Abstract: Six ponies were used to investigate the effect of tolazoline antagonism of detomidine on physiological responses, behavior, epinephrine, norepinephrine, cortisol, glucose, and free fatty acids in awake ponies. Each pony had a catheter inserted into a jugular vein 1 hour before beginning the study. Awake ponies were administered detomidine (0.04 mg/kg intravenously [i.v.]) followed 20 minutes later by either tolazoline (4.0 mg/kg i.v.) or saline. Blood samples were drawn from the catheter 5 minutes before detomidine administration (baseline), 5 minutes after detomidine administration, 20 minutes before detomidine administration which was immediately before the administration of tolazoline or saline (time [T] = 0), and at 5, 30, and 60 minutes after injections of tolazoline or saline (T = 5, 30, and 60 minutes, respectively). Compared with heart rate at T = 0, tolazoline antagonism increased heart rate 45% at 5 minutes. There was no difference in heart rate between treatments at 30 minutes. Blood pressure remained stable after tolazoline, while it decreased over time after saline. Compared with concentrations at T = 0, tolazoline antagonism of detomidine in awake ponies resulted in a 55% increase in cortisol at 30 minutes and a 52% increase in glucose at 5 minutes. The change in free fatty acids was different for tolazoline and saline over time. Free fatty acids decreased after detomidine administration. Free fatty acids did not change after saline administration. After tolazoline administration, free fatty acids increased transiently. Tolazoline tended to decrease sedation and analgesia at 15 and 60 minutes postantagonism. Antagonism of detomidine-induced physiological and behavioral effects with tolazoline in awake ponies that were not experiencing pain appears to precipitate a stress response as measured by cortisol, glucose, and free fatty acids. If antagonism of an alpha-agonist is contemplated, the potential effect on hormones and metabolites should be considered.

Abstract: This study investigated the effect of lidocaine i.v. on halothane minimum alveolar concentration (MAC) in ponies. Six ponies were anaesthetised with thiopentone and succinylcholine, intubated and anaesthesia maintained with halothane. Ventilation was controlled and blood pressure maintained within clinically acceptable limits. Following a 2 h equilibration period, baseline halothane MAC was determined. The ponies were then given a loading dose of lidocaine (2.5 or 5 mg/kg bwt) or saline over 5 min, followed by a constant infusion of lidocaine (50 or 100 microg/kg/min, or saline, respectively). The halothane MAC was redetermined after a 60 min infusion of lidocaine or saline. The baseline halothane MAC for the control group was mean +/- s.d. 0.94 +/- 0.03%, and no significant decrease occurred following saline infusion. Lidocaine decreased halothane MAC in a dose-dependent fashion (r = 0.86; P < 0.0003). The results indicate that i.v. lidocaine may have a role in equine anaesthesia.

Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.

Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.

Abstract: Rossano (Cognition 89:207, 2003) proposes expertise as an indicator of consciousness in humans and other animals. Since there is strong evidence that the development of expertise requires deliberate practice (Ericsson in The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert performance in the arts and sciences, sports and games 1996), and deliberate practice appears to be outside of the bounds of unconscious processing, then any signs of expertise development in an animal are indicators of consciousness. Rossano's argument may lead to an unsolvable debate about animal consciousness while causing researchers to overlook the underlying reality of animal expertise. This article provides evidence indicative of animals meeting each of the three definitions of expertise established in the scientific literature: expertise as a social construction, expertise as exceptional performance, and expertise as knowledge. In addition, cases of deliberate practice by non-human animals are offered. Acknowledging some animals as experts, regardless of consciousness, is warranted by the research findings and would prove useful in solving many issues remaining in the human expertise literature.