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Matsuzawa, T. (1985). Use of numbers by a chimpanzee. Nature, 315(6014), 57–59.
Abstract: Recent studies have examined linguistic abilities in apes. However, although human mathematical abilities seem to be derived from the same foundation as those in language, we have little evidence for mathematical abilities in apes (but for exceptions see refs 7-10). In the present study, a 5-yr-old female chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), 'Ai', was trained to use Arabic numerals to name the number of items in a display. Ai mastered numerical naming from one to six and was able to name the number, colour and object of 300 types of samples. Although no particular sequence of describing samples was required, the chimpanzee favoured two sequences (colour/object/number and object/colour/number). The present study demonstrates that the chimpanzee was able to describe the three attributes of the sample items and spontaneously organized the 'word order'.
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McGonigle, B. (1985). Can apes learn to count? (Vol. 315).
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Baron-Cohen S, Leslie AM, & Frith U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21, 37.
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Galdikas BMF. (1985). Orangutan sociality at Tanjung Puting. Am. J. Primatol., 9, 101.
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Perner J, & Wimmer H. (1985). “John thinks that Mary thinks that”: attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children. J. Exp. Child Psychol., 39, 437.
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Dalin, G., Magnusson, L. E., & Thafvelin, B. C. (1985). Retrospective study of hindquarter asymmetry in Standardbred trotters and its correlation with performance. Equine Vet. J., 17, 292–296.
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Smuts, B. B. (1985). Sex and Friendship in Baboons.
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Trivers, R. L. (1985). Social Evolution.
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