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Dugatkin, L. A., & Wilson, D. S. (1994). Choice experiments and cognition: a reply to Lamprecht & Hofer. Anim. Behav., 47(6), 1459–1461.
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Mesterton-Gibbons, M., & Dugatkin, L. A. (1997). Cooperation and the Prisoner's Dilemma: towards testable models of mutualism versus reciprocity. Anim. Behav., 54(3), 551–557.
Abstract: For the purpose of distinguishing between mutualism and reciprocity in nature, recent work on the evolution of cooperation has both oversimplifed and undersimplified the distinction between these two categories of cooperation. This article addresses the resulting issues of model testability, clarifies the role of time and argues that the category of `pseudo-reciprocity' is an unnecessary complication.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Mesterton-Gibbons, M. (1996). Cooperation among unrelated individuals: reciprocal altruism, by-product mutualism and group selection in fishes. Biosystems, 37(1-2), 19–30.
Abstract: Cooperation among unrelated individuals can evolve not only via reciprocal altruism but also via trait-group selection or by-product mutualism (or some combination of all three categories). Therefore the (iterated) prisoner's dilemma is an insufficient paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation. We replace this game by the cooperator's dilemma, which is more versatile because it enables all three categories of cooperative behavior to be examined within the framework of a single theory. Controlled studies of cooperation among fish provide examples of each category of cooperation. Specifically, we describe reciprocal altruism among simultaneous hermaphrodites that swap egg parcels, group-selected cooperation among fish that inspect dangerous predators and by-product mutualism in the cooperative foraging of coral-reef fish.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Hoglund, J. (1995). Delayed breeding and the evolution of mate copying in lekking species. J. Theor. Biol., 174(3), 261–267.
Abstract: Recent experimental evidence indicates that females may copy the mate choice of others. Here, we present a model for the evolution of mate copying strategies in lekking species. In the model, all females (copiers and non-copiers) assess male quality, but a copier's assessment of a male's quality increases after males have mated with other females. The model demonstrates that mate copying is favored when breeding late in the season has a relatively high cost. We hope that our results will spur empirical work quantifying the time constraints associated with breeding, thus allowing more direct tests of the model's predictions.
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Crowley, P. H., Provencher, L., Sloane, S., Dugatkin, L. A., Spohn, B., Rogers, L., et al. (1996). Evolving cooperation: the role of individual recognition. Biosystems, 37(1-2), 49–66.
Abstract: To evaluate the role of individual recognition in the evolution of cooperation, we formulated and analyzed a genetic algorithm model (EvCo) for playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. Strategies compete against each other during each generation, and successful strategies contribute more of their attributes to the next generation. Each strategy is encoded on a `chromosome' that plays the IPD, responding to the sequences of most recent responses by the interacting individuals (chromosomes). The analysis reported in this paper considered different memory capabilities (one to five previous interactions), pairing continuities (pairs of individuals remain together for about one, two, five, or 1000 consecutive interactions), and types of individual recognition (recognition capability was maximal, nil, or allowed to evolve between these limits). Analysis of the results focused on the frequency of mutual cooperation in pairwise interactions (a good indicator of overall success in the IPD) and on the extent to which previous responses by the focal individual and its partner were associated with the partner's identity (individual recognition). Results indicated that a fixed, substantial amount of individual recognition could maintain high levels of mutual cooperation even at low pairing continuities, and a significant but limited capability for individual recognition evolved under selection. Recognition generally increased mutual cooperation more when the recent responses of individuals other than the current partner were ignored. Titrating recognition memory under selection using a fitness cost suggested that memory of the partner's previous responses was more valuable than memory of the focal's previous responses. The dynamics produced to date by EvCo are a step toward understanding the evolution of social networks, for which additional benefits associated with group interactions must be incorporated.
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Lafleur, D. L., Lozano, G. A., & Sclafani, M. (1997). Female mate-choice copying in guppies,Poecilia reticulata: a re-evaluation. Anim. Behav., 54(3), 579–586.
Abstract: It has been argued that intraspecific mate-choice copying can be adaptive under certain conditions. Dugatkin's (1992,Am. Nat.139, 1384-1389) work with guppies,Poecilia reticulataremains the most influential experimental demonstration of this phenomenon. We replicated Dugatkin's work using several choice criteria to ensure that our results were not dependent upon any single method of judging mate choice. We also tested our findings against two null hypotheses of differing stringency. Irrespective of the choice criteria or null hypothesis used, we did not observe any relationship between female mate choice and copying. We conclude that further experimental evidence of female mate-choice copying is required before the existence of this behaviour can be affirmed.
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Czaran, T. (1999). Game theory and evolutionary ecology: Evolutionary Games & Population Dynamics by J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, and Game Theory & Animal Behaviour, edited by L.A. Dugatkin and H.K. Reeve. Trends. Ecol. Evol, 14(6), 246–247.
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Stephens, D. W., Anderson, J. P., & Benson, K. E. (1997). On the spurious occurrence of Tit for Tat in pairs of predator-approaching fish. Anim. Behav., 53(1), 113–131.
Abstract: An experimental analysis of the movements of predator-approaching fish is presented. The experiments evaluated two competing hypotheses. (1) Predator-approaching fish play the game-theoretical strategy Tit for Tat. Alternatively, (2) the movements of predator-approaching fish superficially resemble Tit for Tat, because fish independently orient to a predator and simultaneously attempt to stay close together. Experimental subjects were mosquito fish,Gambusia affinisapproaching a green sunfish,Lepomis cyanellusTwo experiments were performed. Experiment 1 replicated results of Milinski (1987) and Dugatkin (1991), showing thatGambusiacome closer to a visible predator when a mirror is oriented parallel to their direction of travel. Experiment 2 attempted to separate the effects of common orientation and social cohesion in accounting for the frequency of Tit-for-Tat-like motions in pairs of predator-approachingGambusia. Results of experiment 2 suggest that a simple additive combination of the effects of (1) social cohesion in the absence of a visible predator and (2) orientation to a visible predator in the absence of a visible companion can account for the observed frequency of Tit-for-Tat-like motions for pairs of predator-approachingGambusia. It is concluded that predator approach in shoaling fishes is probably a simple by-product mutualism, rather than cooperation maintained by reciprocity in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
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Dugatkin, L. A. (1996). Tit for Tat, by-product mutualism and predator inspection: a reply to Connor. Anim. Behav., 51(2), 455–457.
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Dugatkin, L. A., & Bekoff, M. (2003). Play and the evolution of fairness: a game theory model. Behav. Process., 60(3), 209–214.
Abstract: Bekoff [J. Consci. Stud. 8 (2001) 81] argued that mammalian social play is a useful behavioral phenotype on which to concentrate in order to learn more about the evolution of fairness. Here, we build a game theoretical model designed to formalize some of the ideas laid out by Bekoff, and to examine whether `fair' strategies can in fact be evolutionarily stable. The models we present examine fairness at two different developmental stages during an individual's ontogeny, and hence we create four strategies--fair at time 1/fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, fair at time 1/not fair at time 2, not fair at time 1/fair at time 2. Our results suggest that when considering species where fairness can be expressed during two different developmental stages, acting fairly should be more common than never acting fairly. In addition, when no one strategy was evolutionarily stable, we found that all four strategies we model can coexist at evolutionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an overwhelming database from which to test our model, the general predictions we make have significant implications for the evolution of fairness.
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