Williams, J. L., Friend, T. H., Toscano, M. J., Collins, M. N., Sisto-Burt, A., & Nevill, C. H. (2002). The effects of early training sessions on the reactions of foals at 1, 2, and 3 months of age. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 77(2), 105–114.
Abstract: An early training procedure commonly termed “foal imprint training” is widely promoted in the horse industry. However, there have been no published scientific investigations of its efficacy. This study determined the effects of a training procedure on foals and their reaction to stimuli used in the early training procedure, and to a novel stimulus, at 1, 2 and 3 months of age. Twenty-five foals received a standard training procedure at 2, 12, 24, and 48 h after birth. After the training procedure, the foals received minimal additional handling that included veterinary treatments and occasional relocation. Twenty-two foals born over the same time period served as controls. All 47 (25 trained, 22 control) foals were tested at 1 month of age. Only 20 were available for testing at 2 months of age, and nine were available at 3 months. Percentage change from baseline heart rate, time required to complete exposure to each stimulus (foals that were more reactive took longer) and the behavior of each foal during the introduction of each stimulus were recorded. Overall, the control foals tended to receive lower (better) behavioral scores at 1 and 2 months of age. Foals that underwent the training procedure tended to require less time to complete exposure to the stimulus and had lower heart rates during exposure to the stimuli at 1 and 2 months of age. By 3 months of age, there were no significant differences between trained and control foals for any measures. Early training was not efficacious in this study.
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Salzen, E. A., & Cornell, J. M. (1968). Self-perception and species recognition in birds. Behaviour, 30(1), 44–65.
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Regolin, L., Marconato, F., & Vallortigara, G. (2004). Hemispheric differences in the recognition of partly occluded objects by newly hatched domestic chicks (Gallus gallus). Anim. Cogn., 7(3), 162–170.
Abstract: Domestic chicks are capable of perceiving as a whole objects partly concealed by occluders (“amodal completion”). In previous studies chicks were imprinted on a certain configuration and at test they were required to choose between two alternative versions of it. Using the same paradigm we now investigated the presence of hemispheric differences in amodal completion by testing newborn chicks with one eye temporarily patched. Separate groups of newly hatched chicks were imprinted binocularly: (1) on a square partly occluded by a superimposed bar, (2) on a whole or (3) on an amputated version of the square. At test, in monocular conditions, each chick was presented with a free choice between a complete and an amputated square. In the crucial condition 1, chicks tested with only their left eye in use chose the complete square (like binocular chicks would do); right-eyed chicks, in contrast, tended to choose the amputated square. Similar results were obtained in another group of chicks imprinted binocularly onto a cross (either occluded or amputated in its central part) and required to choose between a complete or an amputated cross. Left-eyed and binocular chicks chose the complete cross, whereas right-eyed chicks did not choose the amputated cross significantly more often. These findings suggest that neural structures fed by the left eye (mainly located in the right hemisphere) are, in the chick, more inclined to a “global” analysis of visual scenes, whereas those fed by the right eye seem to be more inclined to a “featural” analysis of visual scenes.
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Bering, J. M. (2004). A critical review of the “enculturation hypothesis”: the effects of human rearing on great ape social cognition. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 201–212.
Abstract: Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in “true imitation,” in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.
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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2004). The role of humans in the cognitive development of apes revisited. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 213–215.
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