Abstract: Abstract. Cuttlefish can rapidly alter their appearance by using neurally controlled chromatophore organs. This ability may provide a window into their cognitive capacity. We test whether the changes in body pattern that occur during hunting depend on context. If they do, then it may be possible to use these changes to study cephalopod cognition while the animal is engaged in ecologically relevant tasks. We found consistent individual differences in the tendency of cuttlefish to hunt with the first two arms raised. We also found that cuttlefish usually darken their skin after they seize a prey item. This darkening is observed regardless of the identity of the prey (fish, crab, or shrimp), prey context (buried in sand, in a bare tank, or on top of a rock pile), or the presence of a sudden stimulus. The sudden stimulus was created by presenting an overhead model bird to the cuttlefish. The model induced components of the Deimatic Display, which is a form of antipredator behavior, suggesting that the model was perceived as a potential threat. Passing Cloud displays and the Darkening of the arms were significantly reduced after exposure to the model bird. The effect of a potential predator on body pattern expression during hunting suggests it may be possible to use these changes as a sensitive indicator of ecologically relevant learning. N1 -

Abstract: Discrimination and generalization are important elements of cognition in the daily lives of animals. Nectar-feeding bats detect flowers by olfaction and probably vision, but also use echolocation and echo-perception of flowers in immediate target surroundings. The echo received from an interference-rich flower corolla is a function of a bat's own relative position in space. This raises the question how easily a free-flying bat will generalize an echo stimulus from a learning situation to a new spatial context where differences in relative flight approach trajectories may lead to an unfamiliar spectral composition of the self-generated echoes. We trained free-flying Glossophaga soricina in echoacoustic discrimination in a two-alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) paradigm at location A. We then tested at location B for spontaneous transfer of discrimination ability. Bats did not spontaneously transfer the discrimination ability acquired at A to location B. This lack of spontaneous generalization may have been caused by factors of the underlying learning mechanisms. 2-AFC tasks may not be representative of the natural foraging behaviour of flower-visiting bats. In contrast to insect-eating bats that constantly evaluate the environment to detect unpredictable prey, the spatial stability of flowers may allow flower visitors to rely on spatial memory to guide foraging. The 2-AFC task requires the disregard (learned irrelevance) of salient spatial location cues that are different at each new location. In Glossophaga, a conjunction between spatial context and 2-AFC discrimination learning may have inhibited the transfer of learned irrelevance of spatial location in the 2-AFC task to new spatial locations. Alternatively, the bats may have learnt the second discrimination task completely anew, and were faster only because of an acquired learning set. We suggest a dissociation between 2-AFC task acquisition and novel object discrimination learning to resolve the issue.

Abstract: Our genotype is so similar to those of the African apes, and our last common ancestor with them so recent, that it seems impossible that human and non-human cognition should differ qualitatively. But the outputs of human cognition are unique in their limitless creativity and adaptability. Exaption resolves the apparent paradox. Assume that the power to create symbols emerges from stimulus-stimulus linkages and is latent in many animals, and that the structural side of language emerges from the argument structures inherent in the social calculus associated with reciprocal altruism. These adaptations confer the potential for language. However, creating complex messages requires uniquely long-lasting coherence of neural signals, which depends in turn on the large quantities of neurons unique to Homo. The only difference between human and non-human minds is that we can sustain longer and more complex trains of thought. All else (emotions, rational processes, even consciousness) could be exactly the same.

Abstract: Human beings are biologically adapted for culture in ways that other primates are not, as evidenced most clearly by the fact that only human cultural traditions accumulate modifications over historical time (the ratchet effect). The key adaptation is one that enables individuals to understand other individuals as intentional agents like the self. This species-unique form of social cognition emerges in human ontogeny at around 1 year of age as infants begin to engage with other persons in various kinds of joint attentional activities involving gaze following, social referencing, and gestural communication. Young children's joint attentional skills then engender some uniquely powerful forms of cultural learning, enabling the acquisition of language, discourse skills, tool use practices, and many other conventional activities. These novel forms of cultural learning allow human beings to pool their cognitive resources both contemporaneously and over historical time in ways that are unique in the animal kingdom.