Abstract: At the beginning of the twentieth century, behaviourists like John B. Watson (1878-1958) changed the focus of attention from the inside of the brain (mentalism and introspection then being the main trend in psychology at the time) to the outside (Watson, 1913). They believed that we could learn nearly everything about animals and humans by studying their performance in learning experiments, and this was both measurable and verifiable. Today in the first decade of the twenty-first century, there has been a return to the inside. The neurosciences seek physiological explanations and connections between external behaviour and the neural mechanisms within the nervous system. With the revolution in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology researchers are now able to visually represent neural activity. Other researchers have developed mathematical models and programs to visualise the patterns created in the periphery prior to central integration The author in this paper would like to distinguish these descriptive forms of representation from actual representations, i.e., those of which the animal is actually aware or conscious. Why does an animal sometimes make perceptual mistakes? (Case Study I “The Turtle and the Plastic Bag”). Is there more to dispositions? (Case Study II: “Taking Representation for a Walk. Argos and the Fake Daniel Dennett”). How is prey represented to an animal? (Case Study III “Representation of Prey in the Jellyfish/Herring Predator-Prey Dyad”). Does a simple animal feel pain or suffer? (Case Study IV: A Can of Worms. The Earthworm as Bait) It will be argued on the basis of contemporary biosemiotic research that animals (including both vertebrates and invertebrates) represent environmental information internally, and these representations can be subdivided into i.) primary or peripheral representation and ii.) central representation which are quantitative and qualitative respectively. Sensory information is conveyed via signals, these are received as stimuli then transduced into internal signals (see Theoretical Framework). At this stage the animal is not aware of the quality of the information as it has not yet been integrated or processed in a ganglionic complex. One can describe the properties of this pre-integrated information as quantitative and syntactical i.e., spatial and temporal ordering of incoming signals and their relations. The sign which is the smallest unit of qualitative representation arises only after integration of information from two or more discrete sensory modalities. These findings have repercussions for current models of animal learning and behaviour, especially in lower invertebrates (the principal subject of this paper); they also challenge the development of robots based on so-called simple systems

Abstract: Abstract In several studies of social monitoring in primates, subordinate animals directed more visual attention toward dominant animals than vice versa. This behavior is thought to enable subordinate animals to avoid conflict. We sought to clarify whether visual attention behavior functions in this manner in a small captive group of brown capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella. We tested the hypothesis that social monitoring is related to dominance status. Dominance status was determined based on the directionality of aggressive behavior, and visual attention was quantified by using focal animal sampling. Subordinate animals directed significantly more visual attention toward others than dominant animals. Subordinate animals also looked more frequently at the animals that attacked them and others the most. The results indicate that social monitoring behavior in this captive group was driven by conflict-avoidance.

Abstract: Eavesdropping can be defined as the extraction of information from the interactions between other individuals. It provides a relatively cheap way of gathering relevant information for fitness enhancement. Here, we propose that obligate avian brood parasites, which always lay their eggs in foreign nests of individuals of other species, may eavesdrop on their host sexual signals to locate nests of high quality individuals in which to lay their parasitic eggs. Sexual signal variation can honestly signal parental quality. Thus, by eavesdropping on sexual signals, parasites may select high quality foster parents for their own offspring. Such a use of sexual signals within host populations by brood parasites differs from signal exploitation theory that proposes that parasite only use signals to locate potential host independently from signaller quality. Here, we review the avian literature concerning host choice within a host species by obligate avian brood parasites and find evidence for host selection within individuals of a host species on the basis of cues potentially functioning as sexually selected traits, or at least revealing parental abilities. We have also found support for the existence of benefits linked to host selection by avian brood parasites. Finally, one study reported on the attenuation of a sexual ornament in host populations under strong pressure by brood parasites. Most of these findings have been interpreted as evidence for host selection by avian brood parasites based on the conspicuousness of sexual signals. We suggest, however, that these findings may in fact reveal eavesdropping on host signalling performance by brood parasites which would use the information extracted to choose the better individuals among conspecifics of a given host. This provides a new perspective for the study of host selection in obligate brood parasites, and raises interesting questions for the study of animal cognition that would deserve experimental studies.

Abstract: Abstract
As the brain is responsible for managing an individual's behavioral response to its environment, we should expect that large relative brain size is an evolutionary response to cognitively challenging behaviors. The “social brain hypothesis� argues that maintaining group cohesion is cognitively demanding as individuals living in groups need to be able to resolve conflicts that impact on their ability to meet resource requirements. If sociality does impose cognitive demands, we expect changes in relative brain size and sociality to be coupled over evolutionary time. In this study, we analyze data on sociality and relative brain size for 206 species of ungulates, carnivores, and primates and provide, for the first time, evidence that changes in sociality and relative brain size are closely correlated over evolutionary time for all three mammalian orders. This suggests a process of coevolution and provides support for the social brain theory. However, differences between taxonomic orders in the stability of the transition between small-brained/nonsocial and large-brained/social imply that, although sociality is cognitively demanding, sociality and relative brain size can become decoupled in some cases. Carnivores seem to have been especially prone to this.