at least some aspects of primate intelligence evolved to solve the challenges of interacting with conspecifics.
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Cochet, H., & Byrne, R. W. (2013). Evolutionary origins of human handedness: evaluating contrasting hypotheses. Animal Cognition, 16(4), 531–542.
Abstract: Variation in methods and measures, resulting in past dispute over the existence of population handedness in nonhuman great apes, has impeded progress into the origins of human right-handedness and how it relates to the human hallmark of language. Pooling evidence from behavioral studies, neuroimaging and neuroanatomy, we evaluate data on manual and cerebral laterality in humans and other apes engaged in a range of manipulative tasks and in gestural communication. A simplistic human/animal partition is no longer tenable, and we review four (nonexclusive) possible drivers for the origin of population-level right-handedness: skilled manipulative activity, as in tool use; communicative gestures; organizational complexity of action, in particular hierarchical structure; and the role of intentionality in goal-directed action. Fully testing these hypotheses will require developmental and evolutionary evidence as well as modern neuroimaging data.
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Crockford, C., Wittig, R. M., Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2007). Baboons eavesdrop to deduce mating opportunities. Anim. Behav., 73(5), 885–890.
Abstract: Many animals appear to monitor changes in other individuals' dominance ranks and social relationships and to track changes in them. However, it is not known whether they also track changes in very transient relationships. Rapid recognition of a temporary separation between a dominant male and a sexually receptive female, for example, should be adaptive in species where subordinate males use opportunistic strategies to achieve mating success. Dominant male baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus) form sexual consortships with oestrous females that are characterized by mate guarding and close proximity. To assess whether subordinate males track temporary changes in the status of other males' consortships, we conducted playback experiments using a two-speaker paradigm. In the test condition, subjects heard the consort male's grunts played from one speaker and his consort female's copulation call played from a speaker approximately 40 m away. This sequence suggested that the male and female had temporarily separated and that the female was mating with another male. In a control trial, subjects heard another dominant male's grunts played from one speaker and the female's copulation call played from the other. In a second control trial, conducted within 24 h after the consortship had ended, subjects again heard the consort male's grunt and the female's copulation call played from separate speakers. As predicted, subjects responded strongly only in the test condition. Eavesdropping upon the temporal and spatial juxtaposition of other individuals' vocalizations may be one strategy by which male baboons achieve sneaky matings.
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