Abstract: In the bidirectional control procedure, observers are exposed to a conspecific demonstrator responding to a manipulandum in one of two directions (e.g., left vs. right). This procedure controls for socially mediated effects (the mere presence of a conspecific) and stimulus enhancement (attention drawn to a manipulandum by its movement), and it has the added advantage of being symmetrical (the two different responses are similar in topography). Imitative learning is demonstrated when the observers make the response in the direction that they observed it being made. Recently, however, it has been suggested that when such evidence is found with a predominantly olfactory animal, such as the rat, it may result artifactually from odor cues left on one side of the manipulandum by the demonstrator. In the present experiment, we found that Japanese quail, for which odor cues are not likely to play a role, also showed significant correspondence between the direction in which the demonstrator and the observer push a screen to gain access to reward. Furthermore, control quail that observed the screen move, when the movement of the screen was not produced by the demonstrator, did not show similar correspondence between the direction of screen movement observed and that performed by the observer. Thus, with the appropriate control, the bidirectional procedure appears to be useful for studying imitation in avian species.

Abstract: There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teaching, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations.

Abstract: In general, codes that have been designed to safeguard the welfare of animals emphasize the importance of providing an environment that will ensure good health and a normal physiological and physical state, that is, they emphasize the animals' physical needs. If mental needs are mentioned, they are always relegated to secondary importance. The argument is put forward here that animal welfare is dependent solely on the cognitive needs of the animals concerned. In general, if these cognitive needs are met, they will protect the animals' physical needs. It is contended that in the few cases in which they do not safeguard the physical needs, it does not matter from a welfare point of view. The human example is given of being ill. It is argued that welfare is only adversely affected when a person feels ill, knows that he or she is ill, or even thinks that he or she is ill, all of which processes are cognitive ones. The implications for welfare of animals possessing certain cognitive abilities are discussed. For example, the extent to which animals are aware of their internal state while performing behavior known to be indicative of so-called states of suffering, such as fear, frustration, and pain, will determine how much they are actually suffering. With careful experimentation it may be possible to determine how negative they feel these states to be. Similarly, the extent to which animals think about items or events absent from their immediate environment will determine how frustrated they are in the absence of the real item or event but in the presence of the cognitive representation.

Abstract: A male Grant's Zebra (Equus burchelli boehmi) housed with two mares at the Indianapolis Zoo had a 9-yr history of intermittent aggressive behavior toward mares and other animals. Periods of separation allowed the mares time to heal after sustaining superficial bite wounds. On 26 March 2003, the male (890293) was started on altrenogest at a dosage of 19.8 mg orally once daily to allow reintroduction. The dosage was doubled (40 mg once a day) because of a perceived lack of response. Reintroduction to the mares occurred on 17 May 2003 with no signs of aggression noted. Treatment was reduced to 19.8 mg orally once a day and then discontinued. Altrenogest was restarted at 39.5 mg orally once a day because of the planned introduction of a new mare. There have been no major aggressive displays at this dosage of altrenogest and the dosage has recently been reduced following successful introduction of a new mare.

Abstract: Hungry rats observed a conspecific demonstrator pushing a single manipulandum, a joystick, to the right or to the left for food reward and were then allowed access to the joystick from a different orientation. The effects of right-pushing vs left-pushing observation experience on (1) response acquisition, (2) reversal of a left-right discrimination, and (3) responding in extinction, were examined. Rats that had observed left-pushing made more left responses during acquisition than rats that had observed right-pushing, and rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the direction that had previously been reinforced took longer to reach criterion reversal and made more responses in extinction than rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the opposite direction to that previously reinforced. These results provide evidence that rats are capable of learning a response, or a response-reinforcer contingency, through conspecific observation.