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Cruz, H. (2006). Towards a Darwinian Approach to Mathematics. Foundations of Science, 11, 157–196.
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Purpura, G. J. (2006). In Search of Human Uniqueness. Philosophical Psychology, 19, 443–461.
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Sickler, J., Fraser, J., Webler, T., Reiss, D., Boyle, P., Lyn, H., et al. (2006). Social Narratives Surrounding Dolphins: Q Method Study. Society and Animals, 14, 351–382.
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Deecke, V. B. (2006). Studying Marine Mammal Cognition in the Wild: A Review of Four Decades of Playback Experiments. Aquatic Mammals, 32, 461–482.
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Ottoni, E., de Resende, B., & Izar, P. (2006). Erratum. Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 156.
Abstract: Without Abstract
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Saleh, N., & Chittka, L. (2006). The importance of experience in the interpretation of conspecific chemical signals. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 61(2), 215–220.
Abstract: Abstract Foraging bumblebees scent mark flowers with hydrocarbon secretions. Several studies have found these scent marks act as a repellent to bee foragers. This was thought to minimize the risk of visiting recently depleted flowers. Some studies, however, have found a reverse, attractive effect of scent marks left on flowers. Do bees mark flowers with different scents, or could the same scent be interpreted differently depending on the bees? previous experience with reward levels in flowers? We use a simple experimental design to investigate if the scent marks can become attractive when bees forage on artificial flowers that remain rewarding upon the bees? return after having depleted them. We contrast this with bees trained in the more natural scenario where revisits to recently emptied flowers are unrewarding. The bees association between scent mark and reward value was tested with flowers scent marked from the same source. We find that the bees experience with the level of reward determines how the scent mark is interpreted: the same scent can act as both an attractant and a repellent. How experience and learning influence the interpretation of the meaning of chemical signals deposited by animals for communication has rarely been investigated.
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Chappell J. (2006). Avian cognition: understanding tool use. Curr. Biol., 16, 244.
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Seed AM, Tebbich S, Emery NJ, & Clayton NS. (2006). Investigating physical cognition in rooks (Corvus frugilegus). Curr. Biol., 16(7), 697–701.
Abstract: Summary Although animals (particularly tool-users) are capable of solving physical tasks in the laboratory and the degree to which they understand them in terms of their underlying physical forces is a matter of contention. Here, using a new paradigm, the two-trap tube task, we report the performance of non-tool-using rooks. In contrast to the low success rates of previous studies using trap-tube problems , , and , seven out of eight rooks solved the initial task, and did so rapidly. Instead of the usual, conceptually flawed control, we used a series of novel transfer tasks to test for understanding. All seven transferred their solution across a change in stimuli. However, six out of seven were unable to transfer to two further tasks, which did not share any one visual constant. One female was able to solve these further transfer tasks. Her result is suggestive evidence that rooks are capable of sophisticated physical cognition, if not through an understanding of unobservable forces and , perhaps through rule abstraction. Our results highlight the need to investigate cognitive mechanisms other than causal understanding in studying animal physical cognition.
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Clayton NS, & Dickinson A. (2006). Rational rats. Science, 9, 472.
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Brembs, B., & Wiener, J. (2006). Context and occasion setting in Drosophila visual learning. Learn. Mem., 13(5), 618–628.
Abstract: In a permanently changing environment, it is by no means an easy task to distinguish potentially important events from negligible ones. Yet, to survive, every animal has to continuously face that challenge. How does the brain accomplish this feat? Building on previous work in Drosophila melanogaster visual learning, we have developed an experimental methodology in which combinations of visual stimuli (colors and patterns) can be arranged such that the same stimuli can either be directly predictive, indirectly predictive, or nonpredictive of punishment. Varying this relationship, we found that wild-type flies can establish different memory templates for the same contextual color cues. The colors can either leave no trace in the pattern memory template, leading to context-independent pattern memory (context generalization), or be learned as a higher-order cue indicating the nature of the pattern-heat contingency leading to context-dependent memory (occasion setting) or serve as a conditioned stimulus predicting the punishment directly (simple conditioning). In transgenic flies with compromised mushroom-body function, the sensitivity to these subtle variations is altered. Our methodology constitutes a new concept for designing learning experiments. Our findings suggest that the insect mushroom bodies stabilize visual memories against context changes and are not required for cognition-like higher-order learning.
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