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van der Kolk, J. H., Nachreiner, R. F., Schott, H. C., Refsal, K. R., & Zanella, A. J. (2001). Salivary and plasma concentration of cortisol in normal horses and horses with Cushing's disease. Equine Vet J, 33(2), 211–213.
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Ushitani, T., Fujita, K., & Yamanaka, R. (2001). Do pigeons (Columba livia) perceive object unity? Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 153–161.
Abstract: Human infants perceive two rods moving in concert behind an occluder as one unitary rod. In four experiments we tested whether pigeons also perceive unity of objects. Pigeons were trained on a matching-to-sample task to discriminate between one unitary rod moving at a constant speed and two aligned rods moving together at the same speed. The latter stimulus was identical to the former except for a gap in the center. In experiment 1, we tested pigeons in probe trials in which a rectangle occluded the center of the sample rods, to see which comparison stimulus, the unitary rod or the aligned two rods, the subjects would match to the sample. Two of the three subjects pecked at the two rods significantly more often than at the unitary rod. In experiment 2, we trained the same pigeons to match the sample rods moving “in front of” the occluder. Pigeons persisted in matching two separate rods to the unitary rod moving in front of the occluder. In experiments 3 and 4, we used a parallelogram and an undulating shape as the occluder to alter the shape and the size of the portions above and below the occluder by the motion of the sample rods. Both subjects chose the two rods significantly more often than chance in experiment 3 and one of them did so in experiment 4. The results suggest that pigeons do not complete occluded portions even though the two elements move in concert. These negative results suggest that some alternative way of identifying objects may have evolved in pigeons.
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Tschudin, A. J. - P. C. (2001). 'Mindreading' Mammals? Attribution of Belief Tasks with Dolphins. Anim Welfare, 10, 119–127.
Abstract: 'Mindreading' or theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to attribute mental states to others. This ability is regarded as a critical component of what has, to date, exclusively characterized the advanced social cognition displayed by humans. The false belief task is a key test for ToM in different animal species. On a standard non-verbal false belief task, humans pass from age 4, whereas non-human primates consistently fail. Neuroanatomical and behavioural evidence for dolphins, however, indicates that they are capable of passing ToM tasks. The current paper represents a synthesis of the relevant dolphin research on neocortical evolution and non-invasive behavioural tests of precursors for ToM and the attribution of beliefs. The success of dolphins on attribution of belief tasks, in the absence of learning or cueing, indicates that they are capable of 'mindreading'. What are the implications of animal 'mindreading'? ToM tasks probe for reflexive consciousness and, by this criterion, dolphins may display reflexive consciousness. The implication of this conclusion is that future behavioural studies of social cognition will have considerable ethical and legal implications for animal welfare.
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Tonooka, R. (2001). Leaf-folding behavior for drinking water by wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) at Bossou, Guinea. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 325–334.
Abstract: The use of leaves for drinking water by wild chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes verus) at Bossou, Guinea, was observed intensively. The natural hollow of a tree, used by chimpanzees, was filled up with fresh water every morning. Seventy episodes of leaf-using behavior by 14 chimpanzees were directly observed and video-recorded. The chimpanzees at Bossou most frequently (70.3%) used a particular kind of leaf, Hybophrynium braunianum as tool material. The chimpanzees folded one or more leaves in the mouth. This technique, “leaf folding”, was observed more frequently (57.9 %) than “leaf sponge” or “leaf spoon”. Chimpanzees began to perform this behavior at about 2.5 years old. Infant chimpanzees showed more frequent observations of others (especially their mothers) using leaves before trying to drink water with leaves. Both observation and trial and error might be necessary for the acquisition of this tool-use behavior.
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Tomasello, M., Hare, B., & Fogleman, T. (2001). The ontogeny of gaze following in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta. Anim. Behav., 61(2), 335–343.
Abstract: Primates follow the gaze direction of conspecifics to outside objects. We followed the ontogeny of this social-cognitive skill for two species: rhesus macaques and chimpanzees. In the first two experiments, using both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal design, we exposed individuals of different ages to a human looking in a specified direction. Rhesus infants first began reliably to follow the direction of this gaze at the end of the early infancy period, at about 5.5 months of age. Chimpanzees did not reliably follow human gaze until 3-4 years; this corresponds to the latter part of the late infancy period for this species. In the third experiment we exposed individuals of the same two species to a human repeatedly looking to the same location (with no special object at that location) to see if subjects would learn to ignore the looks. Only adults of the two species diminished their gaze-following behaviour over trials. This suggests that in the period between infancy and adulthood individuals of both species come to integrate their gaze-following skills with their more general social-cognitive knowledge about other animate beings and their behaviour, and so become able to deploy their gaze-following skills in a more flexible manner.
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Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (2001). Books Received. Animal Behaviour, 61(1), 269–270.
Abstract: The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey
Parrots. By I. M. PEPPERBERG. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press (1999).
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Tomasello, M. (2001). Cultural Transmission: A View from Chimpanzees and Human Infants. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32(2), 135–146.
Abstract: Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways that other primates are not, as evidenced most clearly by the fact that only human cultural traditions accumulate modifications over historical time (the ratchet effect). The key adaptation is one that enables individuals to understand other individuals as intentional agents like the self. This species-unique form of social cognition emerges in human ontogeny at around 1 year of age as infants begin to engage with other persons in various kinds of joint attentional activities involving gaze following, social referencing, and gestural communication. Young children's joint attentional skills then engender some uniquely powerful forms of cultural learning, enabling the acquisition of language, discourse skills, tool use practices, and many other conventional activities. These novel forms of cultural learning allow human beings to pool their cognitive resources both contemporaneously and over historical time in ways that are unique in the animal kingdom.
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Timney, B., & Macuda, T. (2001). Vision and hearing in horses. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 218(10), 1567–1574.
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Tebbich, S., Taborsky, M., Fessl, B., & Blomqvist, D. (2001). Do woodpecker finches acquire tool-use by social learning? Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 268(1482), 2189–2193.
Abstract: Tool–use is widespread among animals, but except in primates the development of this behaviour is poorly known. Here, we report on the first experimental study to our knowledge of the mechanisms underlying the acquisition of tool–use in a bird species. The woodpecker finch Cactospiza pallida, endemic to the Galápagos Islands, is a famous textbook example of tool–use in animals. This species uses modified twigs or cactus spines to pry arthropods out of tree holes. Using nestlings and adult birds from the field, we tested experimentally whether woodpecker finches learn tool–use socially. We show that social learning is not essential for the development of tool–use: all juveniles developed tool–use regardless of whether or not they had a tool–using model. However, we found that not all adult woodpecker finches used tools in our experiments. These non–tool–using individuals also did not learn this task by observing tool–using conspecifics. Our results suggest that tool–use behaviour depends on a very specific learning disposition that involves trial–and–error learning during a sensitive phase early in ontogeny.
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Taylor, J. G. (2001). What do Neuronal Network Models of the Mind Indicate about Animal Consciousness? Animal Welfare, 10, 63–75.
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