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Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297–299.
Abstract: During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.
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Brosnan, S. F., Freeman, C., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2006). Partner's behavior, not reward distribution, determines success in an unequal cooperative task in capuchin monkeys. Am. J. Primatol., 68(7), 713–724.
Abstract: It was recently demonstrated that capuchin monkeys notice and respond to distributional inequity, a trait that has been proposed to support the evolution of cooperation in the human species. However, it is unknown how capuchins react to inequitable rewards in an unrestricted cooperative paradigm in which they may freely choose both whether to participate and, within the bounds of their partner's behavior, which reward they will receive for their participation. We tested capuchin monkeys with such a design, using a cooperative barpull, which has been used with great success in the past. Contrary to our expectations, the equity of the reward distribution did not affect success or pulling behavior. However, the behavior of the partner in an unequal situation did affect overall success rates: pairs that had a tendency to alternate which individual received the higher-value food in unequal reward situations were more than twice as successful in obtaining rewards than pairs in which one individual dominated the higher-value food. This ability to equitably distribute rewards in inherently biased cooperative situations has profound implications for activities such as group hunts, in which multiple individuals work together for a single, monopolizable reward.
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Byrne, R. W., & Bates, L. A. (2006). Why are animals cognitive? Curr Biol, 16(12), R445–8.
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Clutton-Brock, T. H., Russell, A. F., Sharpe, L. L., Brotherton, P. N., McIlrath, G. M., White, S., et al. (2001). Effects of helpers on juvenile development and survival in meerkats. Science, 293(5539), 2446–2449.
Abstract: Although breeding success is known to increase with group size in several cooperative mammals, the mechanisms underlying these relationships are uncertain. We show that in wild groups of cooperative meerkats, Suricata suricatta, reductions in the ratio of helpers to pups depress the daily weight gain and growth of pups and the daily weight gain of helpers. Increases in the daily weight gain of pups are associated with heavier weights at independence and at 1 year of age, as well as with improved foraging success as juveniles and higher survival rates through the first year of life. These results suggest that the effects of helpers on the fitness of pups extend beyond weaning and that helpers may gain direct as well as indirect benefits by feeding pups.
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Cohen, J. (2007). Animal behavior. The world through a chimp's eyes (Vol. 316).
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Crowell-Davis, S. L., & Houpt, K. A. (1986). Techniques for taking a behavioral history. Vet Clin North Am Equine Pract, 2(3), 507–518.
Abstract: A thorough behavioral history is essential for adequate assessment of a given case. In reviewing the chief complaint, a description of what actually happened, rather than the owner's interpretation of what happened, is required. Other behavior problems, environment, rearing history, and training need to be reviewed. Sample question sets for some common problems are given.
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de Waal, F. B., & Berger, M. L. (2000). Payment for labour in monkeys. Nature, 404(6778), 563.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). A century of getting to know the chimpanzee. Nature, 437(7055), 56–59.
Abstract: A century of research on chimpanzees, both in their natural habitat and in captivity, has brought these apes socially, emotionally and mentally much closer to us. Parallels and homologues between chimpanzee and human behaviour range from tool-technology and cultural learning to power politics and intercommunity warfare. Few behavioural domains have remained untouched by this increased knowledge, which has dramatically challenged the way we view ourselves. The sequencing of the chimpanzee genome will no doubt bring more surprises and insights. Humans do occupy a special place among the primates, but this place increasingly has to be defined against a backdrop of substantial similarity.
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de Waal, F. B. M. (2005). How animals do business. Sci Am, 292(4), 54–61.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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