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Rüegg J. C. (2003). Psychosomatik, Psychotherapie und Gehirn. Stuttgart: Schattauer Verlag.
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Wallner, B., Brem, G., Muller, M., & Achmann, R. (2003). Fixed nucleotide differences on the Y chromosome indicate clear divergence between Equus przewalskii and Equus caballus. Anim Genet, 34(6), 453–456.
Abstract: The phylogenetic relationship between Equus przewalskii and E. caballus is often a matter of debate. Although these taxa have different chromosome numbers, they do not form monophyletic clades in a phylogenetic tree based on mtDNA sequences. Here we report sequence variation from five newly identified Y chromosome regions of the horse. Two fixed nucleotide differences on the Y chromosome clearly display Przewalski's horse and domestic horse as sister taxa. At both positions the Przewalski's horse haplotype shows the ancestral state, in common with the members of the zebra/ass lineage. We discuss the factors that may have led to the differences in mtDNA and Y-chromosomal observations.
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Bowling, A. T., Zimmermann, W., Ryder, O., Penado, C., Peto, S., Chemnick, L., et al. (2003). Genetic variation in Przewalski’s horses, with special focus on the last wild caught mare, 231 Orlitza III. Cytogenet Genome Res, 102(1-4), 226–234.
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Van Doorn G.S., Hengeveld G.M., & Weissing F.J. (2003). The Evolution of Social Dominance I: Two-player Models. Behavior, 140(10), 1305–1332.
Abstract: A difference in dominance rank is an often-used cue to resolve conflicts between two animals without escalated fights. At the group level, adherence to a dominance convention efficiently reduces the costs associated with conflicts, but from an individual's point of view, it is difficult to explain why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. This is especially true if, as suggested by several authors, dominance not necessarily reflects differences in fighting ability but rather results from arbitrary historical asymmetries. According to this idea, rank differentiation emerges from behavioural strategies, referred to as winner and loser effects, in which winners of previous conflicts are more likely to win the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. In order to investigate whether dominance, based on such winner and loser effects, can be evolutionarily stable, we analyse a game theoretical model. The model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no differences in fighting ability between individuals at all. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. By means of numerical analysis, we find alternative evolutionarily stable strategies, which all utilize these asymmetries for conventional conflict resolution. One class of these strategies is based on winner and loser effects, thus generating evolutionarily stable dominance relations even in the absence of differences in resource holding potential.
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Van Doorn G.S., Hengeveld G.M., & Weissing F.J. (2003). The Evolution of Social Dominance II: Multi-Player Models. Behavior, 140(10), 1333–1358.
Abstract: The social hierarchies observed in natural systems often show a high degree of transitivity. Transitive hierarchies do not only require rank differentiation within pairs of individuals but also a higher level ordering of relations within the group. Several authors have suggested that the formation of linear hierarchies at the group level is an emergent property of individual behavioural rules, referred to as winner and loser effects. Winner and loser effects occur if winners of previous conflicts are more likely to escalate the current conflict, whereas the losers of previous conflicts are less likely to do so. According to this idea, an individual's position in a hierarchy may not necessarily reflect its fighting ability, but may rather result from arbitrary historical asymmetries, in particular the history of victories and defeats. However, if this is the case, it is difficult to explain from an evolutionary perspective why a low ranking individual should accept its subordinate status. Here we present a game theoretical model to investigate whether winner and loser effects giving rise to transitive hierarchies can evolve and under which conditions they are evolutionarily stable. The main version of the model focuses on an extreme case in which there are no intrinsic differences in fighting ability between individuals. The only asymmetries that may arise between individuals are generated by the outcome of previous conflicts. We show that, at evolutionary equilibrium, these asymmetries can be utilized for conventional conflict resolution. Several evolutionarily stable strategies are based on winner and loser effects and these strategies give rise to transitive hierarchies.
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Conradt, L., & Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 421(6919), 155–158.
Abstract: Groups of animals often need to make communal decisions, for example about which activities to perform, when to perform them and which direction to travel in; however, little is known about how they do so. Here, we model the fitness consequences of two possible decision-making mechanisms: 'despotism' and 'democracy'. We show that under most conditions, the costs to subordinate group members, and to the group as a whole, are considerably higher for despotic than for democratic decisions. Even when the despot is the most experienced group member, it only pays other members to accept its decision when group size is small and the difference in information is large. Democratic decisions are more beneficial primarily because they tend to produce less extreme decisions, rather than because each individual has an influence on the decision per se. Our model suggests that democracy should be widespread and makes quantitative, testable predictions about group decision-making in non-humans.
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Rands, S. A., Cowlishaw, G., Pettifor, R. A., Rowcliffe, J. M., & Johnstone, R. A. (2003). Spontaneous emergence of leaders and followers in foraging pairs. Nature, 423(6938), 432–434.
Abstract: Animals that forage socially often stand to gain from coordination of their behaviour. Yet it is not known how group members reach a consensus on the timing of foraging bouts. Here we demonstrate a simple process by which this may occur. We develop a state-dependent, dynamic game model of foraging by a pair of animals, in which each individual chooses between resting or foraging during a series of consecutive periods, so as to maximize its own individual chances of survival. We find that, if there is an advantage to foraging together, the equilibrium behaviour of both individuals becomes highly synchronized. As a result of this synchronization, differences in the energetic reserves of the two players spontaneously develop, leading them to adopt different behavioural roles. The individual with lower reserves emerges as the 'pace-maker' who determines when the pair should forage, providing a straightforward resolution to the problem of group coordination. Moreover, the strategy that gives rise to this behaviour can be implemented by a simple 'rule of thumb' that requires no detailed knowledge of the state of other individuals.
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Camazine, S., Deneubourg, J. L., Franks, N. R., Sneyd, J., Theraula, G., & Bonabeau, E. (2003). Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Couzin, I. D., & Krause, J. (2003). Self-Organization and Collective Behavior in Vertebrates. In Charles T. Snowdon and Timothy J. Roper J. S. R. Peter J. B. Slater (Ed.), Advances in the Study of Behavior (Vol. 32, pp. 1–75). Academic Press.
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Waeber P.O., & Hemelrijk C.K. (2003). Female Dominance and Social Structure in Alaotran Gentle Lemurs. Behaviour, 140(10), 1235–1246.
Abstract: Abstract:
Lemur social systems have the striking social feature, that adult females consistently evoke submissive behaviour of adult males. In the Alaotran gentle lemur, Hapalemur griseus alaotrensis, however, female dominance has not been studied yet. Here we confirm female dominance over males on the basis of a 5-month field study of the social behaviour of four groups, in the Lake Alaotra marshland of eastern Madagascar. Further, we found that dominant individuals initiated aggressive interactions significantly more often than lowerranking ones, they initiated group movements more often and higher-ranking individuals were groomed more often. The spatial configuration was remarkable, since individuals were closer in space to those more distant in rank.
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