Oakenfull, E. A., & Ryder, O. A. (1998). Mitochondrial control region and 12S rRNA variation in Przewalski's horse (Equus przewalskii). Anim Genet, 29(6), 456–459.
Abstract: Variation in the control region and the 12S rRNA gene of all surviving mitochondrial lineages of Przewalski's horse was investigated. Variation is low despite the present day population being descended from 13 individuals probably representing animals from three different regions of its range. Phylogenetic comparison of these sequences, with sequences for the domestic horse, does not resolve the ancestral status of either horse.
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Dyer, F. C. (1998). Spatial Cognition: Lessons from Central-place Foraging Insects. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 119–154). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary Spatial orientation has played an extremely important role in the development of ideas about the behavioral capacities of animals. Indeed, as the modern scientific study of animal behavior emerged from its roots in zoology and experimental psychology, studies of spatial orientation figured in the work of many of the pioneering researchers, including Tinbergen (), von ), Watson () and .
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Smith, W. J. (1998). Cognitive Implications of an Information-sharing Model of Animal Communication. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 227–243). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.
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Beer, C. G. (1998). Varying Views of Animal and Human Cognition. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 435–456). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In this chapter I want to stand back from the splendid empirical work on animal cognitive capacities that is the focus of this book, and look at the broader context of cognitive concerns within which the work can be viewed. Indeed even the term `cognitive ethology' currently connotes and denotes more than is represented here, as other collections of articles, such as and , exemplify. I include the current descendants of behavioristic learning theory, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology and the recent comparative turn that has been taken in cognitive science. These several approaches, despite their considerable overlap, often appear independent and even ignorant of one another. Like the proverbial blind men feeling the hide of an elephant, they touch hands from time to time, yet collectively have only a piecemeal and distributed understanding of the shape of the whole. Although each approach may indeed need the space to work out its own conceptual and methodological preoccupations without confounding interference from other views, a utopian spirit envisages an ultimate coming together, a more comprehensive realization of the synthetic approach to animal cognition that is this book's theme.
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Kamil, A. C. (1998). On the Proper Definition of Cognitive Ethology. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 1–28). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary The last 20-30 years have seen two `scientific revolutions' in the study of animal behavior: the cognitive revolution that originated in psychology, and the Darwinian, behavioral ecology revolution that originated in biology. Among psychologists, the cognitive revolution has had enormous impact. Similarly, among biologists, the Darwinian revolution has had enormous impact. The major theme of this chapter is that these two scientific research programs need to be combined into a single approach, simultaneously cognitive and Darwinian, and that this single approach is most appropriately called cognitive ethology.
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Griffin, D. R. (1998). From cognition to consciousness. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 3–16.
Abstract: This paper proposes an extension of scientific horizons in the study of animal behavior and cognition to include conscious experiences. From this perspective animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects. A major adaptive function of their central nervous systems may be simple, but conscious and rational, thinking about alternative actions and choosing those the animal believes will get what it wants, or avoid what it dislikes or fears. Versatile adjustment of behavior in response to unpredictable challenges provides strongly suggestive evidence of simple but conscious thinking. And especially significant objective data about animal thoughts and feelings are already available, once communicative signals are recognized as evidence of the subjective experiences they often convey to others. The scientific investigation of human consciousness has undergone a renaissance in the 1990s, as exemplified by numerous symposia, books and two new journals. The neural correlates of cognition appear to be basically similar in all central nervous systems. Therefore other species equipped with very similar neurons, synapses, and glia may well be conscious. Simple perceptual and rational conscious thinking may be at least as important for small animals as for those with large enough brains to store extensive libraries of behavioral rules. Perhaps only in “megabrains” is most of the information processing unconscious.
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Czeschlik, T. (1998). Animal cognition – the phylogeny and ontogeny of cognitive abilities. Anim. Cogn., 1(1), 1–2.
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Westergaard, G. C., Liv, C., Chavanne, T. J., & Suomi, S. J. (1998). Token-mediated tool-use by a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 101–106.
Abstract: This research examined token-mediated tool-use in a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). We conducted five experiments. In experiment 1 we examined the use of plastic color-coded chips to request food, and in experiments 2-5 we examined the use of color-coded chips to request tools. Our subject learned to use chips to request tools following the same general pattern seen in great apes performing analogous tasks, that is, initial discrimination followed by an understanding of the relationship among tokens, tools, and their functions. Our findings are consistent with the view that parallel representational processes underlie the tool-related behavior of capuchins and great apes.
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Astié, A. A., Kacelnik, A., & Reboreda, J. C. (1998). Sexual differences in memory in shiny cowbirds. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 77–82.
Abstract: Avian brood parasites depend on other species, the hosts, to raise their offspring. During the breeding season, parasitic cowbirds (Molothrus sp.) search for potential host nests to which they return for laying a few days after first locating them. Parasitic cowbirds have a larger hippocampus/telencephalon volume than non-parasitic species; this volume is larger in the sex involved in nest searching (females) and it is also larger in the breeding than in the non-breeding season. In nature, female shiny cowbirds Molothrus bonariensis search for nests without the male's assistance. Here we test whether, in association with these neuroanatomical and behavioural differences, shiny cowbirds display sexual differences in a memory task in the laboratory. We used a task consisting of finding food whose location was indicated either by the appearance or the location of a covering disk. Females learnt to retrieve food faster than males when food was associated with appearance cues, but we found no sexual differences when food was associated with a specific location. Our results are consistent with the view that parasitism and its neuroanatomical correlates affect performance in memory tasks, but the effects we found were not in the expected direction, emphasising that the nature of avian hippocampal function and its sexual differences are not yet understood.
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Call, J., Hare, B. A., & Tomasello, M. (1998). Chimpanzee gaze following in an object-choice task. Anim. Cogn., 1(2), 89–99.
Abstract: Many primate species reliably track and follow the visual gaze of conspecifics and humans, even to locations above and behind the subject. However, it is not clear whether primates follow a human's gaze to find hidden food under one of two containers in an object-choice task. In a series of experiments six adult female chimpanzees followed a human's gaze (head and eye direction) to a distal location in space above and behind them, and checked back to the human's face when they did not find anything interesting or unusual. This study also assessed whether these same subjects would also use the human's gaze in an object-choice task with three types of occluders: barriers, tubes, and bowls. Barriers and tubes permitted the experimenter to see their contents (i.e., food) whereas bowls did not. Chimpanzees used the human's gaze direction to choose the tube or barrier containing food but they did not use the human's gaze to decide between bowls. Our findings allowed us to discard both simple orientation and understanding seeing-knowing in others as the explanations for gaze following in chimpanzees. However, they did not allow us to conclusively choose between orientation combined with foraging tendencies and understanding seeing in others. One interesting possibility raised by these results is that studies in which the human cannot see the reward at the time of subject choice may potentially be underestimating chimpanzees' social knowledge.
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