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Brosnan, S. F., Schiff, H. C., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). Tolerance for inequity may increase with social closeness in chimpanzees. Proc Biol Sci, 272(1560), 253–258.
Abstract: Economic decision-making depends on our social environment. Humans tend to respond differently to inequity in close relationships, yet we know little about the potential for such variation in other species. We examine responses to inequity in several groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in a paradigm similar to that used previously in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). We demonstrate that, like capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees show a response to inequity of rewards that is based upon the partner receiving the reward rather than the presence of the reward alone. However, we also found a great amount of variation between groups tested, indicating that chimpanzees, like people, respond to inequity in a variable manner, which we speculate could be caused by such variables as group size, the social closeness of the group (as reflected in length of time that the group has been together) and group-specific traditions.
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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
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de Waal, F. B., & Luttrell, L. M. (1986). The similarity principle underlying social bonding among female rhesus monkeys. Folia Primatol (Basel), 46(4), 215–234.
Abstract: Twenty adult female rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were observed over a three-year period. They lived in a mixed captive group with kinship relations known for three generations. The study's aim was to test Seyfarth's [J. theor. Biol. 65: 671-698, 1977] model of rank-related grooming and to investigate two other possible determinants of social bonding, i.e. relative age and the group's stratification into two social classes. Data on affiliation, coalitions, and social competition were collected by means of both focal observation and instantaneous time sampling. Whereas certain elements of the existing model were confirmed, its explanatory principles were not. Social competition did not result in more contact among close-ranking females (the opposite effect was found), and the relation between affiliative behavior and coalitions was more complex than predicted. Based on multivariate analyses and a comparison of theoretical models, we propose a simpler, more encompassing principle underlying interfemale attraction. According to this 'similarity principle', rhesus females establish bonds with females whom they most resemble. The similarity may concern genetical and social background, age, hierarchical position and social class. Effects of these four factors were independently demonstrated. The most successful model assumed that similarity factors influence female bonding in a cumulative fashion.
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Hinde, R. A. (1969). Analyzing the roles of the partners in a behavioral interaction--mother-infant relations in rhesus macaques. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 159(3), 651–667.
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King, A. J., Douglas, C. M. S., Huchard, E., Isaac, N. J. B., & Cowlishaw, G. (2008). Dominance and affiliation mediate despotism in a social primate. Curr Biol, 18(23), 1833–1838.
Abstract: Group-living animals routinely have to reach a consensus decision and choose between mutually exclusive actions in order to coordinate their activities and benefit from sociality. Theoretical models predict “democratic” rather than “despotic” decisions to be widespread in social vertebrates, because they result in lower “consensus costs”-the costs of an individual foregoing its optimal action to comply with the decision-for the group as a whole. Yet, quantification of consensus costs is entirely lacking, and empirical observations provide strong support for the occurrence of both democratic and despotic decisions in nature. We conducted a foraging experiment on a wild social primate (chacma baboons, Papio ursinus) in order to gain new insights into despotic group decision making. The results show that group foraging decisions were consistently led by the individual who acquired the greatest benefits from those decisions, namely the dominant male. Subordinate group members followed the leader despite considerable consensus costs. Follower behavior was mediated by social ties to the leader, and where these ties were weaker, group fission was more likely to occur. Our findings highlight the importance of leader incentives and social relationships in group decision-making processes and the emergence of despotism.
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