Abstract: Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in “true imitation,” in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.

Abstract: Abstract  When apes are not fully understood by humans, they persist with attempts to communicate, elaborating their behaviours to better convey their meaning. Such abilities have never been investigated in dogs. The present study aimed to clarify any effect of the visual attentional state of the owner on dogs’ (Canis familiaris) social-communicative signals for interacting with humans, and to determine whether dogs persist and elaborate their behaviour in the face of failure to communicate a request. Gaze at a hidden target or at the owner, gaze alternation between a hidden target and the owner, vocalisations and contacts in 12 guide and 12 pet dogs were analysed (i) when the dogs were asked by their owners (blind or sighted) to fetch their inaccessible toy and (ii) when the dogs were subsequently given an unfamiliar object (apparent unsuccessful communication) or their toy (apparent successful communication). No group differences were found, indicating no effect of the visual status of the owner on the dogs’ socio-communicative modes (i.e. no sensitivity to human visual attention). Results, however, suggest that the dogs exhibited persistence (but not elaboration) in their “showing” behaviours in each condition, except that in which the toy was returned. Thus, their communication was about a specific item in space (the toy). The results suggest that dogs possess partially intentional non-verbal deictic abilities: (i) to get their inaccessible toy, the dogs gazed at their owners as if to trigger their attention; gaze alternation between the owner and the target direction, and two behaviours directed at the target were performed, apparently to indicate the location of the hidden toy; (ii) after the delivery of the toy, the dogs behaved as if they returned to the play routine, gazing at their owner whilst holding their toy. In conclusion, this study shows that dogs possess partially intentional non-verbal deictic abilities: they exhibit successive visual orienting between a partner and objects, apparent attention-getting behaviours, no sensitivity to the visual status of humans for communication, and persistence in (but no elaboration of) communicative behaviours when apparent attempts to “manipulate” the human partner fail.

Abstract: An important question in the study of animal communication is whether non-human animals are able to produce communicative gestures, i.e. nonvocal bodily actions directed to a recipient, physically ineffective but with a meaning shared in the social group [1]. Passive gestures are instrumental, tuned to the mere presence/absence of others, whereas active informers recognize receivers as communicative agents and activate shared-attention mechanisms for identifying their attentional state (SAM [2]; e.g. Schwab and Huber [3]). Six operational criteria must be evaluated to classify a signal as referential and intentional [4]: (1) alternative gazes between the partner and the target; (2) apparent attention-getting behaviours are deployed; (3) an audience is required to exhibit the behaviour; (4) the attentional status of an observer influences the propensity to exhibit behaviours; (5) communication is persistent and (6) there is elaboration of communicative behaviour when apparent attempts to manipulate the partner fail. Dogs [5] and non-human primates (reviewed in Liebal and Call [6]) can tune a human receiver’s attention to the object of interest by combining directional and attention-getting signals, such as turning the head or body, gazing to the receiver, and/or establishing eye contact. Research on other species is scarce.
Horses rely on humans to survive in domestic settings and may have evolved skills for communicating flexibly with them [7]. Horses understand human attentional cues (such as body and head orientation, eyes opened/closed) [8], permanent pointing [9] and, to some extent, gazing [10]. Here we tested the ability of 14 outdoor, herd-living domestic horses to communicate referentially with a human partner about the location of a desired target, a bucket of food out of reach. After the baiting of two buckets placed in opposite, unreachable locations were shown by the experimenter, the subject would walk to one of the two buckets. Because approaching a bucket would reveal that the food is out of reach, we expected the horse to look back to the experimenter, then to the bucket, and alternate this gazing several times to indicate its intention. To test whether our prediction is correct and alternate gazing is indeed the result of the horse's referential communication, we video-recorded the behaviour of the subjects in the test (FORWARD) and three control conditions: (1) FORWARD: experimenter oriented to the center of the arena, (2) BACK: experimenter backward oriented in respect to the arena, (3) ALONE: experimenter absent, (4) MANY: as FORWARD plus a familiar human oriented to the subject behind the bucket (Figure 1). We used a conservative criterion of back gazing by considering only turning the head back more than 90 degrees. The results confirmed our prediction. The horses alternated gazes between the partner and the buck significantly more often in the FORWARD than in all the other conditions (Table 1), thus satisfying operational criteria #1, #3 and #4. They also alternated head nods with gazes to the partner significantly more often during the FORWARD condition. We thus considered head nods not an instrumental signal of arousal, but an attention-getting behaviour with communicative function. Subjects used both head nods and neck stretched toward the buck more often in the FORWARD than in the BACK and the ALONE conditions, thus satisfying criteria #2, #3 and #4. In condition MANY, the frequency of head nods did not differ from condition FORWARD, probably because nods were directed to the additional partner behind the buck. This also satisfies criteria #4. The horses gazed to the partner most often in the FORWARD than in the BACK and the MANY conditions, but not in the ALONE. In this condition, subjects could observe the partner walking further from the test arena. To test for the different functions of gazes in presence and in absence of the partner, we compared their average duration between the two conditions: the significantly longer duration of gazes when the subject was alone suggests the instrumental monitoring function of gazes in this experimental condition.
Altogether, the findings suggest that domestic horses possess the ability to use referential communication in an interspecific context, but additional analyses are needed to test for operational criteria #5 and #6. Flexible and voluntary use of communicative signals reveal sophisticated cognitive processes involved in the strategic emission of these signals, and the finding of referential communication skills in an ungulate species forces us to reconsider the evolutionary path of intelligence. Furthermore, ungulates are used intensively by humans (transportation, meat, agriculture, leisure activities), and their welfare is often compromised. Determining whether ungulates can communicate their needs and preferences is paramount to a proper ethical management.

Abstract: Abstract  Animals living in groups have to make consensus decisions and communicate with each other about the time, or the direction, in which to move. In some species, the process relies on the proposition of a single individual, i.e. a first individual suggests a movement and the other group members decide whether or not to join this individual. In Tonkean (Macaca tonkeana) and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), it has been observed that this first individual displays specific signals at departure. In this paper, we aimed to explore the function of such behaviours, i.e. if these behaviours were recruitment signals or only cues about the motivation of the first departed individual. We carried out temporal analyses and studied the latencies of the first departed individual’s behaviours and of the joining of other group members. We also assessed whether the social style of a species in terms of dominance and kinship relationships influenced the patterns of signal emissions. We then analyzed how the first departed individual decided to make a pause or to stop it according to the identities of group members that joined the collective movement. Results showed that Tonkean macaques and rhesus macaques seemed to use back-glances to monitor the joining of other group members and pauses to recruit such individuals. This was especially the case for highly socially affiliated individuals in Tonkean macaques and kin-related individuals in rhesus macaques. Moreover, back-glances and pauses disappeared when such individuals joined the first departed individual. From these results, we suggested that such behaviour could be considered intentional. Such findings could not be highlighted without temporal analyses and accurate observations on primate groups in semi-free ranging conditions.

Abstract: Do nonhuman primates attribute goals to others? Traditional studies with chimpanzees provide equivocal evidence for “mind reading” in nonhuman primates. Here we adopt looking time, a methodology commonly used with human infants to test infant chimpanzees. In this experiment, four infant chimpanzees saw computer-generated stimuli that mimicked a goal-directed behavior. The baby chimps performed as well as human infants, namely, they were sensitive to the trajectories of the objects, thus suggesting that chimpanzees may be endowed with a disposition to understand goal-directed behaviors. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.