Matsushima, T., Izawa, E. - I., Aoki, N., & Yanagihara, S. (2003). The mind through chick eyes: memory, cognition and anticipation. Zoolog Sci, 20(4), 395–408.
Abstract: To understand the animal mind, we have to reconstruct how animals recognize the external world through their own eyes. For the reconstruction to be realistic, explanations must be made both in their proximate causes (brain mechanisms) as well as ultimate causes (evolutionary backgrounds). Here, we review recent advances in the behavioral, psychological, and system-neuroscience studies accomplished using the domestic chick as subjects. Diverse behavioral paradigms are compared (such as filial imprinting, sexual imprinting, one-trial passive avoidance learning, and reinforcement operant conditioning) in their behavioral characterizations (development, sensory and motor aspects of functions, fitness gains) and relevant brain mechanisms. We will stress that common brain regions are shared by these distinct paradigms, particularly those in the ventral telencephalic structures such as AIv (in the archistriatum) and LPO (in the medial striatum). Neuronal ensembles in these regions could code the chick's anticipation for forthcoming events, particularly the quality/quantity and the temporal proximity of rewards. Without the internal representation of the anticipated proximity in LPO, behavioral tolerance will be lost, and the chick makes impulsive choice for a less optimized option. Functional roles of these regions proved compatible with their anatomical counterparts in the mammalian brain, thus suggesting that the neural systems linking between the memorized past and the anticipated future have remained highly conservative through the evolution of the amniotic vertebrates during the last 300 million years. With the conservative nature in mind, research efforts should be oriented toward a unifying theory, which could explain behavioral deviations from optimized foraging, such as “naive curiosity,” “contra-freeloading,” “Concorde fallacy,” and “altruism.”
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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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Griffin, D. R. (2001). Animals know more than we used to think (Vol. 98).
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Healy, S. D., Braham, S. R., & Braithwaite, V. A. (1999). Spatial working memory in rats: no differences between the sexes. Proc Biol Sci, 266(1435), 2303–2308.
Abstract: In a number of mammalian species, males appear to have superior spatial abilities to females. The favoured explanations for this cognitive difference are hormonal, with higher testosterone levels in males than females leading to better spatial performance, and evolutionary, where sexual selection has favoured males with increased spatial abilities for either better navigational skills in hunting or to enable an increased territory size. However, an alternative explanation for this sex difference focuses on the role of varying levels of oestrogen in females in spatial cognition (the 'fertility and parental care' hypothesis). One possibility is that varying oestrogen levels result in variation in spatial learning and memory so that, when tested across the oestrous cycle, females perform as well as males on days of low oestrogen but more poorly on days of high oestrogen. If day in the oestrous cycle is not taken into account then, across an experiment, any sex differences found would always produce male superiority. We used a spatial working memory task in a Morris water maze to test the spatial learning and memory abilities of male and female rats. The rats were tested across a number of consecutive days during which the females went through four oestrous cycles. We found no overall sex differences in latencies to reach a submerged platform in a Morris water maze but, on the day of oestrus (low oestrogen), females took an extra swim to learn the platform's location (a 100% increase over the other days in the cycle). Female swim speed also varied across the oestrous cycle but females were no less active on the day of oestrus. These results oppose the predictions of the fertility and parental care hypothesis.
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Reichmuth Kastak, C., & Schusterman, R. J. (2002). Long-term memory for concepts in a California sea lion ( Zalophus californianus). Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 225–232.
Abstract: An adult California sea lion ( Zalophus californianus) with extensive experience in performing discrimination learning tasks was tested to evaluate her long-term memory for two previously learned concepts. An associative concept, that of equivalence classification, was retested after a retention interval of approximately 1 year. The sea lion had originally shown emergent equivalence classification with nonsimilarity-based classes of stimuli in a simple discrimination repeated-reversal procedure as well as in a matching-to-sample procedure. The 1-year memory test revealed no decrement in classification performance in either procedure. A relational concept, that of generalized identity matching, was retested after approximately 10 years. The sea lion had originally received trial-and-error exemplar training with identity matching-to-sample problems prior to transferring the concept to novel stimulus configurations. In the 10-year memory test, the sea lion immediately and reliably applied the previously established identity concept to familiar and novel sets of matching problems. These are the first reports of long-term conceptual memory in a nonprimate species. The experimental findings are consistent with a variety of observations of sea lions in natural settings, which indicate that natal sites, feeding areas, and individuals may be remembered over long periods of time.
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