Birke, L. (2007). “Learning to speak horse”: The culture of “natural horsemanship”. Society and Animals, 15(3), 217–239.
Abstract: This paper examines the rise of what is popularly called “natural horsemanship” (NH), as a definitive cultural change within the horse industry. Practitioners are often evangelical about their methods, portraying NH as a radical departure from traditional methods. In doing so, they create a clear demarcation from the practices and beliefs of the conventional horse-world. Only NH, advocates argue, properly understands the horse. Dissenters, however, contest the benefits to horses as well as the reliance in NH on disputed concepts of the natural. Advocates, furthermore, sought to rename technologies associated with riding while simultaneously condemning technologies used in conventional training (such as whips). These contested differences create boundaries and enact social inclusion and exclusion, which the paper explores. For horses, the impact of NH is ambiguous: Depending on practitioners, effects could be good or bad. However, for the people involved, NH presents a radical change-which they see as offering markedly better ways of relating to horses and a more inclusive social milieu.
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Heinrich, B., & Bugnyar, T. (2007). Just how smart are ravens? Sci Am, 296(4), 64–71.
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Cohen, J. (2007). Animal behavior. The world through a chimp's eyes (Vol. 316).
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Morell, V. (2007). Nicola Clayton profile. Nicky and the jays (Vol. 315).
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Straub, A. (2007). An intelligent crow beats a lab. Science, 316(5825), 688.
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Silk, J. B. (2007). Social Components of Fitness in Primate Groups. Science, 317(5843), 1347–1351.
Abstract: There is much interest in the evolutionary forces that favored the evolution of large brains in the primate order. The social brain hypothesis posits that selection has favored larger brains and more complex cognitive capacities as a means to cope with the challenges of social life. The hypothesis is supported by evidence that shows that group size is linked to various measures of brain size. But it has not been clear how cognitive complexity confers fitness advantages on individuals. Research in the field and laboratory shows that sophisticated social cognition underlies social behavior in primate groups. Moreover, a growing body of evidence suggests that the quality of social relationships has measurable fitness consequences for individuals.
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Pennisi, E. (2007). PSYCHOLOGY: Nonhuman Primates Demonstrate Humanlike Reasoning. Science, 317(5843), 1308–.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates. Science, 317(5843), 1402–1405.
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). online material (Vol. 317).
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Dunbar, R. I. M., & Shultz, S. (2007). Evolution in the Social Brain. Science, 317(5843), 1344–1347.
Abstract: The evolution of unusually large brains in some groups of animals, notably primates, has long been a puzzle. Although early explanations tended to emphasize the brain's role in sensory or technical competence (foraging skills, innovations, and way-finding), the balance of evidence now clearly favors the suggestion that it was the computational demands of living in large, complex societies that selected for large brains. However, recent analyses suggest that it may have been the particular demands of the more intense forms of pairbonding that was the critical factor that triggered this evolutionary development. This may explain why primate sociality seems to be so different from that found in most other birds and mammals: Primate sociality is based on bonded relationships of a kind that are found only in pairbonds in other taxa.
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