Abstract: Observation of behaviour, especially social behaviour, and experimental studies of learning and brain function give us information about the complexity of concepts that animals have. In order to learn to obtain a resource or carry out an action, domestic animals may: relate stimuli such as human words to the reward, perform sequences of actions including navigation or detours, discriminate amongst other individuals, copy the actions of other individuals, distinguish between individuals who do or do not have information, or communicate so as to cause humans or other animals to carry out actions. Some parrots, that are accustomed to humans but not domesticated, can use words to have specific meanings. In some cases, stimuli, individuals or actions are remembered for days, weeks or years. Events likely to occur in the future may be predicted and changes over time taken into account. Scientific evidence for the needs of animals depends, in part, on studies assessing motivational strength whose methodology depends on the cognitive ability of the animals. Recognition and learning may be associated with changes in physiology, behaviour and positive or negative feelings. Learning and other complex behaviour can result in affect and affect can alter cognition. The demonstration of cognitive bias gives indications about affect and welfare but should be interpreted in the light of other information. All of the information mentioned so far helps to provide evidence about sentience and the level of awareness. The term sentience implies a range of abilities, not just the capacity to have some feelings. The reluctance of scientists to attribute complex abilities and feelings to non-humans has slowed the development of this area of science. Most people consider that they have obligations to some animals. However, they might protect animals because they consider that an animal has an intrinsic value, or because of their concern for its welfare. In social species, there has been selection promoting moral systems that might result in behaviours such as attempts to avoid harm to others, collaboration and other altruistic behaviour. An evaluation of such behaviour may provide one of the criteria for decisions about whether or not to protect animals of a particular species. Other criteria may be: whether or not the animal is known as an individual, similarity to humans, level of awareness, extent of feelings, being large, being rare, being useful or having aesthetic quality for humans. Cognitive ability should also be considered when designing methods of enriching the environments of captive animals.

Abstract: Lateralization of emotions has received great attention in the last decades, both in humans and animals, but little interest has been given to side bias in perceptual processing. Here, we investigated the influence of the emotional valence of stimuli on visual and olfactory explorations by horses, a large mammalian species with two large monocular visual fields and almost complete decussation of optic fibres. We confronted 38 Arab mares to three objects with either a positive, negative or neutral emotional valence (novel object). The results revealed a gradient of exploration of the 3 objects according to their emotional value and a clear asymmetry in visual exploration. When exploring the novel object, mares used preferentially their right eyes, while they showed a slight tendency to use their left eyes for the negative object. No asymmetry was evidenced for the object with the positive valence. A trend for an asymmetry in olfactory investigation was also observed. Our data confirm the role of the left hemisphere in assessing novelty in horses like in many vertebrate species and the possible role of the right hemisphere in processing negative emotional responses. Our findings also suggest the importance of both hemispheres in the processing positive emotions. This study is, to our knowledge, the first to demonstrate clearly that the emotional valence of a stimulus induces a specific visual lateralization pattern.

Abstract: There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teaching, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations.

Abstract: Repeated encounters with unfamiliar conspecifics in large groups of domestic birds create a potentially stressful social environment which can affect the birds' emotional reactivity and consequently their welfare. As social relationships between young quail are particularly influenced by their social motivation (i.e., the motivation to seek close proximity with conspecifics), it is likely that the reaction of quail to repeated encounters with strangers depends on their social motivation. The aim of this study was to assess the emotional reactivity of quail chicks with high (HSR) or low (LSR) social motivation housed under stable and unstable social conditions. Quail chicks were housed either in stable pairs, i.e. remaining with the same cagemate until testing (NHSR = 19 and NLSR = 18 pairs), or in unstable pairs, i.e. changing cagemate daily from 6 to 13 days of age (NHSR = 20 and NLSR = 19 pairs). Emotional reactivity was measured using a novel object test on day 14, and an emergence test and a tonic immobility test on day 15. The social condition affected the number of induction attempts of quail chicks in the tonic immobility test but only in the LSR ones. This number of inductions was lower under the stable than under the unstable social condition in this line. Moreover, the HSR chicks showed greater disturbance than the LSR ones in the three behavioural tests. In conclusion, social instability did not affect the emotional reactivity of HSR quail chicks, which was high, regardless of social condition. In contrast, repeated cagemate changes seemed to decrease the emotional reactivity of LSR quail chicks. These results suggest that low social motivation makes easier the adaptation to the potential social instability encountered in large flocks.