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Crowell-Davis, S. L., & Houpt, K. A. (1985). Coprophagy by foals: effect of age and possible functions. Equine Vet J, 17(1), 17–19.
Abstract: In colts and fillies observed from birth to 24 weeks old, coprophagy occurred from Weeks 1 to 19. Its frequency was greatest during the first two months. Coprophagy was rarely observed in mares and stallions. Foals usually ate the faeces of their mother but were observed to eat their own and those of a stallion and another unrelated mare. Urination by the foal occurred before, during or after 26 per cent of the coprophagy incidents. It is hypothesised that foals may consume faeces in response to a maternal pheromone which signals the presence of deoxycholic acid or other acids which the foal may be deficient in and which it may require for gut immuno-competence myelination of the nervous system. Such a pheromone may also serve to accelerate growth and sexual maturation. Coprophagy may also provide nutrients and introduce normal bacterial flora to the gut.
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Crowell-Davis, S. L., Houpt, K. A., & Carnevale, J. (1985). Feeding and drinking behavior of mares and foals with free access to pasture and water. J. Anim Sci., 60(4), 883–889.
Abstract: The feeding and drinking behavior of 11 mares and 15 foals living on pasture with free access to water was recorded during 2,340 15-min focal samples taken over 2 yr. Lactating mares on pasture spent about 70% of the day feeding. Foals began feeding on their first day of life. As they grew older, they spent progressively more time feeding, but still spent only 47 +/- 6% of the time feeding by 21 wk of age. Foals fed primarily during the early morning and evening. While grass formed the major proportion of the diet of both foals and mares, they also ate clay, humus, feces, bark, leaves and twigs. Almost all feeding by foals was done while their mothers were feeding. Movement to water sources was frequently, but not invariably, carried out by an entire herd. Frequency (P = .005) but not duration (P greater than .05) of drinking bouts by mares increased as the temperature increased. Frequency was greatest at 30 to 35 C, at which temperature mares drank once every 1.8 h. Frequency of drinking varied with the time of day (P less than .01), being rarest during the early morning (0500 to 0900 h eastern daylight time) and most frequent during the afternoon (1300 to 1700 h). Drinking by foals was very rare. The youngest age at which a foal was observed to drink was 3 wk, and 8 of 15 foals were never observed to drink before weaning.
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Dalin, G., Magnusson, L. E., & Thafvelin, B. C. (1985). Retrospective study of hindquarter asymmetry in Standardbred trotters and its correlation with performance. Equine Vet. J., 17, 292–296.
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Duncan, P. (1985). Time-budgets of Camargue horses III. Environmental influences. Behaviour, 92, 188–208.
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Eisenmann V,. (1985). Quagga. Mammoth Trumpet, 2.
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EISENMANN, V. (1985). Le couagga: un zebre aux origines. La Recherche, 16, 254–256.
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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Forster, H. V., Pan, L. G., Bisgard, G. E., Flynn, C., & Hoffer, R. E. (1985). Changes in breathing when switching from nares to tracheostomy breathing in awake ponies. J Appl Physiol, 59(4), 1214–1221.
Abstract: We assessed the consequences of respiratory unloading associated with tracheostomy breathing (TBr). Three normal and three carotid body-denervated (CBD) ponies were prepared with chronic tracheostomies that at rest reduced physiological dead space (VD) from 483 +/- 60 to 255 +/- 30 ml and lung resistance from 1.5 +/- 0.14 to 0.5 +/- 0.07 cmH2O . l-1 . s. At rest and during steady-state mild-to-heavy exercise arterial PCO2 (PaCO2) was approximately 1 Torr higher during nares breathing (NBr) than during TBr. Pulmonary ventilation and tidal volume (VT) were greater and alveolar ventilation was less during NBr than TBr. Breathing frequency (f) did not differ between NBr and TBr at rest, but f during exercise was greater during TBr than during NBr. These responses did not differ between normal and CBD ponies. We also assessed the consequences of increasing external VD (300 ml) and resistance (R, 0.3 cmH2O . l-1 . s) by breathing through a tube. At rest and during mild exercise tube breathing caused PaCO2 to transiently increase 2-3 Torr, but 3-5 min later PaCO2 usually was within 1 Torr of control. Tube breathing did not cause f to change. When external R was increased 1 cmH2O . l-1 . s by breathing through a conventional air collection system, f did not change at rest, but during exercise f was lower than during unencumbered breathing. These responses did not differ between normal, CBD, and hilar nerve-denervated ponies, and they did not differ when external VD or R were added at either the nares or tracheostomy.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)
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Galdikas BMF. (1985). Orangutan sociality at Tanjung Puting. Am. J. Primatol., 9, 101.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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