|
|
de Waal, F. B., & Luttrell, L. M. (1986). The similarity principle underlying social bonding among female rhesus monkeys. Folia Primatol (Basel), 46(4), 215–234.
Abstract: Twenty adult female rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were observed over a three-year period. They lived in a mixed captive group with kinship relations known for three generations. The study's aim was to test Seyfarth's [J. theor. Biol. 65: 671-698, 1977] model of rank-related grooming and to investigate two other possible determinants of social bonding, i.e. relative age and the group's stratification into two social classes. Data on affiliation, coalitions, and social competition were collected by means of both focal observation and instantaneous time sampling. Whereas certain elements of the existing model were confirmed, its explanatory principles were not. Social competition did not result in more contact among close-ranking females (the opposite effect was found), and the relation between affiliative behavior and coalitions was more complex than predicted. Based on multivariate analyses and a comparison of theoretical models, we propose a simpler, more encompassing principle underlying interfemale attraction. According to this 'similarity principle', rhesus females establish bonds with females whom they most resemble. The similarity may concern genetical and social background, age, hierarchical position and social class. Effects of these four factors were independently demonstrated. The most successful model assumed that similarity factors influence female bonding in a cumulative fashion.
|
|
|
|
King, A. J., Douglas, C. M. S., Huchard, E., Isaac, N. J. B., & Cowlishaw, G. (2008). Dominance and affiliation mediate despotism in a social primate. Curr Biol, 18(23), 1833–1838.
Abstract: Group-living animals routinely have to reach a consensus decision and choose between mutually exclusive actions in order to coordinate their activities and benefit from sociality. Theoretical models predict “democratic” rather than “despotic” decisions to be widespread in social vertebrates, because they result in lower “consensus costs”-the costs of an individual foregoing its optimal action to comply with the decision-for the group as a whole. Yet, quantification of consensus costs is entirely lacking, and empirical observations provide strong support for the occurrence of both democratic and despotic decisions in nature. We conducted a foraging experiment on a wild social primate (chacma baboons, Papio ursinus) in order to gain new insights into despotic group decision making. The results show that group foraging decisions were consistently led by the individual who acquired the greatest benefits from those decisions, namely the dominant male. Subordinate group members followed the leader despite considerable consensus costs. Follower behavior was mediated by social ties to the leader, and where these ties were weaker, group fission was more likely to occur. Our findings highlight the importance of leader incentives and social relationships in group decision-making processes and the emergence of despotism.
|
|
