Abstract: Although this bookis focusedon the cognitive neuroscience ofhuman social behaviour, an
understandingofsocial cognition in non-human animals is critical for unravellingthe neural basis of
social cognition in humans as well as the selective pressures that have shapedthe evolution ofcomplex
social cognition. Thanks to methodological limitations, we know little about the relationships between
certain biochemical andelectrophysiological properties ofthe human brain andhow theycompute the
behaviour andmental states ofother individuals. Traditional techniques for examiningneural function
in humans, such as event-relatedpotentials (ERP),positron emission tomography(PET),and
functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI),are constrainedbythe fact that subjects are placed
either into an immoveable scanner with a lot ofbackgroundnoise or wiredup with dozens of
electrodes that are sensitive to slight movements. The possibilityofscanningor recordingbrain waves
from two individuals that are physicallyinteractingsociallyis technicallyimpossible at present
(however, see Montague et al, 2002 for a new methodfor simultaneouslyscanningtwo individuals
interactingvia a computer).
The onlywayto understandthe neurocognitive architecture ofhuman social behaviour is to examine
similar social processes in both human andnon-human animal minds andmake comparisons at the
species level. An additional argument is that traditional human socio-cognitive tasks are dependent on
the use ofstories, cartoons andverbal cues andinstructions (Heberlein & Adolphs, this volume)which
themselves will elicit specific neural responses that have to be eliminatedfrom neural responses
specificallyrelatedto mindreading. Therefore, the development ofnon-verbal tasks wouldprovide a
breakthrough for studies in non-linguistic animals, pre-verbal human infants andhuman cognitive
neuroimaging.

Abstract: To what extent can animal behaviour be described as rational? What does it even mean to describe behaviour as rational? This book focuses on one of the major debates in science today – how closely does mental processing in animals resemble mental processing in humans. It addresses the question of whether and to what extent non-human animals are rational, that is, whether any animal behaviour can be regarded as the result of a rational thought processes. It does this with attention to three key questions, which recur throughout the book and which have both empirical and philosophical aspects: What kinds of behavioural tasks can animals successfully perform? What if any mental processes must be postulated to explain their performance at these tasks? What properties must processes have to count as rational? The book is distinctive in pursuing these questions not only in relation to our closest relatives, the primates, whose intelligence usually gets the most attention, but also in relation to birds and dolphins, where striking results are also being obtained. Some chapters focus on a particular species. They describe some of the extraordinary and complex behaviour of these species – using tools in novel ways to solve foraging problems, for example, or behaving in novel ways to solve complex social problems – and ask whether such behaviour should be explained in rational or merely mechanistic terms. Other chapters address more theoretical issues and ask, for example, what it means for behaviour to be rational, and whether rationality can be understood in the absence of language. The book includes many of the world's leading figures doing empirical work on rationality in primates, dolphins, and birds, as well as distinguished philosophers of mind and science. The book includes an editors' introduction which summarises the philosophical and empirical work presented, and draws together the issues discussed by the contributors.

Abstract: It is widely accepted that many species of nonhuman animals appear to engage in transitive inference,
producing appropriate responses to novel pairings of non-adjacent members of an ordered series
without previous experience of these pairings. Some researchers have taken this capability as
providing direct evidence that these animals reason. Others resist such declarations, favouring instead
explanations in terms of associative conditioning. Associative accounts of transitive inference have
been refined in application to a simple 5-element learning task that is the main paradigm for
laboratory investigations of the phenomenon, but it remains unclear how well those accounts
generalise to more information-rich environments such as social hierarchies which may contain scores
of individuals, and where rapid learning is important. The case of transitive inference is an example of
a more general dispute between proponents of associative accounts and advocates of more cognitive
accounts of animal behaviour. Examination of the specific details of transitive inference suggests
some lessons for the wider debate.