Madigan, J. E., & Whittemore, J. (2000). The role of the equine practitioner in disasters. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 216(8), 1238–1239.
|
|
Atock, M. A., & Williams, R. B. (1994). Welfare of competition horses. Rev Sci Tech, 13(1), 217–232.
Abstract: In the large majority of cases and circumstances, horses benefit from their association with man. However, abuse of horses can occur, due to neglect or through the pressures of competition. The welfare of all animals, including competition horses, has become increasingly topical over the past ten years. Equestrian sport is coming under closer public scrutiny due to reports of apparent abuse. The bodies responsible for regulating these sports strenuously endeavour to protect the welfare of horses which compete under their rules and regulations. The Federation Equestre Internationale (FEI: International Equestrian Federation) is the sole authority for all international events in dressage, show-jumping, three-day event, driving, endurance riding and vaulting. The FEI rules illustrate the ways in which the welfare of competing horses is safeguarded.
|
|
Kirkwood, J. K. (2000). Animal minds and animal welfare. Vet. Rec., 146(11), 327.
|
|
Curtis, S. E., & Stricklin, W. R. (1991). The importance of animal cognition in agricultural animal production systems: an overview. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5001–5007.
Abstract: To describe and then fulfill agricultural animals' needs, we must learn more about their fundamental psychological and behavioral processes. How does this animal feel? Is that animal suffering? Will we ever be able to know these things? Scientists specializing in animal cognition say that there are numerous problems but that they can be overcome. Recognition by scientists of the notion of animal awareness has been increasing in recent years, because of the work of Griffin and others. Feeling, thinking, remembering, and imagining are cognitive processes that are factors in the economic and humane production of agricultural animals. It has been observed that the animal welfare debate depends on two controversial questions: Do animals have subjective feelings? If they do, can we find indicators that reveal them? Here, indirect behavioral analysis approaches must be taken. Moreover, the linear additivity of several stressor effects on a variety of animal traits suggests that some single phenomenon is acting as a “clearinghouse” for many or all of the stresses acting on an animal at any given time, and this phenomenon might be psychological stress. Specific situations animals may encounter in agricultural production settings are discussed with respect to the animals' subjective feelings.
|
|
Duncan, I. J., & Petherick, J. C. (1991). The implications of cognitive processes for animal welfare. J. Anim Sci., 69(12), 5017–5022.
Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.
|
|