Abstract: A preference test was used to demonstrate that gilts have the ability to associate two sets of neutral cues with two different periods of confinement and water deprivation and to anticipate the long-term consequences of their choice in the test. Twelve gilts housed in two large, straw-bedded pens were trained to go to two sets of 12 crates, positioned on each side of a choice point, for feeding twice a day. Following initial training, the two sets of crates were marked with contrasting visual patterns and the patterns were associated with either 30 min (`short' confinement) or 240 min (`long' confinement) of confinement in the crates after entry. During 16 days of preference testing, the gilts were sent alternately to one side or the other in the mornings and allowed to choose in the afternoons. Eight gilts chose the short confinement side more often, two, the long confinement side more often and two, each side an equal number of times, indicating that most gilts learned the association and preferred to be released shortly after feeding. However, gilts still chose the long confinement side on occasion, suggesting that they did not find 240 min of confinement very aversive. When the gilts were sent to the crates in the morning, their behaviour indicated that they expected to be released or confined depending on which crate they were in. The cognitive abilities of animals with respect to perception of time and anticipation of future events have important implications for their welfare. This study demonstrates that methods can be developed to ask animals about such things.

Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.

Abstract: This article examines the relations between methods used in both animal work and study and concepts of animal mind. By “animal work” the authors mean humans and animals working together, and by “animal study” they mean the discipline of ethology, especially the emerging area of cognitive ethology. Within these areas the wide range of conceptions of animal mind includes varying emphases on intelligence, forms of rationality and language, cognition, consciousness, and intentionality. The authors' central concern is to elucidate the vocabulary and the concepts which seem necessary to establishing successful working relationships with sheepdogs and gundogs. Their argument moves toward an emphasis on the appreciation of particular intentional states and recognizes that they invariably deploy elements of a moral vocabulary in achieving creative teamwork performances with dogs and other animals. The article concludes by consid enng the relevance of accounts of work with animals for associated considerations of intentionality.

Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious.