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Ash, C., Chin, G., Pennisi, E., & Sugden, A. (2007). Living in Societies. Science, 317(5843), 1337–.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). online material. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural Intelligence Hypothesis. Science, 317(5843), 1360–1366.
Abstract: Humans have many cognitive skills not possessed by their nearest primate relatives. The cultural intelligence hypothesis argues that this is mainly due to a species-specific set of social-cognitive skills, emerging early in ontogeny, for participating and exchanging knowledge in cultural groups. We tested this hypothesis by giving a comprehensive battery of cognitive tests to large numbers of two of humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and orangutans, as well as to 2.5-year-old human children before literacy and schooling. Supporting the cultural intelligence hypothesis and contradicting the hypothesis that humans simply have more “general intelligence,” we found that the children and chimpanzees had very similar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world but that the children had more sophisticated cognitive skills than either of the ape species for dealing with the social world.
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Dunbar, R. I. M., & Shultz, S. (2007). Evolution in the Social Brain. Science, 317(5843), 1344–1347.
Abstract: The evolution of unusually large brains in some groups of animals, notably primates, has long been a puzzle. Although early explanations tended to emphasize the brain's role in sensory or technical competence (foraging skills, innovations, and way-finding), the balance of evidence now clearly favors the suggestion that it was the computational demands of living in large, complex societies that selected for large brains. However, recent analyses suggest that it may have been the particular demands of the more intense forms of pairbonding that was the critical factor that triggered this evolutionary development. This may explain why primate sociality seems to be so different from that found in most other birds and mammals: Primate sociality is based on bonded relationships of a kind that are found only in pairbonds in other taxa.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). online material (Vol. 317).
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Wood, J. N., Glynn, D. D., Phillips, B. C., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). The Perception of Rational, Goal-Directed Action in Nonhuman Primates. Science, 317(5843), 1402–1405.
Abstract: Humans are capable of making inferences about other individuals' intentions and goals by evaluating their actions in relation to the constraints imposed by the environment. This capacity enables humans to go beyond the surface appearance of behavior to draw inferences about an individual's mental states. Presently unclear is whether this capacity is uniquely human or is shared with other animals. We show that cotton-top tamarins, rhesus macaques, and chimpanzees all make spontaneous inferences about a human experimenter's goal by attending to the environmental constraints that guide rational action. These findings rule out simple associative accounts of action perception and show that our capacity to infer rational, goal-directed action likely arose at least as far back as the New World monkeys, some 40 million years ago.
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Pennisi, E. (2007). PSYCHOLOGY: Nonhuman Primates Demonstrate Humanlike Reasoning. Science, 317(5843), 1308–.
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Silk, J. B. (2007). Social Components of Fitness in Primate Groups. Science, 317(5843), 1347–1351.
Abstract: There is much interest in the evolutionary forces that favored the evolution of large brains in the primate order. The social brain hypothesis posits that selection has favored larger brains and more complex cognitive capacities as a means to cope with the challenges of social life. The hypothesis is supported by evidence that shows that group size is linked to various measures of brain size. But it has not been clear how cognitive complexity confers fitness advantages on individuals. Research in the field and laboratory shows that sophisticated social cognition underlies social behavior in primate groups. Moreover, a growing body of evidence suggests that the quality of social relationships has measurable fitness consequences for individuals.
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Fleurance, G., Duncan, P., Fritz, H., Cabaret, J., Cortet, J., & Gordon, I. J. (2007). Selection of feeding sites by horses at pasture: Testing the anti-parasite theory. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 108(3-4), 228–301.
Abstract: Management of grazed grasslands for production and/or conservation objectives requires a thorough understanding of the choices of feeding sites by herbivores, and of the biological processes involved. Most models of the feeding strategies of herbivores are based on the principle that optimising the intake of energy (or some nutrient) is the primary goal of foragers but other selective forces, such as parasitism, could be important. Gastrointestinal parasites (including cyathostome nematodes) have powerful effects on the fitness of herbivores and may act as a major selection pressure favouring host behaviour that reduces the risk of encountering parasites. Among large herbivores, horses have perhaps the most marked tendency to select particular feeding sites within grasslands. We test here: (1) whether horses select feeding patches with relatively low parasite densities and (2) if their choice is affected by their parasite load. We used 10 two-year old saddle-horses and three periods. In the first period, the horses were under natural parasitism which varied strongly among individuals; in the second period they were all dewormed, and in the third, a sub-set of the horses was experimentally infected with cyathostome larvae. Ninety-eight percent of the infective larvae in the pasture were found <1 m from faeces. The main determinant of the choice of feeding patch by horses was the availability of patches of different parasite risk and grass height. Controlling for availability, the horses used tall grasses (>16 cm) less than expected, whether the grass was contaminated or not, and they selected for short patches >1 m from faeces, where the risk of encountering parasites was low. These results suggest that selection of feeding sites by horses is driven by an interaction between their nutritional and anti-parasite strategies: the horses avoid the patches of tall grass which are generally of low quality and areas contaminated by parasite larvae which leads them to prefer the patches of short grass far from faeces. The parasite status of the horses at the time of the experiment had no effect on their feeding choices. However, before concluding that the challenge by cyathostomes has no effect on the selection of feeding sites in horses, it will be necessary to test whether the history of parasitism of the individuals, rather than the current status, is important.
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Kokko, H., & Lopez-Sepulcre, A. (2007). The ecogenetic link between demography and evolution: can we bridge the gap between theory and data? Ecology Letters, 10(9), 773–782.
Abstract: Abstract Calls to understand the links between ecology and evolution have been common for decades. Population dynamics, i.e. the demographic changes in populations, arise from life history decisions of individuals and thus are a product of selection, and selection, on the contrary, can be modified by such dynamical properties of the population as density and stability. It follows that generating predictions and testing them correctly requires considering this ecogenetic feedback loop whenever traits have demographic consequences, mediated via density dependence (or frequency dependence). This is not an easy challenge, and arguably theory has advanced at a greater pace than empirical research. However, theory would benefit from more interaction between related fields, as is evident in the many near-synonymous names that the ecogenetic loop has attracted. We also list encouraging examples where empiricists have shown feasible ways of addressing the question, ranging from advanced data analysis to experiments and comparative analyses of phylogenetic data.
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