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Manson, J. H. (1994). Male aggression: a cost of female mate choice in Cayo Santiago rhesus macaques. Anim. Behav., 48, 473–475.
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Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis : Methods and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Ballou, J. (1994). Population Biology. In L. Boyd, & C. A. Houpt (Eds.), Przewalski’s horse: The History and Biology of an Endangered Species. Albany: tate University of New York Press.
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Houpt, K. A., & Boyd L. (1994). Social Behaviour. In Boyd L., & K. A. Houpt (Eds.), Przewalski's horse. Albany: State university of New York Press.
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Thun, R., & Schwarz-Porsche, D. (1994). Nebennierenrinde (F.H.Döcke, Ed.). Jena, Stuttgart: Verlag Gustav Fischer.
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Fisher, J., & Hinde, R. A. (1994). The opening of milk bottles by birds. British Birds, (42), 347–357.
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Byrne R.W. (1994). The evolution of intelligence. In P.J.B. Slater and T.R. Halliday (Ed.), Behaviour and Evolution (pp. 223–265). Cambridge,UK: Cambridge University Press.
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Boesch, C. (1994). Cooperative hunting in wild chimpanzees. Anim. Behav., 48(3), 653–667.
Abstract: A model for the evolution of cooperation shows that two conditions are necessary for cooperation to be stable: a hunting success rate that is low for single hunters and increases with group size, and a social mechanism limiting access to meat by non-hunters. Testing this model on TaI chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, showed that (1) it pays for individuals to hunt in groups of three or four rather than alone or in pairs, and (2) cooperation is stable because hunters gain more at these group sizes than cheaters, owing to a meat-sharing pattern in which hunting, dominance and age, in that order, determine how much an individual gets. In addition, hunters provide cheaters (about 45% of the meat eaters) with the surplus they produce during the hunts. Thus, cooperation in Tai male chimpanzees is an evolutionarily stable strategy, and its success allows cheating to be an evolutionarily stable strategy for Tai female chimpanzees. In Gombe chimpanzees, cooperation is not stable, first, because hunting success is very high for single hunters, and second, because no social mechanism exists that limits access to meat by non-hunters. The analysis showed that some assumptions made when discussing cooperation in other social hunters might be wrong. This might downgrade our general perception of the importance of cooperation as an evolutionary cause of sociality.
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Chase, I. D., Bartolomeo, C., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1994). Aggressive interactions and inter-contest interval: how long do winners keep winning? Anim. Behav., 48(2), 393–400.
Abstract: Abstract. Considerable evidence across many taxa demonstrates that prior social experience affects the outcome of subsequent aggressive interactions. Although the 'loser effect', in which an individual losing one encounter is likely to lose the next, is relatively well understood, studies of the 'winner effect', in which winning one encounter increases the probability of winning the next, have produced mixed results. Earlier studies differ concerning whether a winner effect exists, and if it does, how long it lasts. The variation in results, however, may arise from different inter-contest intervals and procedures for selecting contestants employed across previous studies. These methodological differences are addressed through a series of experiments using randomly selected winners and three different inter-contest intervals in the pumpkinseed sunfish, Lepomis gibbosus. The results indicate that a winner effect does in fact exist in pumpkinseed sunfish, but that it only lasts between 15 and 60 min. Based on these results, predictions about the behavioural dynamics of hierarchy formation are discussed, and it is suggested that it may be impossible, in principle, to predict the outcome of dominance interactions between some individuals before they are actually assembled to form a group. Finally, the possible mechanisms underlying the winner effect are explored.
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Avital, E., & Jablonka, E. (1994). Social learning and the evolution of behaviour. Anim. Behav., 48(5), 1195–1199.
Abstract: Abstract. In animals capable of learning from a parent or other individual, socially acquired behaviour can be transmitted through several generations. When the inheritance of variations in such behaviour is independent of genotypic variations, natural selection can operate on an additional level. Direct evolution of behaviour becomes possible, and this may alter the estimates of costs and benefits of behaviour patterns for the individual who transmits them. It is suggested that the effects of maternally transmitted behaviour contribute to the evolution of maternal behavioural strategies, and to the evolution of behaviour associated with male-female conflict.
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