Abstract: Recent water maze experiments suggest that rats performing place navigation primarily use the geometric information provided by a set of landmarks, and neglect the featural information provided by the identities of the landmarks. Here, I develop a model that explains how an animal may perform place navigation by relying only on geometric information. The core of the model is the representation of places as panoramas defined by circular bar-codes embodying the relative bearings and apparent sizes of the landmarks, irrespective of their identities. There are two stages in the model. During the first stage, the animal freely explores its environment in order to acquire spatial information at the local level. During the second stage, the animal uses the information previously memorized to perform place navigation towards the goal it intends to reach. The possible role of two brain areas in place navigation is discussed within this framework. Beyond their primary role in landmark-based representations of places, hippocampal place cells may be involved in computing the current distances to the landmarks. Beyond their primary role in landmark-based representations of headings, post-subicular head-direction cells may be involved in computing the “compass bearings” of the landmarks.

Abstract: In experiment 1, pigeons were trained to match temporal (2, 8, and 10 s of houselight) and location (feeder light, left key, center key illumination) samples to color comparison stimuli. Red choices were correct following the 2-s and feeder light, orange choices were correct following the 8-s and center key, and green choices were correct following the 10-s and left key. Samples that were harder to discriminate (8- vs 10-s, and left vs center key) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easier to discriminate (2- vs 8-s, and feeder light vs left key) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate(red vs orange). The pattern of errors for temporal and location samples indicated that these samples were not represented by a common code even though they were associated with the same comparison stimuli. In experiment 2, the same pigeons were trained with visual samples in which samples that were hard to discriminate (triangle vs circle) were mapped onto comparisons that were easy to discriminate (orange vs green), while samples that were easy to discriminate(plus vs triangle) were mapped onto comparisons that were hard to discriminate (red vs orange). Following acquisition of the visual discrimination, the temporal samples were re-introduced and many-to-one training was continued. During delay testing, the pattern of errors for temporal and visual samples was equivalent and consistent with the hypothesis that visual samples were being coded in terms of the duration appropriate for the temporal sample with which it shared a common comparison response. Data from no-sample test sessions ruled out a simple response bias explanation of the data. The properties of common codes for temporal and nontemporal events can be somewhat flexible and more complicated than previously envisaged.

Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious.

Abstract: Abstract: Individual recognition is generally assumed to be a prerequisite for establishing and maintaining a complex social system. Indeed, there is good evidence that highly social species have complex systems of vocal communication with individual recognition by acoustic cues. In this study, we provide experimental evidence that vocal class and individual recognition is present in a non-passerine bird, the spectacled parrotlet (Forpus conspicillatus). Spectacled parrotlets live in a complex system of social relationships. Soon after fledging, the young establish close sibling relationships which are important for successful socialization, pairing and reproduction. In a series of playback experiments we tested if spectacled parrotlets use contact calls for vocal recognition. The results showed that spectacled parrotlets discriminate between the contact calls of different social categories. Adult birds preferred to respond to the contact calls of their mates. Subadult individuals recognized the contact calls of their siblings. During the period of pair bond formation, the affiliative contacts to the siblings decrease, but the parrotlets continue to respond to the calls of their siblings. This is the first evidence that vocal sibling recognition might outlast the period of strong sibling interaction and extends into the period of pair bond formation. In cases of mate loss or divorce, the acoustic contact to their siblings might facilitate the re-establishment of close sibling relationships.

Abstract: Mate-choice copying has recently been demonstrated in several species. Two, not mutually exclusive, explanations for copying have been proposed: it reduces sampling costs and/or error of mate choice. In guppies, Poecilia reticulata, and black grouse, Tetrao tetrix, young females seem most likely to copy. Therefore, copying may teach inexperienced females what attractive males look like. I developed a 2-year dynamic model, to investigate under which conditions a mate-copying strategy might first evolve. An original population of pure choosers was assumed, which was invaded by a mutant female, able to copy during her first mating season, thereby instantly improving her ability to assess male quality. Alternatively, she could either wait and learn by observing males, just as non-copiers may do, but incurring some time costs, or choose, relying on her own abilities. The degree to which copying occurred among these mutant, young, inexperienced females increased with an increasing proportion of old, experienced females in the population, and with decreasing time left until the end of the season. The model demonstrates that mate-choice copying may evolve, when young females are poor at discrimination and need to learn what high-quality males look like. Male quality proved to be unimportant for copying to evolve, as long as there are sufficient differences in quality for mate choice to be meaningful. As with previous models, time constraints are an important assumption for copying to be advantageous over non-copying. Copyright 1998 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Copyright 1998 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.