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Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297–299.
Abstract: During the evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and pay-offs with those of others. Negative reactions may occur when expectations are violated. One theory proposes that aversion to inequity can explain human cooperation within the bounds of the rational choice model, and may in fact be more inclusive than previous explanations. Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this 'sense of fairness' is probably a human universal that has been shown to prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. However, we are not the only cooperative animals, hence inequity aversion may not be uniquely human. Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman primate, the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella), responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges with a human experimenter. Monkeys refused to participate if they witnessed a conspecific obtain a more attractive reward for equal effort, an effect amplified if the partner received such a reward without any effort at all. These reactions support an early evolutionary origin of inequity aversion.
Keywords: Aging; Animals; Cebus/*psychology; Choice Behavior; *Cooperative Behavior; Female; Male; *Reward; Social Justice
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Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P., & Knights, S. (2003). Sociology: The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature, 421(6926), 911–2; discussion 912.
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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
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Rands, S. A., Cowlishaw, G., Pettifor, R. A., Rowcliffe, J. M., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs. Nature, 423(6938), 432–434.
Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.
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Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nat Rev Neurosci, 4(3), 165–178.
Abstract: We are an intensely social species--it has been argued that our social nature defines what makes us human, what makes us conscious or what gave us our large brains. As a new field, the social brain sciences are probing the neural underpinnings of social behaviour and have produced a banquet of data that are both tantalizing and deeply puzzling. We are finding new links between emotion and reason, between action and perception, and between representations of other people and ourselves. No less important are the links that are also being established across disciplines to understand social behaviour, as neuroscientists, social psychologists, anthropologists, ethologists and philosophers forge new collaborations.
Keywords: Cognition; Emotions; Humans; Models, Psychological; *Social Behavior
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Earley, R. L., Tinsley, M., & Dugatkin, L. A. (2003). To see or not to see: does previewing a future opponent affect the contest behavior of green swordtail males (Xiphophorus helleri)? Naturwissenschaften, 90(5), 226–230.
Abstract: Animals assess the fighting ability of conspecifics either by engaging in aggressive interactions or observing contests between others. However, whether individuals assess physical prowess outside the context of aggressive interactions remains unknown. We examined whether male green swordtails (Xiphophorus helleri) extract information about the fighting ability of solitary individuals via observation and whether acquiring such information elicits behavioral modifications. Contests preceded by mutual visual assessment were significantly shorter than fights where only one or neither of the two individuals was informed in advance. Focal animals initiated aggressive behavior more often against larger opponents only after previewing their adversary, indicating that swordtails can extract information about relative body size from watching solitary conspecifics. When a fighting disadvantage is perceived, observers adopt tactics that increase their probability of winning the contest.
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Milgram, N. W. (2003). Cognitive Experience and Its Effect on Age-Dependent Cognitive Decline in Beagle Dogs. Neurochemical Research, 28(11), 1677–1682.
Abstract: Test-sophisticated beagle dogs show marked age sensitivity in a size discrimination learning task, with old and senior dogs performing significantly more poorly than young dogs. By contrast, age differences in learning were not seen in dogs naive with respect to neuropsychological test experience. These results indicate that old animals benefit less from prior cognitive experience than young animals, which is an example of an age-dependent loss in plasticity. This finding also suggests that behaviorally experienced animals are a more useful model of human cognitive aging than behaviorally naive animals. We also looked at the effect of a program of behavioral enrichment in aged dogs. One year of enrichment did not lead to significant differences, but after 2 years the behaviorally enriched group performed significantly better than the control group. The effect after 2 years indicates that a prolonged program of cognitive enrichment can serve as an effective intervention in aged dogs. These findings demonstrate that cognitive abilities in aged animals can be modified by providing behavioral experience, indicating that cognitive abilities remain moderately plastic, even in very old animals.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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Branchi, I., Bichler, Z., Berger-Sweeney, J., & Ricceri, L. (2003). Animal models of mental retardation: from gene to cognitive function. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 27(1-2), 141–153.
Abstract: About 2-3% of all children are affected by mental retardation, and genetic conditions rank among the leading causes of mental retardation. Alterations in the information encoded by genes that regulate critical steps of brain development can disrupt the normal course of development, and have profound consequences on mental processes. Genetically modified mouse models have helped to elucidate the contribution of specific gene alterations and gene-environment interactions to the phenotype of several forms of mental retardation. Mouse models of several neurodevelopmental pathologies, such as Down and Rett syndromes and X-linked forms of mental retardation, have been developed. Because behavior is the ultimate output of brain, behavioral phenotyping of these models provides functional information that may not be detectable using molecular, cellular or histological evaluations. In particular, the study of ontogeny of behavior is recommended in mouse models of disorders having a developmental onset. Identifying the role of specific genes in neuropathologies provides a framework in which to understand key stages of human brain development, and provides a target for potential therapeutic intervention.
Keywords: Animals; Animals, Genetically Modified/growth & development; Behavior/physiology; Behavior, Animal; Brain/*growth & development; Cognition/*physiology; *Disease Models, Animal; Environment; Genes; Genetic Diseases, Inborn/physiopathology; Humans; Mental Retardation/classification/*genetics/*physiopathology
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Call, J. (2003). Beyond learning fixed rules and social cues: abstraction in the social arena. Phil. Trans. Biol. Sci., 358(1435), 1189–1196.
Abstract: Abstraction is a central idea in many areas of physical comparative cognition such as categorization, numerical competence or problem solving. This idea, however, has rarely been applied to comparative social cognition. In this paper, I propose that the notion of abstraction can be applied to the social arena and become an important tool to investigate the social cognition and behaviour processes in animals. To make this point, I present recent evidence showing that chimpanzees know about what others can see and about what others intend. These data do not fit either low-level mechanisms based on stimulus-response associations or high-level explanations based on metarepresentational mechanisms such as false belief attribution. Instead, I argue that social abstraction, in particular the development of concepts such as seeing in others, is key to explaining the behaviour of our closest relative in a variety of situations.
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