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Nakagawa, S. (2004). A farewell to Bonferroni: the problems of low statistical power and publication bias. Behav Ecol, 15.
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Squire, L. (2004). Memory systems of the brain: a brief history and current perspective. Neurobiol Learn Mem, 82.
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Kleiven, J., Bjerke, T., & Kaltenborn, B. P. (2004). Factors influencing the social acceptability of large carnivore behaviours. Biodivers Conserv, 13.
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Apollonio, M., Mattioli, L., Scandura, M., Mauri, L., Gazzola, A., & Avanzinelli, E. (2004). Wolves in the Casentinesi Forests: insights for wolf conservation in Italy from a protected area with a rich wild prey community. Biol Conserv, 120.
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Lazareva, O. F., Smirnova, A. A., Bagozkaja, M. S., Zorina, Z. A., Rayevsky, V. V., & Wasserman, E. A. (2004). Transitive responding in hooded crows requires linearly ordered stimuli. J Exp Anal Behav, 82(1), 1–19.
Abstract: Eight crows were taught to discriminate overlapping pairs of visual stimuli (A+ B-, B+ C-, C+ D-, and D+ E-). For 4 birds, the stimuli were colored cards with a circle of the same color on the reverse side whose diameter decreased from A to E (ordered feedback group). These circles were made available for comparison to potentially help the crows order the stimuli along a physical dimension. For the other 4 birds, the circles corresponding to the colored cards had the same diameter (constant feedback group). In later testing, a novel choice pair (BD) was presented. Reinforcement history involving stimuli B and D was controlled so that the reinforcement/nonreinforcement ratios for the latter would be greater than for the former. If, during the BD test, the crows chose between stimuli according to these reinforcement/nonreinforcement ratios, then they should prefer D; if they chose according to the diameter of the feedback stimuli, then they should prefer B. In the ordered feedback group, the crows strongly preferred B over D; in the constant feedback group, the crows' choice did not differ significantly from chance. These results, plus simulations using associative models, suggest that the orderability of the postchoice feedback stimuli is important for crows' transitive responding.
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Murai, C., Tomonaga, M., Kamegai, K., Terazawa, N., & Yamaguchi, M. K. (2004). Do infant Japanese macaques ( Macaca fuscata) categorize objects without specific training? Primates, 45(1), 1–6.
Abstract: In the present study, we examined whether infant Japanese macaques categorize objects without any training, using a similar technique also used with human infants (the paired-preference method). During the familiarization phase, subjects were presented twice with two pairs of different objects from one global-level category. During the test phase, they were presented twice with a pair consisting of a novel familiar-category object and a novel global-level category object. The subjects were tested with three global-level categories (animal, furniture, and vehicle). It was found that they showed significant novelty preferences as a whole, indicating that they processed similarities between familiarization objects and novel familiar-category objects. These results suggest that subjects responded distinctively to objects without training, indicating the possibility that infant macaques possess the capacity for categorization.
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Gould, J. L. (2004). Thinking about thinking: how Donald R. Griffin (1915-2003) remade animal behavior. Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 1–4.
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Gasser, R. B., Hung, G. - C., Chilton, N. B., & Beveridge, I. (2004). Advances in developing molecular-diagnostic tools for strongyloid nematodes of equids: fundamental and applied implications. Mol Cell Probes, 18(1), 3–16.
Abstract: Infections of equids with parasitic nematodes of the order Strongylida (subfamilies Strongylinae and Cyathostominae) are of major veterinary importance. In last decades, the widespread use of drugs against these parasites has led to problems of resistance within the Cyathostominae, and to an increase in their prevalence and intensity of infection. Novel control strategies, based on improved knowledge of parasite biology and epidemiology, have thus become important. However, there are substantial limitations in the understanding of fundamental biological and systematic aspects of these parasites, which have been due largely to limitations in their specific identification and diagnosis using traditional, morphological approaches. Recently, there has been progress in the development of DNA-based approaches for the specific identification of strongyloids of equids for systematic studies and disease diagnosis. The present article briefly reviews information on the classification, biology, pathogenesis, epidemiology of equine strongyloids and the diagnosis of infections, highlights knowledge gaps in these areas, describes recent advances in the use of molecular techniques for the genetic characterisation, specific identification and differentiation of strongyloids of equids as a basis for fundamental investigations of the systematics, population biology and ecology.
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Laland K.N. (2004). Social learning strategies. Learn. Behav., 32, 4–14.
Abstract: In most studies of social learning in animals, no attempt has been made to examine the nature of the strategy adopted by animals when they copy others. Researchers have expended considerable effort in exploring the psychological processes that underlie social learning and amassed extensive data banks recording purported social learning in the field, but the contexts under which animals copy others remain unexplored. Yet, theoretical models used to investigate the adaptive advantages of social learning lead to the conclusion that social learning cannot be indiscriminate and that individuals should adopt strategies that dictate the circumstances under which they copy others and from whom they learn. In this article, I discuss a number of possible strategies that are predicted by theoretical analyses, including copy when uncertain, copy the majority, and copy if better, and consider the empirical evidence in support of each, drawing from both the animal and human social learning literature. Reliance on social learning strategies may be organized hierarchically, their being employed by animals when unlearned and asocially learned strategies prove ineffective but before animals take recourse in innovation.
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Griffin, D. R., & Speck, G. B. (2004). New evidence of animal consciousness. Anim. Cogn., 7(1), 5–18.
Abstract: This paper reviews evidence that increases the probability that many animals experience at least simple levels of consciousness. First, the search for neural correlates of consciousness has not found any consciousness-producing structure or process that is limited to human brains. Second, appropriate responses to novel challenges for which the animal has not been prepared by genetic programming or previous experience provide suggestive evidence of animal consciousness because such versatility is most effectively organized by conscious thinking. For example, certain types of classical conditioning require awareness of the learned contingency in human subjects, suggesting comparable awareness in similarly conditioned animals. Other significant examples of versatile behavior suggestive of conscious thinking are scrub jays that exhibit all the objective attributes of episodic memory, evidence that monkeys sometimes know what they know, creative tool-making by crows, and recent interpretation of goal-directed behavior of rats as requiring simple nonreflexive consciousness. Third, animal communication often reports subjective experiences. Apes have demonstrated increased ability to use gestures or keyboard symbols to make requests and answer questions; and parrots have refined their ability to use the imitation of human words to ask for things they want and answer moderately complex questions. New data have demonstrated increased flexibility in the gestural communication of swarming honey bees that leads to vitally important group decisions as to which cavity a swarm should select as its new home. Although no single piece of evidence provides absolute proof of consciousness, this accumulation of strongly suggestive evidence increases significantly the likelihood that some animals experience at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings. The next challenge for cognitive ethologists is to investigate for particular animals the content of their awareness and what life is actually like, for them.
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